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China’s environmental protection efforts are characterized by reactive projects 
targeting specific environmental crises (e.g. devastating floods, dust storm, and emergent 
air pollution) or external stressors (international pressures). While the responsiveness 
may be efficient in solving urgent environmental problems in the short run, the lack of 
careful planning and detailed assessment of environmental impacts pose great challenges 
to these programs’ long-term success. This study examines the implementation of the 
largest ecological restoration program in China, the Sloping Land Conversion Program 
(SLCP). To date, most studies regarding the SLCP have focused on its conservation and 
rural development impacts. While some of the studies praise the SLCP as a big success in 
alleviating environmental problems and offering alternative ways for people to make a 
living, other field studies reveal some implementation failures, including poor targeting, 
interagency conflicts, inefficient funding allocation, and a high tendency for farmers to 
reconvert to cropping after program compensation ceases. Few studies have further 
explored the reasons for these failures. My research fills this gap by examining the 
problematic motivations and behaviors of the three key parties involved in the SLCP: the 
central government, local governments, and individual rural households. The lessons and 
implications generated by this research extend beyond the forestry industry to other 
natural resources management fields. 
The center’s preference to short-term programs has led to many changes in 
forestry policies. The induced uncertainty has distorted land owners’ harvesting decisions 
and has lowered the value of China’s forest output. The study provides an analytical 
xi 
 
framework for assessing these effects. Without compensation, potential loss due to policy 
uncertainty leads to premature harvesting. Government payments may solve this problem 
by covering the immediate losses, but the policy-induced uncertainty may impose 
sizeable losses on other agents in the economy. As the mediating agency in the SLCP, 
local governments have not been properly funded. Due to lack of administrative funding, 
they tend to utilize the most parsimonious approaches in implementing the SLCP. This 
results in inefficient allocation of reforestation quota and lack of post-reforestation 
supports. Both problems may compromise the sustainability of the ecological services 
generated under the SLCP. Local governments also try to solve their funding shortage by 
seeking financial resources both within and outside the SLCP framework. However, none 
of the existing funding mechanisms explored by local governments would provide perfect 
solutions to the local deficit.  
Further assessment and planning work are necessary for designing proper 
incentives for local participation in the SLCP. Rural residents are the core agents in 
implementing the SLCP. They take a general positive attitude towards the reforestation 
efforts under the SLCP, and show a high willingness to be involved in the program. 
However, their willingness could not be tempered by their concern about economic losses 
in the SLCP. Majority of the farmers surveyed in my study think government 
compensation is necessary if they are required to give up the right to crop on steep-
sloping lands. Overall, the study suggests that motivational deficiencies with the three 
key players are the major cause of implementation failures of the SLCP, and significant 





China’s Reforestation Policy and Its Institutional Failures: An 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the past thirty years, China’s per capita income (measured by GDP, gross 
domestic production) has increased more than fifty-fold, and as a result hundreds of 
millions of people have been lifted out of poverty (World Bank, 2013). However, rapid 
industrialization, urbanization, and agricultural intensification have imposed great 
pressures upon the country’s already degraded environment and scant natural resources. 
The overwhelming majority of China’s city dwellers are breathing air that is considered 
“hazardous” by European Union standards (World Bank, 2007). At the beginning of 2013, 
Beijing’s air pollution index soared to unprecedented levels (The Economist, 2013).  
It is not just the air. China holds the fourth largest fresh-water resources in the 
world (following Brazil, Russia, and Canada), but two-thirds of its cities are suffering 
from severe water shortages, because most of the water resources, including major river 
basins, great lakes, coastal zones, and ground water, have been badly polluted by lightly- 
regulated industry (Ma, 2004). Soil erosion and desertification are also threatening China. 
Official reports estimate that 2,500 km
2
 of land turns to desert each year (Chen, 2009). 
China is in the midst of several environmental crises.  
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Environmental degradation is a common issue that most countries face during 
periods of growth and development. Economic structures, technological disadvantages, 
political systems, governance capacities, public awareness, and social participation all 
affect the forms and extent of environmental degradation in any given country. In China, 
the biggest problems are likely the result of the country’s strategy of prioritizing 
economic development and its weak political institutions for addressing environmental 
issues (Chen, 2009).  
Although there are many uncritical analyses of China’s environmental governance 
system, this study provides in-depth analysis of three striking problems that may impede 
effective environmental protection in China: (1) frequent environmental policy changes 
and their associated uncertainty; (2) weak capacity of local environmental protection 
agencies; and (3) environmental attitudes among the general public, especially rural 
residents. While these problems may be common in many sub-fields of environmental 
protection, I take the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) as a case study, 
considering its massive scale, pervasive influence, and institutional complexity. The 
discussion here is not intended to provide a comprehensive solution to China’s failures in 
environmental protection, but it does aim to generate some convincing explanations for 
these failures and suggest avenues for potential action. 
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the whole dissertation. It first provides 
critical descriptions of China’s environmental and forestry governance institutions 
(Section 1.2), as well as China’s major approaches to governing national forest resources 
(Section 1.3). Next, the chapter introduces the SLCP as a Payment for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) program to illustrate how forest projects are implemented in China 
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(Section 1.4). Section 1.5 introduces the structure of the rest of the dissertation, 
specifying how subsequent chapters will address each environmental governance 
problem.  
1.2 Environmental and forestry governance institutions in China 
Generally speaking, China’s political system is characterized by a multi-layered 
and multi-sectional structure (tiao-kuai jiegou). Vertically, there are five basic territorial 
divisions at the central (zhongyang), provincial (sheng), municipal (shi), county (xian), 
and township (xiang) levels. Horizontally, a government consists of functional units that 
are in charge of various issues, such as foreign affairs, finance, international trade, 
education, and environmental protection.  
1.2.1 Environmental governance institutions 
At the central level, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) holds the 
principal power and responsibility to deal with environmental issues, but the authority of 
environmental protection is actually shared among many other ministries and 
commissions, as shown in Figure 1-1 (Chen, 2009). When international cooperation is 
involved in environmental protection, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may play a leading 
role in signing international environmental agreements. Similarly, the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) may significantly influence implementation of environmental policies, as 
it is the source of most environmental funding. The Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) 
and the Ministry of House and Urban-Rural Development address issues concerning 
water resource protection and municipal water management, respectively. Since energy is 
so closely related to economic development, the National Development and Reform 
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Commission (NDRC) has long incorporated energy supply and consumption under its 
jurisdiction.  
Over the course of the past three decades, the national scheme of prioritizing 
development has often entailed the marginalization of the MEP’s policy priorities.  Other 
units, like the MOF and the NDRC, have even been granted much stronger authority than 
the MEP in implementing environmental policies, especially when the environmental 
goals conflict with high profile economic goals. For example, in 2007, the MEP’s 
predecessor, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) proposed 
adopting Euro III standards to curb automobile emissions. The NDRC rejected the 
proposal on the grounds that incompatible fuel would damage the new engines and 
impede the development of China’s emerging automobile industry (Sina, 2007). 
Ironically, toxic automobile emissions are now considered to be the primary cause of 
rampant air pollution in most Chinese cities.  
The relationship between the MEP and the State Forestry Administration is more 
complex, and somewhat confusing. Although the function of forest management has been 
generally considered as part of environmental protection, it is not merged into the 
responsibility of the MEP, but placed under the jurisdiction of a separate government 
body, the SFA (State Forestry Administration)1. The SFA is a commission under the 
direct leadership of the State Council. As specified in its commission, this agency 
replicates the MEP’s functions in management of natural forest resources and forestry 
industry. However, the boundary between the MEP and the SFA’s function is not that 
                                                             




clear-cut in practice. For example, the MEP may intervene with natural reserve 
management with the authority of guiding, coordinating, and monitoring natural 
restoration projects. Conversely, the SFA may also involve itself into biodiversity 
protection activities, which has been designated as a function of the MEP. It seems that 
environmental government functions are not allocated in a transparent and strict way, but 
the allocation follows some latent rules (Zhou & Grumbine, 2011). Sometimes, the SFA 
coordinates its forestry policy with the MEP, sometimes it also competes with the MEP 
for the limited administrative resources. For example, in early 2013, the SFA initiated the 
Green GDP Accounting Program, which has traditionally been considered as a task of the 
MEP (Zhang, 2013).   
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Like other functional units in charge of domestic affairs, the MEP has local 
agencies through the vertical chain. As shown in Figure 1-2, a typical local 
environmental protection agency (Environmental Protection Bureau, EPB) is under the 
jurisdiction of two higher-level authorities, its parent unit and the local government. 
While the parent unit supervises local EPBs’ activities, coordinates EPBs in different 
regions, and directs policy implementation, the local government enjoys greater voice in 
local EPBs’ routine administration, as it provides annual budgetary funding and 
determines EPB officials’ career promotions (Jahiel, 1998). There are potential conflicts 
between the vertical and the horizontal lines of authorities (Lieberthal, 1997). As 
economic growth has been prioritized at the central level, GDP growth has been used as a 
major criterion to determine local officials’ administrative performance and their career 
promotion. Thus, local officials have been turned into entrepreneurial promoters of local 
economic prosperity (Jahiel, 1997), who tend to subordinate long-term, diffuse, and 
controversial goals of environmental protection in favor of local economic development 
and its more immediate and obvious benefits. Some local officials even consider 
pollution to be a necessary cost of economic development and expect to see an inverse 
trend of environmental protection and improvement once average incomes exceed a 
certain level. The theory of the Environmental Kuznets Curve might fairly ground their 




Figure 1-2. Environmental Governance Sandwich: MEP, Local EPBs, and Local 
Governments 
Overall, sustaining economic growth is more important than sustaining the 
environment in China’s environmental governance system. This incentive deficit also 
weakens the effectiveness of environmental legal system. Nominally, China has a 
complicated and comprehensive system of environmental protection legislation that 
consists of a basic environmental protection law, twenty-four special laws, and countless 
local environmental legislation and decrees (Beyer, 2006). However, most of the laws 
were written hastily and lack precision and procedural specificity. They provide little 
guidance on implementation. In addition, some provisions were set with little economic 
reasoning. For example, for a long time, the maximum fine for illegal pollutant discharge 
was kept at the level of RMB 100,000, much lower than the marginal benefits of 
pollution and the marginal cost of cleanup (Jahiel, 1997). Moreover, unlike the Western 
judiciary system, which acts as an independent power, courts in China are under the 
leadership of local governments and their law practices are subject to local 
administrations’ biases towards economic growth (Edmonds, 1998). As Jahiel (1997) 
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argues, few owners of polluting firms believe environmental laws can be strictly enforced. 
Instead, they seek to avoid costly compliance with environmental standards by 
maintaining a dominant role in the local economy or by maintaining strong relationships 
with local officials. 
Table 1-1. Major Environmental Laws in China 
 
The Title of Law Year 
Marine Environmental Protection Law 1982 
Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution 1984 
Grassland Law 1985 
Forestry Law 1985 
Fisheries Law 1986 
Mineral Resources Law 1986 
Land Administration Law 1986 
Water Law 1988 
Law on the Protection of Wildlife 1988 
Law on Water and Soil Conservation 1991 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution 1995 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste 1995 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Pollution from Environmental Noise 1996 
Law on Conserving Energy 1997 
Law on Desert Prevention and Transformation  2001 
Law on the Administrative of Sea Area 2001 
Law on the Promotion of Clean Production 2002 
Law on the Environmental Impact Assessment 2002 
Law on Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control 2003 
Law on the Protection of Oceanic Environment 2004 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Pollution from Solid Waste 2005 
Law on the Promotion of Recycling Economy 2008 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution 2008 
Environmental Information Disclosure Decree 2008 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
In short, China’s environmental protection efforts are suppressed by its economic 
development ambitions and the government apparatus’ lack of authority and enforcement 
power over environmental policy. These factors have been identified as significant causes 
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for repeated and massive environmental crises in China. As it faces these crises, China 
has seen a sharp increase in environmental concern among its general public, as well as a 
rise in environmental petitions and movements (Zhang, 2009). National statistics show 
that 58,678 cases of environmental complaints were filed to the xinfang2 offices in 1995. 
In 2006, this number had increased more than ten-fold to 616,122. In the same period, the 
number of social movements with an appeal for pollution control or environmental 
restoration increased at an annual rate of 29%. In 2005 alone, over 50,000 environmental 
disputes were recorded national-wide (Zhang, 2009). In conjunction with increasing 
environmental awareness, most media platforms also stress the topics of environmental  
Table 1-2. Major Environmental Movements 2005-2009 
Year Location Short description 
2005 Wuxiu, 
Henan 
Serious lead contamination caused large-scale student relocation and a 
violent protest against the lead factory and local government 
2005 Dongyang, 
Zhejiang 
To fight against the serious chemical pollution discharged from 13 chemical 
plants in the local industrial park, senior village residents gathered together 
to block the transportation of raw materials to these plants   
2005 Shaoxing, 
Zhejiang 
After long-term suffering from water and air pollution and an explosion of 
fatal chemicals, 15,000  village protestors conducted a containment action 
and  encirclement attack on a local pharmaceutical factory, which was 
blamed as the major causes of such contaminants  
2005 Huzhou, 
Zhejiang 
Containment action and  encirclement attacks on some battery firms took 
place due to their lead contamination 
2007 Qiugang, 
Anhui 




Illegal exploitation of a coal mine produced unbearable noise and destroyed 
local geologic structure. Local villagers clashed with some gang boys who 
were believed to be hired by the mine owner 
2008 Dinghai, 
Zhejiang 
Protest held by thousands of people against poisonous gas pollution  
2009 Linxian, 
Shanxi 
Protests caused by the unequal distribution of the cost and benefits of local 
coal exploitation 
Source: summarized by the author from web and television news 
                                                             
2
 Xinfang is a special institutional mechanism in China that serves as the last resort for people to express 
their grievances, if the ruling of the administration and the courts cannot solve a dispute. People can file 
their complaints to officials in Xinfang offices, which are established in the upper level governments.  
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protection and sustainable development, and China’s civil society has shown a growing 
enthusiasm about greening the environment. Hence, by 2007, there were about 3,000 
active grassroots environmental groups in China, including formally registered civil 
organizations and informal groups (Larson, 2008).   
 
Domestic environmental concerns, accompanied by pressures from the 
international community, have forced China to prioritize environmental issues on its 
government agenda. In 1998 and 2008, it successively upgraded the environmental 
government organ, then called the NEPA (National Environmental Protection Agency), 
to the SEPA, a commission directly under the State Council with semi-ministerial status, 
and then the MEP, an organ of full ministry status. China’s top leaders, including 
President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, as well as former President Hu Jintao and 
Premier Wen Jiabao, have repeatedly and publicly stressed the Chinese government’s 
commitment to environmental protection and its willingness to fund future protection 
initiatives. The government’s investment in environmental protection has increased from 
$224 billion during the 11
th
 five-year plan3 (2006-2010) to $454 billion during the 12
th
 
five-year plan (2011-2015) (Global Water Intelligence, 2010). Nonetheless, despite this 
increased focus on environmental protection in the government’s system, China’s 
environmental governance structures and institutions have rarely been improved. Thus, 
major problems and challenges remain.  
 
                                                             
3 The institution of five-year plan (wunian jihua) is inherited from the pre-1978 planned economy in China. 
In order to more accurately reflect China's transition from a planned economy to a market economy, the 
term of “plan” was changed to “guideline” (guihua) in 2006. Regardless of the name change, this scheme is 




Figure 1-3. A Model of China’s Environmental Governance Dilemma Highlighting the 
Three Key Stakeholders 
The model shown in Figure 1-3 summarizes the dilemma of China’s 
environmental governance. At the central level, the MEP lacks the authority to back up 
environmental policy enforcement, especially when it is in conlfict with other high 
priority national goals. At the local level, environmental benefits tend to be marginalized 
due to a lack of coordination between local EPBs, as well as between EPBs and other 
government bodies. The central and local deficits make China’s environmental 
governance weak, which in turn leads to severe environmental problems.  
In response to environmental crises, China often launches environmental 
campaigns, which are defined as temporary short-term initiatives that mobilize extra-
ordinary administrative resources, energy, and attention to achieve a specific and 
measurable goal (or goals) (Guo & Foster, 2008). This approach has been used 
consistently at both the local and national levels, including such initiatives as the ‘three 
rivers and three lakes campaign’ aimed at cleaning up the Liao, Huai, and Hai rivers, and 
Tai, Chao, and Dianchi lakes since 1997; the ten-year logging ban campaign, begun in 
1998, in response to the disastrous flood in the Yangtze River; and Beijing’s air clean-up 
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campaign designed to address the International Olympic Committee’s concerns about air 
quality for the 2008 Olympics (Rich et al., 2012). While these problem-oriented measures 
or projects may be efficient in addressing specific environmental concerns in the short 
run, the campaign strategy often fails to change the incentive structure and the behavior 
patterns of stakeholders over the long term. 
The tiao-kuai division or central-local conflicts, the prioritizing of development, 
the lack of rule of law, and the induced equilibrium of interests adverse to environmental 
protection remain as major obstacles to significant improvements. Reactive campaigns 
only operate on the surface of the established structures and cannot break down the 
vicious cycle of environmental degradation, as shown in the model. In addition, the 
strategy of targeted campaigns poses great challenges for building formal and credible 
environmental governance institutions in the long run. As environmental protection is 
affected by the frequent and sporadic campaign-style projects, the credibility of 
environmental laws and regulations is diminished. Worse still, as the MEP devotes its 
time and efforts to designing short-term plans, it tends to overlook the importance of 
long-term environmental policies. Short-term projects entail creating temporary 
implementation agencies that have little dedication to long-term environmental benefits 
(Guo and Foster, 2008). In addition, following the MEP’s focus on specific 
environmental problems, the general public may accordingly focus on the specific 
negative consequences of specific problems, rather than on the bigger picture of 
environment degradation.  
In order to address these dilemmas, it is essential to clarify the incentives and 
constraints of three key stakeholders in China’s environmental policy-making and 
13 
 
implementation process, as highlighted in Figure 1-3: the central government, the local 
governments, and individual citizens. How does the central government balance the long-
term stability and short-term effectiveness of a policy? How does the policy uncertainty 
affect local agents’ conservation behaviors? How do local governments balance the goals 
of economic development and environmental protection? What are the impacts of the 
conflicting interests on local ecological conservation? As to individual citizens, what are 
their attitudes towards the environment? This last question is especially important with 
regard to rural residents, since most environmental projects today are located in rural 
areas and employ farmers as their core implementing agents. To address these questions, 
this study uses the SLCP as an example and analyzes the incentives of the three key 
stakeholders, the central State Forestry Administration, local forestry bureaus, and 
individual farmers, in forestry governance.  
1.2.2  Forestry governance institutions 
In China, two separate but closely related government sectors—the MEP and the 
SFA—are in charge of environmental and forestry governance. In the early stages of the 
People’s Republic of China, forestry management was more important than 
environmental protection, and this fact was reflected in China’s policy framework. The 
Ministry of Forestry was established in 1951 to be responsible for the overall protection 
of forests, reforestation of key areas, and rational use and exploitation of forests. In light 
of the great importance of forest products in the national economy, a separate Ministry of 
Forest Industry was founded in 1956, though it merged with the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry two years later. In 1979, the ministry was split up again, and the Ministry of 
Forestry was reestablished as an independent executive section at ministry tier until 1998.  
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In contrast, during this two decade period, environmental protection was only a 
marginalized function of the Ministry of Construction.  The turning point came in 1998. 
This was the year in which China encountered serious environmental disasters. In that 
year, the SEPA became a ministry level unit, a change that ensured it an independent 
budget that was doubled. The change also expanded SEPA’s jurisdiction to include some 
functions that had been under the control of other ministries or administrations. For 
example, SEPA took over responsibilities for biodiversity, natural reserves, and wetland 
protection, as well as for desertification control from the Ministry of Forestry.4 
Concomitantly, the Ministry of Forestry lost some of its status, becoming the State 
Forestry Administration and only retaining authority over timber management and 
afforestation projects. These changes in forestry management have been met with fierce 
opposition. As one member of the SFA noted,  
“Ask the premier himself, we don’t know why we were downgraded! Our 
authority has declined; our director general is now only as high as a vice governor 
and that has made our work more difficult. We are responsible to protect forest 
and increase the forest reserves. If we would be abolished and our tasks 
transferred to the Ministry of Land Resources, I assure you, that ministry would 
not have the ability or the resources to protect the forest.” (Ho, 2006) 
Thus, the 1998 administrative reform led to a hampered administration. 
Importantly, however, the SFA still factually keeps its authority over natural forest 
protection, biodiversity preservation and a range of forest-related functions. It also 
engages in afforestation of barren hills and sandy land, although these functions are not 
on its working log (Ho, 2006).  
                                                             
4
 Along with rising environmental concern, in 2008, the SEPA was promoted from an “Organization 
Directly under the State Council” to an “Organ Composing the State Council” and re-titled as the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP). 
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Much like the MEP’s institutional dilemma, the SFA suffers from horizontal and 
vertical conflicts in China’s government system. At the central level, the SFA has 
marginal authority over national forests and implementing uniform policies, especially 
when those policies affect strong economic sectors, such as energy, transportation and 
communications (Liu, 2001). Administrative authority over forest lands is fragmented 
among the SFA, the Ministry of Land Resources, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs. While 
forest permits are issued by the forestry departments, land permits are issued by the land 
administration. Permit allocation and management are often not coordinated between the 
two apparatuses, and therefore their permits can contain different, often contradictory, 
stipulations regarding use and ownership rights (Ho, 2006). Further complications arise 
when the boundaries of a forest crosses provincial lines, requiring the involvement of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs for the formal delimitation of the plot. In addition, forest 
management is further fragmented, because the SFA requires assistance from the MOF 
(funding support), the NDRC (auditing), and the Western Development Office of the 
State Council (project coordination, if the forestry area falls within the office’s 
geographical jurisdiction). 
In addition to the connection and conflicts with other central government bodies, 
the SFA per se also struggles with its dual function of overseeing forestry governance 
(linzheng) and the forest industry (linye). While the former represents a government 
function of resource conservation, the latter assumes more of an industrial approach to 
resource exploitation and use. It is difficult to balance the two goals, especially within 
one management agency (Ross, 1988). Due to the status of forests as sources of valuable 
timber and valuable ecosystems, the forest industry has long been subject to direct 
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government management, and has not been part of the independent market sector. In 
recent years, China has initiated a new round of forestry reforms, encouraging the 
development of forest firms, but the majority of its forest resources are still managed 
through the government and subject to heavy regulation (Wang et al, 2007).  
 
Figure 1-4. Coordination and Competition between SFA and Other Functional Units 
 At the local level, forestry governance also tends to be influenced by local 
interests in economic concerns, which creates the same challenges as discussed earlier in 
the case of environmental protection. Local forestry bureaus obtain most of their funding 
from local governments, although in recent years they have also received extra funding 















Ministry of Civil Affairs; 
Provincial Governments 
Forest Project Funding Ministry of Finance 
Forest Project Auditing 
National Development 







In addition to forestry bureaus, the SFA has more diverse local agencies than the 
MEP, including 35 national forest parks, 42 state forest farms, 67 natural reserves, over 
6,000 forestry police stations, and about 37,000 forestry work stations. These agencies 
oversee various tasks in protecting, managing, operating, and monitoring forests. For 
example, state forest farms are set up to manage plantations, and they execute almost all 
production activities within assigned geographic jurisdictions. All farms are under the 
direct leadership of provincial, municipal, or county governments and report to local 
forest bureaus. The bureaus control local forest farms and wood processing facilities, 
both of which report to provincial governments for personnel and planning, but are 
subject to the forest management guidelines of the SFA (Hyde et al, 2003). Slightly 
different from other governmental agencies, state forest farms also face the problems of 
large state-owned-enterprises, including aging infrastructure, outdated management 
systems, and high costs in providing social services (housing, health care, and insurance) 
to their employees. With these burdens, forest farms tend to over-exploit forests under 
their charge to increase their revenue. Field evidence suggests that most over-harvesting 
and poor logging practices are being carried out by large-scale, state-owned timber 
enterprises, rather than in community or private forests (Xu et al., 2004). In addition, 
historically, the authority of state forest farms has often been challenged by the local 
populace, especially because state ownership sometimes originated through the state’s 
seizure of landlords’ woodlots and temples, and sometimes was closely intermixed with 
collective forests. In such cases, the local populace often regarded state ownership as 
unjust and was likely to express long-standing grievances whenever state power 
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weakened. The state dealt with such opposition with severe sanctions, which have proven 
inefficient in actual application (Ross, 1988).  
While these traditional bodies are common and essential in any forest governance 
system, they are incapable of resolving the contradictions between the diverse functions 
of forest ecosystems and the multiple needs of the various stakeholders, the major 
challenge for forest management in contemporary China. In response to that challenge, 
new institutions are emerging at the community level. These institutions are based on 
traditional institutions. Villagers are encouraged to make their own rules to regulate their 
community resources. However, the applicability of the new institutions is restricted by 
two factors. First, some village assemblies may be ineffective in monitoring their leaders, 
as the leaders can easily manipulate the assemblies. Second, the village leader selection 
process is often poorly executed due to illiteracy and cultural barriers.  
These institutional problems in environmental and forestry governance systems, 
as represented by multi-sectoral and multi-layered conflicts, will be analyzed with a case 
study of the Sloping Land Conversion Program, which was initiated as a strategic 
response to the devastating floods and droughts in the Yangtze River and Yellow River 
Basins in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The Program represents an environmental 
campaign, which lacked thorough planning and involves great policy uncertainty. Second, 
local forestry bureaus serve as indispensable liaisons between the SFA and individual 
rural households carrying out the SLCP, and the SLCP implementation entails various 
central-local conflicts that will be addressed in the following section. Third, the program 
directly engages millions of rural farmers as core implementation agents. Thus, farmers’ 
environmental attitudes, as well as their willingness to participate in the reforestation 
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program, are of great importance. Finally, because the project has been active for over ten 
years, it offers a unique opportunity for policy analysis. 
1.3 Forestry policy in China and the Sloping Land Conversion Project (SLPC) 
 1.3.1 Forestry policy in China 
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, the forests 
covered 8.6 % of the country’s 960 million ha of lands. However, the new administration 
launched a rapid industrialization policy, which depended on natural resource extraction. 
In the Great Leap Forward campaign (1958-1960), households were encouraged to use 
their homemade furnaces to make steel; these highly inefficient furnaces had to be fueled, 
and people were encouraged to harvest forests for that purpose. Accordingly, the forestry 
sector’s primary goal in the planned economy was to increase timber supply to support 
the country’s ambitious industrialization project. The basic forestry policy during this 
period was to promote large-scale tree planting to expand timber supply, with little 
concern for forest protection (Ministry of Forestry, 1986). Between 1949 and1979, over 
one billion cubic meters of timber were produced nationwide, but the results of tree-
planting were dismal: of 104 million ha planted, only 20% of the trees survived. “The 
pre-reform period was characterized by rhetoric-laden campaigns aimed at mass 
mobilization for tree planting, and by unsustainable timber harvest in primary forest areas” 
(Richardson, 2000).  
Along with Deng’s opening-up economic reform in 1978, China’s forestry sector 
also experienced a radical transformation. The policy focus shifted from the single goal 
of timber output to three equally important objectives: increasing timber supply by 
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commercial investment, enhancing the role of forests in ecological rehabilitation and 
environmental protection, and promoting rural well-being and poverty reduction through 
agroforestry. China’s mid- and long-term objectives became to maintain the ecological 
stability and site productivity of forest plantations, and develop afforestation techniques 
for wastelands, deserted industrial sites and deserted land in arid and semi-arid areas 
(Wang et al., 2004). Basically, the SFA has three policy tools in managing national forest 
resources: forest tenure arrangement, forest market control, and forestry projects. 
Because of the diverse geographic and social situations in China, any effort to 
manage forests under a uniform tenure framework is unlikely to succeed. For example, 
China once tried to decentralize the rights of forest management to individual households 
to capture the potential efficiency gains. However, some of the forests were returned to 
collective management due to the prohibitively high operational costs to manage small 
and non-contiguous plots (Liu, 2001). This has legitimized a diversified forest tenure 
arrangement in China. If forest tenure is defined based on land ownership, China’s forests 
are either state property (42%) or collective property (58%) (Wang et al, 2004). Under 
these two main regimes, more complex tenure arrangements exist, such as share-holding 
systems and collective management. Most state-owned forests are natural forests, mainly 
situated in the Northeast and the Southwest. They occupy about 62 million hectares 
(Hyde et al., 2003). As conservation has become a major concern in natural forests, most 
state-owned forests are now left idle and governed by natural forces. 
 Collective forests are those managed by village/township collective economic 
organizations or other entities or individuals who are engaged in cultivation, protection 
and utilization of forest resources on rural collective land (Miao et al., 2004). About 80% 
21 
 
of collective forests are operated by individual households (Hyde et al, 2003). 
Households’ and communities’ ability to benefit from collective forests has varied across 
different forms of collective management (Liu and Edmunds, 2003).  
        During Mao’s era, the government believed that collectivization would unleash the 
productivity power of the masses, and result in production efficiency. Thus, China’s rural 
sectors experienced an ambitious collectivization process during 1951-1956. In a second 
stage of that process, collectives increased from 30-40 households per unit to 300-400 per 
unit. This collectivization campaign was fueled by the state’s subsidies in financial 
credits, production tools, seeds, and other inputs. 
        Affected by the 1978 land-tenure reform in the agriculture system, the forest sector 
also adopted the household production responsibility system (HRS). Rural households 
were encouraged to take over the reforestation of bare land. Farmers would turn over part 
of the benefit from the plantation to the collective and reap the other part of the benefits. 
This policy was quite welcomed by farmers as it provided new opportunities to get access 
to timber and secure additional land for tree planting and intercropping (Wang et al, 
2004). However, adoption of HRS in the forest sector differed significantly in northern 
and southern China. In southern provinces, local forestry bureaus and governments 
traditionally had strong control over the collective forests. They were reluctant to adopt 
the HRS, arguing that transferring management to individual households would induce 
excessive logging. Thus, until 1984, 70% of the region’s forests remained under 
collective control. This trend was eventually reversed through grassroots rural 
communities’ objections, and by the end of 1986, over 70% of forests had been allocated 
to households.  
22 
 
Table 1-3. Contemporary Tenure and Management Arrangements for Non-State Forests 
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Source: Intercept from Liu, D. (2001). Tenure and management of non-state forests in China since 1950: a 
historical review. Environmental History, 239-263. 
In contrast, northern China was traditionally a farm region, and forestry was a less 
important sector. HRS adoption in this area encountered little resistance (Yin & Newman, 
1997; Yin et al, 2003). By the mid-1980s, the majority of collectively-owned woodlots 
had been handed over to farmers. In some areas, tenure of usufructuary rights of forests 
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was extended to up to 99 years and declared inheritable. This change has been recognized 
as a crucial driver in China’s forestry reforms (Richardson, 1990, 1994; Yin, 1994, 1995; 
Liu, 2001; Lu et al., 2002). 
However, at lower levels of government, the disputes over rights of collective 
forests have never been settled. When management was devolved to individual 
households, village governments asserted their rights by emphasizing the significance of 
economy of scale and local rights equality. When township or village governments took 
over management authority, their control was challenged by grassroots communities, 
many of which had traditional control over the land, or county governments, which had to 
consider the general goal of decentralization of the collective forests. In many situations, 
compromises were reached between individual and collective control, as reflected by the 
sub-groups listed in Table 1-3.  
In view of the struggles between the concerns for production efficiency and 
economy of scale, a unique player, professional forestry enterprises, has emerged along 
with the forestry reform in early 1980s (Xu et al., 2005). Compared to farmers, forestry 
enterprises possess expertise in tree species selection, trees-raising, forest regulations, 
and forest products marketing. They may also have the social capital to facilitate 
communication with forestry officials. With these advantages, forestry enterprises now 
often acquire the management rights of forests by contracting with individual rural 
households, thus taking over operation of collective forests. The functions of forestry 
enterprises may also be undertaken by farmers’ own cooperatives, when a third party 
forest company is not welcome. For example, farmers in cooperation in Sanming, Fujian 
manage their forests with the principle of “wu tong yi fen”, which is signing contracts 
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collectively, planning collectively, planting collectively, managing the forest collectively, 
applying harvest quotas collectively, but making harvest decisions individually (Song et 
al., 2004).  
In forest management, what matters is not only the tenure arrangement per se, but 
also the stability of the tenure (Yin & Newman, 1997; Liu, 2001). However, forest tenure 
in China can be everything but stable. For more than sixty years, the tenure of non-state 
forests in China has oscillated between regimes of private and common property. There 
have been at least four radical transitions, with no property-rights regime lasting more 
than twenty years. Before 1955, most non-state forests were privately owned. In 1955, 
however, the socialist campaign terminated the private property regime. Forests became 
common property. After 26 years of inefficient forest operations that led to limited 
growth in plantation volume and destruction of natural forests, the forestry department 
modified this collective regime. In 1981, the department implemented a household 
responsibility system. Under this system, non-state forest lands were still collectively 
owned, but rural households were entitled to usufructuary rights over timber and non-
timber forest products from their land. This privatization, however, led to immediate 
overharvesting during 1981–1982 and was again terminated only four years after it 
commenced (Liu 2001). For the next seventeen years, a relatively stable common 
property regime dominated the non-state forest sector. But a new round of privatization 
reform was initiated in 2003 (Xu et al. 2008).   
In addition to the property rights arrangements, the state also keeps close market 
control over the price and quantity of forest products. In the pre-reform planned economy, 
the price of timber and other forest products were intentionally kept low to support 
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industry development. Between 1980 and 1985, the prices of a small proportion of forest 
products were liberalized. Full liberalization occurred in 1985, when timber was allowed 
to be sold at a negotiated market price (Zhu et al., 2004). In contrast to price, the control 
over quantity of timber permitted in forest markets has never been relaxed, even after the 
Reform and Open Door Policy was implemented in 1978. Nevertheless, in view of the 
depletion of forest resources, a harvest quota system was put into trial use in 1979, and 
formally implemented in 1987 (Yin & Newman, 1997). Theoretically, such a system 
guards against over-consumption of forest resources and balances short term and long 
term benefits of forest use. In this system, all wood producing units, including state forest 
farms, collective forest communities, and county forestry bureaus (representing 
individual households) are required to submit requests for quotas of annual allowable cut 
(AAC). The AAC is determined every five years, and compiled each year from county 
forestry bureaus to municipal, provincial bureaus, and then to the SFA. After receiving 
the compiled requests, the SFA assigns harvest quotas all the way back down to the 
county level (as shown in Figure 1-5) (Xie, 2009). Quota compiling and allocation are 
both regulated by strict procedures.  These harvesting quotas come with permits for 
shipping, processing, and marketing wood products.  
Restrictions on forest harvesting put in place in 1998 have aggravated the large 
gap between demand and supply of timber and other forest products. On the one hand, 
this gap is mainly filled by imports. China is now a major importer of many primary 
forest products in the international market, including logs, swan wood, and wood pulp 
(Démurger et al., 2009). On the other hand, the demand-supply gap stimulates illegal 
logging and above-quota production in China. As estimated by the SFA, during the 
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period of the sixth forest inventory (1998-2003), the average above-quota harvest was 
75.54 million m
3
 per year, compared to an average quota production of 47.42 million m
3
 
(Xiong, 2004; Zhu, 2004). This gap indicates a clear problem with the effectiveness of 
forest governance.  
 
 
Figure 1-5. The Path for Requesting and Assigning AAC 
In addition to price and quantity control, China’s forest sector is also subject to 
heavy taxes and fees. There are four kinds of general taxes that farmers pay (value-added 
tax, education value-added tax, urban construction and maintenance tax, and income tax), 
four kinds of SFA charges (afforestation fee, maintenance and upgrade fee, forest 
protection and construction fee, and forest quarantine fee), and four kinds of provincial 
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charges (forest restoration fee, insect and disease control fee, fire protection fee, and 
administration fee) that can be imposed on forest production (Liu & Landell-Mills, 2003). 
In addition, many unauthorized charges may be levied by agencies under the provincial 
level. The steep charges can make forestry an unprofitable industry in China. For 
example, in Sanming Fujian, Yin and Newman (1997) documented that government 
taxation on the average price of mason pine logs (372.69 yuan/m
3
) amounted to 22.9%; 
the forestry bureau took 25.7%; the local government took 7.2%, and timber companies 
charged 13.3% in procurement and sales costs. Farmers received the remaining 30.9% to 
cover their harvest costs and save as their incomes.   
Tenure management and forest market control are two primary approaches China 
used and uses to manage its forest resources. In recent years, a third way has emerged. 
China has initiated several large projects that contain a significant share of national forest 
resources. The six major ones are listed in Table 1-4. These projects together have 
produced an average of one million ha of trees planted each year (FAO, 2004). While 
some of them, as indicated by their names, focus on specific regions or environmental 
purposes, others have a broader reach.  












Key Shelterbelt Development Program 1978 9.5 N.A. 
Sloping Land Conversion Program 1999 29.0 40.00 
Natural Forest Protection Program 2000 98.0 5.60 
Beijing and Tianjin Sandstorm Source Control Program 2000 7.6 8.21 
Wildlife Conservation and Nature Reserve Development Program 2001 172.8 19.95 
Fast-Growing High-Yield Plantation Development Program 2002 1.8 0.10 
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 Two of the projects, the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP) and the 
Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP), have often been cited as evidence of China’s 
contribution to global ecological restoration. They are among the biggest ecological 
programs in the world, in terms of “their ambitious goals, massive scales, huge payments, 
and potentially enormous impacts” (Liu et al., 2008). Through conservation and 
restoration of forests under these programs, China has successfully increased its forest 
coverage from 13.9% in early 1990s to 18% in 2003 (Song & Zhang 2010, Xu et al., 
2004). In the following sections of the chapter, I will use the SLCP as an example to 
illustrate how forest restoration projects are implemented in China.    
1.3.2  The SLCP as a PES program  
In 1997 and 1998, devastating floods and droughts successively hit the two most 
important water systems in China, the Yangtze River and the Yellow River basins. Many 
scientists believed that the hydrological disasters were caused by excessive deforestation 
and  soil erosion in the upper and middle reaches of the two rivers (Zheng, 2006). 
Accordingly, they proposed the SLCP, a watershed vegetation restoration program, as a 
solution. This program was approved by the central government in 1999. 
During the pilot phase (1999-2001), the project was implemented in the provinces 
of Shaanxi and Gansu, located at the middle and upper reaches of the Yellow River, 
respectively, and the province of Sichuan, located at the upper reaches of the Yangtze 
River. The project’s primary goal was to “reduce soil erosion and desertification and 
increase China’s forest cover by retiring steeply sloping and marginal land from 
agricultural production” (Bennett, 2008). After the initial phase, the SLCP expanded very 
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quickly in terms of the area of the enrolled land and the number of the participating 
households (Figure 1-6). By the end of the pilot period, the program was being 
implemented in about 27,000 villages across 400 counties in 20 provinces. In 2005, a 
total of about 9 million ha of cropland in 25 provinces had been enrolled (Bennett, 2008). 
Accordingly, the central government expanded the environmental services targeted under 
the SLCP, including timber value, forest rehabilitation, and landscape restoration. In 
addition, the SFA explicitly stated that the SLCP would also aim to help with poverty 
reduction in remote regions with high proportions of sloping and degraded land (SFA, 
2003).  
With a budget of more than $72 billion and involving millions of rural households 
as core agents, the SLCP is one of the most influential ecological projects in China, and 
globally (Bennett, 2008). Multiple government agencies are involved in the program. 
While the SFA and local forestry bureaus take the primary responsibility for project 
implementation, annual reforestation plans are subject to auditing by the NDRC, program 
funding is provided by the MOF, erosion treatment in the program is under the 
supervision of the MWR, and project coordination is the responsibility of the Western 
Development Office of the State Council (SFA, 2003). In addition, except for the two 
stated goals, it is generally believed that the fast expansion of the SLCP and its high grain 
subsidy ratio resulted from the central government’s hidden aim of subsidizing the State 
Grain Bureau (SGB) and reducing the national grain stockpiles (Bennett, 2008). By the 
end of 2003, the SLCP payment helped reduce the SGB’s stock by 24.55 million tons, 





Figure 1-6 A. SLCP Coverage 1999-2000 
 




Figure 1-6 C. SLCP Coverage 2002 and Forward 
Figure 1-6. Geographic Expansion of the SLCP 
In contrast to other ecological and environmental programs that rely on 
command-and-control approaches, the SLCP represents an important shift. It is the first 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) program in China. The central government pays 
rural households to retire their steeply-sloping crop lands and plant trees on it. The 
payments are adapted to two regional regimes, including 1) 2250 kg and 1500 kg of grain 
(as of 2004, this payment has been switched out for the cash equivalent of 3150 Yuan and 
2100 Yuan, where 1USD=6.27 Yuan) for every hectare of enrolled cropland in the 
Yangtze River Basin and in the Yellow River Basin, respectively; 2) a cash subsidy of 
300 Yuan/ha; and 3) free seeds or seedlings, provided to farmers at the beginning of the 
planting period (Chen et al, 2009). Thus, the SLCP is also referred to as the Grain for 
Green Program (GGP). In addition, the subsidies take three different lengths: eight years 
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if ecological forests are planted, five years if economic forests are planted, and two years 
if grasses are planted.5 These payments are on average quite generous, even compared to 
PES compensation standards in wealthier countries. In monetary terms, SLCP 
compensation in the Yellow River and Yangtze River basins respectively are around 2.6 
and 3.7 times the average rental payments of the US Conservation Reserve Program. 
While the SLCP contains a public payment scheme that directly engages millions of rural 
households, it has been criticized for the top-down, simplified contract structure and lack 
of respect of the principles of volunteerism, which differentiate it from a pure market 
mechanism (Wang et al., 2007). Thus, it is useful to examine the program’s design, 
implementation, and outcomes against the framework of PES.  
 
Figure 1-7. PES Mechanism in the SLCP 
 
                                                             
5 In SFA’s system, ecological forests refer to timber-producing forests, and economic forests refer to 
orchard crops or trees with medicinal value.  
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A. PES as a market mechanism 
The provision of ecosystem services (ES) is impeded by the goods’ very nature of 
externality. Externality exists whenever one individual’s well-being is affected by the 
actions of another - whether for better or for worse - without paying or being 
compensated (Mankiw, 2011). Taking forest operation as an example, forest owners incur 
all costs and acquire the benefits from timber and non-timber forest products. In the 
meantime, maintaining forest cover also induces other ES flows, such as water regulation 
and climate stabilization, which benefits downstream water users and society on the 
whole. Thus, the social benefits of maintaining forest cover exceed the private benefits 
accruing to forest owners. As shown in Figure 1-8, social marginal benefits of extending 
forest cover are higher than private marginal benefits. Given that marginal cost is a stable 
increasing function of forest area, externality would lead to undersupply of the forest ES 
(Q0<Q*).  
In reality, most ES suffer from the problem of supply shortage and ineffective 
functioning of the market to maximize social utility. The recent Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MA, 2003; 2005) revealed that nearly two thirds of global ES6 are in decline. 
PES was introduced as a mechanism to solve this problem by translating external non-
market values of ES into real financial incentives for ecosystem stewards to expand 
provision of them. In other words, the PES corrects market failures by extending the 
scope of the market from tangible products, such as food and timber, to some intangible 
but valuable goods, such as water filtration, aesthetic benefits, and soil formation. As 
                                                             
6 The ES accounted by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment include provisioning services such as food, 
water, timber, and fiber; regulating services that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; 
cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such as 
soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling (MA, 2005, p. 9). 
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shown in Figure 1-8, the payments transferred from service users to suppliers help raise 
the private marginal benefits line towards the social marginal benefit line and reduce the 
gap between Q0 and Q*. When compensation fully covers the difference between private 
and social marginal benefits, the market mechanism  roots out social inefficiency and 
motivate ecosystem managers to extend conservation efforts to the socially optimal level 
(Q*). Compared to traditional command-and-control approaches, the market-based PES 
mechanism is expected to achieve the same compensation goals with much higher 
efficiency.  
 
Figure 1-8. External Benefit of Forest Operation7 
Wunder (2005; 2008) defined the PES as “(1) voluntary transaction where (2) a 
well-defined ES (or corresponding land use) is (3) being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) 
                                                             
7 Q0 is the equilibrium supply determined by rational profit-maximizing forest owners who do not take into 
account the benefits not accruing to them. Q* is the socially optimal supply. As shown in the figure, Q0<Q*. 
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ES buyer (4) from a (minimum one) ES provider (5) if and only if ES provision is 
secured (conditionality).” While this definition ideally reflects PES principles, it sets up a 
system of criteria that is too narrow to include most payment schemes. Within the Center 
for International Forestry Research’s (CIFOR) list of 287 such cases, there are no more 
than a couple dozen experiences globally that fit all five criteria (Wunder, 2008). Most 
recorded programs, including the SLCP, are PES-like initiatives (Landell-Mills & Porras, 
2002). However it is still useful to compare a PES program against Wunder’s definition, 
as this comparison helps evaluate the extent to which the program truly represents the 
underlying PES principles, as well as the potential to improve efficiency.     
Applying Wunder’s criteria, China’s reforestation efforts specifically target soil 
and water conservation in the Yangtze and Yellow River Basin (criterion 2). The central 
government, representing direct service beneficiaries, (criterion 3) pays millions of rural 
households (criterion 4) to retire their crop land, with a stated principle of volunteerism 
(criterion 1). However, this principle has been seriously violated and the participation 
recruitment in the SLCP adopts a de facto top-down approach.  
As officially instructed by the SFA, assignment of reforestation quotas should be 
realized in this way: at the beginning of each year, reforestation quotas are distributed 
from the SFA to the provinces, followed by subsequent distribution to counties. County 
forestry bureaus further select participating townships and villages. Such an assignment 
process is heavily influenced by China’s structure of local government, since only 
households in participating villages are able to enter the program (Zuo, 2001). In each 
participating village, farmers willing to participate should apply for reforestation quotas 
from village governments or SLCP offices, and the application should be publically 
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announced to the whole village assembly. Once the applications are accepted, farmers 
should sign reforestation contracts (as shown in Appendix III) with local governments, 
and their reforestation activities are subject to guidance and monitoring (SFA, 2003).  
However, the state voluntary rule has been repetitively violated. According to a 
2003 household and village-level survey conducted by the Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences (referred to as 2003 CAS survey in 
the following sections), only 43% of participants indicated that villagers had been 
consulted by higher level authorities regarding program design and implementation 
before their village started the SLCP. Furthermore, only 53% of surveyed households felt 
that they could choose whether or not to participate (61.7% of the participants and only 
25.9% of non-participants). Only 36% said they could choose what kinds of trees to plant 
on their enrolled land. And only 34.5% and 29.9% of participant households respectively 
felt that they could choose which areas and decide which plots to retire (Bennett, 2008).  
Because of the lack of choice, SLCP has not realized the potential efficiency gains 
promised by the PES market mechanism over traditional command-and-control 
approaches. Various cases under the SLCP have been recorded in which net incomes 
from reforested land were below previous crop incomes (Wang et al., 2007).  
Moreover, due to the lack of local enforcement capacity, the reforestation 
initiative under the SLCP has been loosely monitored (criterion 5). Like most functional 
government units in China, local forestry bureaus receive budgetary funding from local 
governments, which covers only their routine administrative costs, not the administrative 
fees to support an ambitious project, like the SLCP. In a 2005 survey, village 
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governments reported that they spent on average 112 worker-days implementing SLCP, 
or an average of 6 worker-days per hectare of enrolled land in the village. The significant 
administrative burdens were not covered in the SLCP plan. This shortage of funding 
resulted in backlogs in inspection and certification (Zuo, 2001; Xu and Cao, 2001). There 
were cases where participating plots were not inspected on time, or not inspected at all 
after they had entered the SLCP (Xu et al., 2004). Yet, payments were made in good faith 
or out of consideration for poverty reduction, which further impaired the efficiency of the 
SLCP as a PES program.  
B. Services and actors 
While ecosystems provide a wide variety of benefits, four types of ES are most 
amenable to the PES approach. They are carbon sequestration and storage, biodiversity 
protection, landscape beauty, and watershed protection (Wunder, 2005; Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005). Since most of these services are derived from forest ecosystems, forest 
conservation and restoration has been a dominant theme in most PES programs. With the 
PES approach, landholders are able to capture more of the values of ES than would be 
possible in the absence of this mechanism (Pagiola et al., 2005). However, it should be 
noted that PES might not be able to fully correct the market failure of externality, as there 
are still some forest ES that have not been commercialized, such as air purification and 
microclimate stabilization.  
While the aforementioned ES are core benefits desired in PES programs, they 
have been rarely monitored through direct approaches, since direct monitoring of ES 
outputs is prohibitively expensive. Instead, most PES schemes use proxies of actions or 
outcomes (e.g., the presence of buffer strips or the amount of forest cover) which are easy 
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to measure and relate to the level of benefits provided (Jack et al., 2008). However, 
selecting appropriate proxies relating to forest ES, such as biodiversity and watershed 
protection, is not that easy.  
This is another problem embedded in China’s SLCP. As stated in the official 
documents, water services (i.e. reducing soil erosion and desertification) in the upper and 
middle reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow River basins are the main focus of the 
program, and other forest ES and landscape restoration are also important targets. The 
SFA linked soil erosion to intensive farming on sloping land and required that land in 
ecologically sensitive areas or with slopes greater than 25 degrees be retired from crop-
planting and transferred into forests. In other words, the SLCP uses the area of reforested 
land as a proxy to measure the ES. Program compliance has been defined in terms of the 
quality, type and survival rates of the trees planted on the enrolled land. Such proxy 
selection is based on the assumption that tree-planting on sloping and fragile land can 
control soil erosion and land degradation, and further reduce the frequency and severity 
of floods and droughts. However, these linkages are not universally true (FAO-CIFOR, 
2005). For example, under the SLCP, planting rubber trees was encouraged in the 
Xishuangbanna prefecture of China’s Yunnan Province, as it counted as reforestation. 
However, the industrial plantation has not necessarily benefited the environment (Butler, 
2009). In addition, most reforestation sites under the SLCP take the form of single or few 
species plantations. Homogenization not only decreases the overall landscape 
biodiversity, but also makes the tree farms prone to fire and other natural disasters and 
aggregates the risks of future soil erosion and floods (Weyerhaeuser et al., 2005).  
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The nature of the demand side of a PES program also matters, as the value of ES 
depends not only on their nature and magnitude, but also on the users’ willingness to pay 
for them. Scherr et al. (2004) categorized ES buyers into four types: (1) public sector 
buyers that seek to protect the public good of ES on behalf of their constituencies, (2) 
private sector buyers under regulatory obligation who are mandated to offset their 
environmental impacts by law, (3) private sector buyers acting voluntarily, mainly due to 
the incentive to maintain a green brand image, and (4) consumers of eco-certified 
products who are motivated by both use and non-use values. Accordingly, PES programs 
can be divided into “government-financed” program, if purchase decisions are made by 
the first type of buyers, and “user-financed” programs, if purchase decisions are made by 
the latter three types of buyers (Engel et al., 2008). The public sector is the largest 
purchaser of ES. Most PES programs have been financed by the government, or an 
international institution, that acts on behalf of service users (FAO, 2004). The SLCP 
program definitely falls into this category, as 92% of its funds are provided by China’s 
national government and managed by the MOF (Tallis et al., 2008; Bennett, 2008).  
Compared to user-financed programs, government-financed programs tend to be 
less efficient, as the buyers, (1) have incomplete information about the service value, (2) 
cannot observe directly whether the service is being delivered, and (3) are less sensitive 
about service targeting, based on either benefits, costs, or the ratio between them (Pagiola 
& Platais, 2007). As a government-financed program, the SLCP exemplifies all three 
problems. The value of ES generated under the program has never been comprehensively 
evaluated. Project monitoring is incomplete and sometimes omitted. The most striking 
aspect is the lack of flexibility in the compensation scheme. Although payments in the 
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SLCP are on average quite generous,8 there are only two regional regimes and three 
subsidy lengths as detailed above. Influenced by the rigid stipulations, many cases have 
been reported in which net incomes on reforested land were substantially above or below 
previous crop incomes, indicating problematic compensation allocation (Wang et al., 
2007; Uchida et al., 2005). Even facing the inefficiency, the actual ES payers in the 
SLCP, i.e. China’s tax payers, cannot withdraw from the program, since tax-payment is 
secured by law.  
While there are many reasons to expect government-financed programs to be less 
efficient, in many instances they are the only option, as is the case with the SLCP. The 
SLCP’s initial plan focused on water services in the Yangtze and Yellow River Basins, 
large regions that host a total of over 40% of Chinese population (Shi, 2013; Li et al., 
2010). In subsequent years, as the scale and goals of the SLCP quickly expanded (i.e. 
targeting landscape restoration and sand control in over wider areas of the country), the 
project influenced a much larger population. As the number of beneficiaries of the SLCP 
increases, the ES generated by the SLCP become public goods. It is difficult to identify 
and delimit users, and everyone has strong incentives to free-ride on others. In this case, 
government involvement is the only way the proposed reforestation efforts can be 
materialized. Government can overcome the free-riding problem by charging every tax-
payer, although not all of them equally benefit from the SLCP (Bennett, 2008; Engel et 
al., 2008; Tallis et al., 2008; Jack et al., 2008). In addition, the buyer-side monopoly 
power helps reduce transaction costs, as coordination and agreement among buyers are 
not necessary (Kemes et al., 2010). According to the Coasian theorem, when transaction 
                                                             
8 The compensation payments in the SLCP are higher on per hectare basis, even compared to the in the US 
(Uchida et al., 2007). 
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costs are low, bargaining between the buyers and sellers of ES will lead to an efficient 
outcome regardless of the distribution of initial property rights (Coase, 1960).  
The next key aspect of a PES program is the supply side. In most ongoing PES 
programs, the sellers are a group of actors who are in a position to safeguard the delivery 
of ES, such as the upstream landowners in Costa Rica’s National Forestry Financing 
Fund (FONAFIFO) program, coffee producers in Mexico’s Shade-Grown Coffee 
program, and private sector investors in the carbon cap-and-trade programs (Pagiola et al., 
2002). Except for these private actors, national and local governments may also be 
landholders in the position to receive PES if they change the land use for ecological 
purposes. In practice, because many stakeholders are involved in and affected by land use 
decision-making, it is not easy to precisely target the potential sellers of ES. For example, 
logging in state forests may also affect the livelihoods of local communities who claim 
use rights of these forests. And the claims may even overlap between communities. Who 
should be compensated in this case, the actors with de jure land rights or the actors with 
de facto rights?  
Both, as Wunder asserts (2005). He argues that a PES program should 
compensate the ones with “credible site-specific claims” and the “right to exclude others 
to use the land.” Since the SLCP clearly targets rural households with the use rights of 
sloping cropland, and the distribution of use rights among rural households is relatively 
clear-cut, the complexity of selecting service sellers does not matter too much in the 
SLCP’s implementation. What does affect the SLCP’s implementation efficiency is the 
large number of agents involved and the associated high transaction costs. Jack et al. 
(2008) argue that when the number of agents is small, contracting and monitoring are 
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cheaper. Conversely, all else being equal, if contracts have to be signed with a critical 
mass of decision makers, the costs associated with implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement will be extremely high. However, the significant transaction costs have been 
completely ignored in the SLCP stipulations, which dictated that local forestry bureaus 
serve as the key mediators between the SFA and rural households and carry out these 
implementation tasks on their own budget. In response to this unreasonable stipulation, 
local forestry bureaus tend to (1) minimize their efforts in program implementation and 
(2) recoup the administrative cost via interception or retention of the compensation 
payments. 
C. Market institutions in a PES program 
As a social institution, no matter whether it is developed from scratch or built on 
pre-existing arrangements, a market mechanism of PES cannot emerge from an 
institutional vacuum, (Engel et al., 2008). For example, the PSA program in Costa Rica, a 
world model PES program, has directly benefited from the country’s Forest Credit 
Certificate policy, which provided a system of payments for reforestation and forest 
management, even before the PSA program was created (Pagiola, 2008). Prior to the 
SLCP, China gained a large amount of eco-engineering experiences through other 
forestry programs, including the Natural Forest Protection Program, the Key Shelterbelt 
Development Program, the Beijing and Tianjin Sandstorm Source Control Program, the 
Wildlife Conservation and Nature Reserve Development Program, and the Fast-Growing 
High-Yield Plantation Development Program (Xu et al., 2006; SFA, 2005; Zhu et al., 
2004). As summarized by Jack et al. (2008), the policy outcome of a PES program is 
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partially determined by the interactions between its policy design and the environmental, 
socio-economic, and political contexts in which it is implemented (Figure 1-9). 
 
Figure 1-9. Context Interactions with PES Policy Design (Source: Jack et al., 2008) 
Since most PES are payments to particular land uses,  an appropriate land 
property rights regime is the most essential contextual institution (Farley & Costanza, 
2010; Pagiola et al., 2005). Clearly established private property rights could definitely 
lubricate PES program implementation. In other cases, propertied, but not privatized, 
rights also work, like common property asset trusts. Either way, land tenure has to be 
secure. The importance of stable property rights has been well established in case studies 
of Mozambique, Uganda, and Malawi. The three sub-Saharan countries all implemented 
Plan Vivo9 community-based forest PES projects at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. In 
                                                             
9 Plan Vivo is a standard that places a particular focus on the delivery of socio-economic co-benefits in 
conjunction with carbon storage service in forests. The principal criterion for participating in a Plan Vivo 
project is clear ownership or recognized user rights of land, either as an individual or formal user group. 
Projects are coordinated by a project coordinating body (PCB) that works closely with local government 
authorities to support project objectives. The PCB typically has a team of field staff responsible for training 
and capacity building, community engagement and leading carbon-monitoring activities. Carbon credits are 
monetized as compensation for the costs of altering land-management practices and provide money prior to 
the delivery of additional economic benefits from trees, such as from fruit harvests, non-timber forest 
products and/or increased crop yields owing to improved soil fertility (Dougill et al., 2012). 
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Mozambique, project communities had no way of proving formal long-term rights over 
land. Instead, customary use rights were used as the basis of project participation. This 
involved a protracted process of identifying individual landowners and seeking formal 
and informal legal evidence for land ownership. This process was mired in difficulties 
that significantly affected project implementation. In contrast, the Uganda and Malawi 
projects had much clearer customary rights over land, and similar PES programs were 
carried out smoothly in the two countries (Dougill et al., 2009).  
 
 
Figure 1-10. Factors Concerning Rural Participants of the SLCP 
The importance of secure land tenure is of particular importance when a PES 
program requires long-term investments and efforts, like reforestation under the SLCP 
(Pagiola et al., 2005). However, China’s forest tenure can be anything but certain, as 
discussed in section 1.3.1. The survey data I collected during my field work shows that 

































Figure 1-10, of the 216 farmer respondents 63 (29.2%) were concerned with land tenure 
security and 31 (14.4%) with forest property rights. 
While secure property rights and economic incentives are the key elements in a 
PES program, on their own they are unlikely to transform local cultural, ethical, and 
behavioral traits towards environmental stewardship and citizenship, which may also be 
important for promoting a PES program (Turner & Daily, 2008). For example, in 
Mexico’s Scolel Té project, buyers of carbon sequestration credits appeared to be 
motivated by their personal, ethical concerns and public relations objectives. Such 
motives may help overcome defects in emerging market-based mechanisms, such as the 
limited understanding of forest-hydrological links (Pagiola et al., 2002). Equally 
important are the regulatory and political frameworks under which a PES is implemented.  
Without the Kyoto Protocol, the European emission trading system (ETS) and the clean 
development programs (CDM) would never have emerged. In contrast, the introduction 
of some PES schemes were blocked as politically powerful actors did not want to bear 
the potential costs or share the potential benefits, as in the case of some proposed 
watershed protection programs in Bolivia (Pagiola et al., 2002; Asquith et al., 2008).  
Formal and informal local institutions also take on considerable importance for 
the implementation of PES programs, especially the ones based in rural communities. 
These institutions are needed to identify project participants, channel benefits to local 
communities, facilitate communication between multiple levels of actors, and secure 
behavior change (Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003; Dougill et al., 2003). For example, without the 
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social capital embedded in local institutions, Sukhomajri’s10 erosion problem could not 
have been solved and the FONAG (The Fund for the Protection of Water, Ecuador) 
program could not have secured sufficient funding from local government, national park 
authorities, non-government agencies, and water user groups (Pagiola, et al., 2002).  
Parallel with these contextual institutions are the design characteristics of a PES 
program, including how it measures ecological gains, how it determines payments, and 
how it channels payments from ES buyers to sellers. As mentioned earlier, most PES 
programs adopt an area-based scheme, in which contracts stipulate land-use caps for a 
pre-agreed number of land units (Wunder, 2005). When the stipulation involves land use 
changes, it requires much higher costs compared to the cases when programs only focus 
on retaining existing land uses or taking land out of production (Engel, 2008; Wunder et 
al., 2008). For example, since reforestation is required under the SLCP, it pays not only 
cash and grain compensation but also free seedlings at the beginning of each cultivation 
cycle. While the land-based approach simplifies program monitoring, it allows little 
flexibility in methods for achieving environmental objectives. Alternatively, the PES 
approach may bring in adaptive institutions, in which participants are allowed to freely 
choose among a variety of conservation ways to optimize economic or ecological benefits, 
or balance between them (Jack et al., 2008). Resilience induced from such flexibility 
would make great sense as enormous uncertainties are embedded within ES provision and 
the magnitude of their benefits (Farley & Costanza, 2010).  
                                                             
10 Sukhomajri is a small village located in the northern Indian state of Haryana. One of its lakes, the Sukhna 
Lake was threatened by gradual siltation. In 1974, a project was organized to install soil conservation 
structures and restrict animal grazing in the lake’s watershed. This project won general support from local 
residents as it compensated them with the environmental services of protecting the hillside in the Sukhna 
Lake watershed (Kerr, 2002).   
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Once the measurements of ES are properly set up, a PES program should specify 
its compliance criterion. Ideally, compensation payments should be proportional to 
qualified land use or land use change, or ES supply. However, such strict conditionality 
has rarely been observed in practice. In small user-financed programs, conditionality may 
be limited by monitoring capacity. In large government-financed programs, it may be 
limited by an apparent unwillingness to penalize non-compliant participants, who may be 
politically powerful or poor (Wunder et al., 2008). Too-poor-to-penalize is one of the 
obstacles for the SLCP’s implementation. As the program has explicitly set poverty 
reduction as one of its goals, non-compliance or low survival rate of trees in the 
reforestation site have seldom resulted in withdrawal of cash and grain compensation 
(Bennett, 2008). In addition, since the program requires reforestation, compensation of 
tree seedling is front-loaded, which reduces conditionality (Wunder et al., 2008).    
To be cost-effective, the amounts and kinds of compensation in a PES program 
should also be deliberately designed. Theoretically, the payment should be set equal to 
landowners’ WTA a conservation contract, since under-compensation could not change 
their land use behaviors and over-compensation would reduce conservation benefits from 
a given budget. The theoretically optimal payment strategy can be achieved through 
procurement auctions, which are applied in some developed countries’ programs, such as 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the U.S. (Jack et al., 2008). However, 
payments in programs in developing countries are at most moderately differentiated, with 
plot-level customized pricing or several payment categories (Wunder et al., 2008). In the 
SLCP, there are only three subsidy lengths and two regional regimes. Lack of 
differentiation has been criticized as one of the reasons for the program’s inefficiency 
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(Bennett, 2008). Besides the amount of compensation, the kinds of compensation also 
matter. While cash is generally considered a preferable mode of stimulation, in-kind 
payments can be more effective, given that the payments are low (Heyman & Ariely, 
2004). In the least-developed rural communities, cash payment may increase short-term 
spending. In-kind payments are preferred to promote sustainable development and 
poverty reduction. For example, in the watershed protection program in Santa Rosa, 
recipients discussed the possibility of payment in the form of beehives, combined with 
technical training of beekeeping. Using beehives would allow them to create a long-term 
cash flow, whereas cash compensation would be spent right away (Wunder, 2005). 
Although having different kinds of payments may be even harder than having different 
sums of payment, this potential variety is a promising way to promote sustainable 
development in regions affected by conservation programs, and deserves further 
exploration. In the SLCP, technical assistance and professional training are also highly 
desired as large numbers of rural laborers are seeking off-farm employment opportunities 
(Bennett, 2008). 
D. Ecological conservation and poverty reduction 
Two critical dimensions of PES program evaluation concern the extent to which 
they are able to promote conservation and contribute to rural development and poverty 
reduction. As to the first dimension, Wunder and his colleagues (2008) provided a 
framework to evaluate ES supply. It considers how many high-value ES providers are 
enrolled in the program (enrollment), whether they could comply with contract 
requirements (compliance), how much of the provision of ES represents real change of 
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land use from the baseline scenario (additionality), and whether the provision of ES could 
sustain itself in the long run (permanence).  
Checked against this set of criteria, the SLCP is a moderately successful program 
in promoting ecological conservation. Ecologically sensitive areas, defined by the SLCP 
as land with a slope greater than 25 degrees, have been preferentially enrolled in the 
program, either through volunteer or coercive measures (Zuo, 2001). However, since 
contiguous plots have been chosen to minimize local transaction costs, a significant 
portion of high quality low-sloping land has also been enrolled in some regions (Xu, et al., 
2010). Among the reforestation sites enrolled under the SLCP, the degree of compliance 
is highly contextual. The 2003 CAS survey showed that tree survival rates ranged from 
39.4% to 100%,11 with half of them below SLCP standards (Bennett, 2008). Since the 
SLCP’s rigid regime could not accommodate regional variation, the central government 
had to tolerate low survival rates and allow for significant local variation in interpreting 
the program of compliance.  
There is no explicit baseline listed in the SLCP plan, and it is unclear what would 
occur without the program. Scholars’ opinions diverge on this question. Zhang et al., 
(2003) estimated that there at least 1.2 million hectares of forest land was turned into 
cropland between the late 1980s and 2000. In addition, thanks to its fast economic growth, 
increasing off-farm employment opportunities, technical innovation in agriculture, and 
changes in relative prices, China may reach a point where transition from cropland to 
forest would naturally occur (Bennett, 2008). In contrast to this line of opinions, the 2003 
                                                             
11 The data were collected over three rounds of inspection and in 18 townships, including Yanshuiguan, 
Majiahe, Yuji, Yanxia, Jianling, Chigan, Zhigan, Gangou, Lingzhi, Zhangzigou, Tiezhai, Hexi, Datan, 




CAS survey indicated that most farmers would not have retired sloping cropland from 
production without the SLCP. Uchida et al. (2007) and Xu et al. (2010) also provide 
further evidence that SLCP has motivated participants in the sample to shift out of 
cropping.  
None of these measures, however, ensures the permanence of the ecological 
benefits generated under the SLCP. The ability to achieve such sustainability hinges on 
the degree to which the SLCP benefits its participants and prepares them for off-farm 
jobs, such as forestry management or husbandry. However, these sorts of job transfers 
have been rarely observed in the field and many participants expressed the tendency to 
return to crop planting after the rotation periods (SFA, 2003; Wang et al., 2007).  
Recent years have also brought many quantitative evaluations of the program’s 
environmental impacts, and most of them reached positive conclusions. For example, the 
statistics of the SFA suggests that forest cover within the SLCP region has increased by 2% 
during 2000-2007. The program reduces surface runoff and soil erosion, as demonstrated 
by the evidence collected in the provinces of Hunan and Sichuan and some sample 
counties in Hubei (Li et al., 2006; Bao et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007). In addition, the 
SLCP also helps improve soil structure, maintain soil fertility, and lower river sediments. 
In two studies with soil samples collected from the provinces of Shaanxi and Guizhou, 
soil moisture and nutrition are all higher in SLCP plots than those in non-SLCP plots 
(Liang et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2002). Finally, the SLCP contributes to water conservation 
and desertification reduction, as can be illustrated in the case of the Minqin county of 
Gansu Province (Ma & Fan, 2005).  
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However, counter-evidence also exists in other case studies. For example, a GIS 
analysis of soil erosion in Mudanjiang City of Heilongjiang Province shows that soil 
erosion has actually been aggravated in paddy fields, grass lands, and unused lands after 
the SLCP was implemented. Since the trees in the SLCP plots are so young, their soil and 
water conservation capacity is quite limited. In addition, the problem of leakage has 
seriously affected the ecological effectiveness of the SLCP. While land retirement and 
vegetation coverage successfully weakens soil erosion in the middle mountain areas, it 
induces farmland over-exploitation in the plains and makes the land more vulnerable to 
soil erosion. Finally, the erosion control effect of the SLCP is only marginally successful. 
In Mudanjian, while the areas suffering from severe erosion decreased sharply from 
3161.52 km
2
 to 672.38 km
2
 after the SLCP, the very intense erosion areas significantly 
increased from 691.32 km
2
 to 2822.72 km
2 
(Gao et al., 2010). In another evaluation based 
on a field study in Baiwu Township, Yanyuan County, Liangshan Yi Autonomous 
Prefecture in southwestern Sichuan province, Trac et al. (2007) challenged the official 
claims of the SLCP’s success and reported a variety of observed failures, including 
inappropriate species selection, high mortality rates, over-grazing in the reforestation 
sites, and ineffective and cursory monitoring.  
Most of these studies, with either positive or negative conclusions, are based on 
small-scale case studies. Since most study regions do not overlap with each other, it is 
nearly impossible to reject any one of them due to the counter-arguments raised in 
another study. Thus, it is too early to draw a definite conclusion about the SLCP’s 
ecological effectiveness. However, in view of the failures observed in some SLCP 
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regions, it can be inferred that the program at least suffers from implementation deficits 
that need to be revised before more reforestation success can be achieved.  
The other key dimension of a PES program lies in its socioeconomic impacts. 
Since most environmentally sensitive areas tend to coincide with a high concentration of 
poor inhabitants, the role of PES in poverty reduction is of particular interest for ethical 
reasons. Some programs even explicitly stress poverty reduction as a policy goal; these 
include the SLCP, the Rewarding the Upland Poor for Ecosystem Services in Asia, the 
Western Altiplano Natural Resources Management Project in Guatemala, and the 
National Environmental Management Project in El Salvador. A common framework has 
been raised to evaluate the effectiveness of PES on poverty reduction, as shown in Figure 
1-11 (Wunder, 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Milder et al., 2010). 
 















 This framework consists of three layers. The overall benefits of a PES program 
depend on the benefits accrued to its sellers, buyers, and people who do not actively 
participate in but are affected by the program. And the opportunity for the poor stewards 
to be involved as ES sellers further depends on their eligibility, desire, ability, and 
competitiveness to participate. Since most PES programs are based on land use or land 
use change, this land-based eligibility criterion may exclude many landless people who 
tend to be among the poorest of the poor. Those owning land can only be involved when 
their land is of strategic environmental value and that value is demanded by specific 
buyers. Poor, small landholders with environmentally valuable land may still be excluded 
from some PES programs since the programs may require formal land titles or a 
minimum area of participating land (Wunder, 2008; Milder et al., 2010).  
Eligible landholders further need to have their own motivation to participate. 
Profitability is an essential element. Given that PES payments may be lower than the 
opportunity costs from other land operations, land stewards might have little incentive to 
participate, unless they are forced to (Pagiola et al., 2005). In addition, they also need to 
balance the benefits, costs, and risks of participation. In some circumstances, land 
stewards might reject rewarding land use change, this change may increase the risks of 
losing control of the land (Wunder, 2005).  
Even poor land stewards who are eligible and willing to participate in the PES 
might still be excluded for lack of necessary skills, knowledge, and resources to 
implement specific management activities and reliably deliver the targeted ES (Milder et 
al., 2010). Or their participation might be resisted by non-participating neighbors. For 
example, in China’s municipality of Chongqing, serious complaints against the SLCP 
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have been voiced among the non-participating rural households, as tree growing on the 
adjacent SLCP sites takes away most soil nutrients and impedes crop growth on their land.  
Finally, with regards to the poor’s competitiveness in supplying ES, in a specific 
program, the transaction costs for each PES contract negotiation are relatively stable. 
Since the poor tend to hold small plots of land, they are often at competitive disadvantage, 
because the per-unit transaction costs for contracting with them are higher than with large 
landowners.   
If the poor overcome all of these barriers and are successfully recruited in a PES 
program, the next question is whether they are better off because of their participation. 
Assessments of this should consider both income and non-income benefits. Empirical 
evidence shows that gross incomes from many PES or PES-like schemes contribute a 
significant share of participants’ total household income, ranging from 10% to over 80% 
(Miranda et al., 2003; Pagiola et al., 2005). In addition, some PES programs also help 
create short-term employment opportunities and production assets that could generate 
long-term benefits, such as bee-keeping training and beehive transfer in the Bolivian 
watershed protection program (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005).  
However, counter evidence also exists. For example, in the SLCP, some farmers 
were forcefully recruited into the program and have experienced a net loss (Bennett, 
2008). In addition, they cannot secure long-term off-farm jobs as they cannot receive 
proper training from local forestry bureaus, who are embarrassed about administrative 
funding shortage. In short, the direction and magnitude of income effects are specific to 
individual programs and depend on the program’s rules. Beyond that, some non-
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monetary benefits of PES may also be considered, such as land-tenure consolidation, 
increased human and social capital, and higher visibility for attracting external 
investments (Rosa, et al., 2003). 
    PES not only affects the welfare of the poor as ES sellers, but also that of some 
disadvantaged ecosystem users, although they are not necessarily the buyers. Many 
disadvantaged ES users free-ride on others’ payments to receive improved services. For 
example, tropical farmers benefit from the global warming mitigation without actually 
buying any carbon credits. They can free-ride on the developed countries’ payment for 
the ES of carbon sequestration. Similarly, poor urban residents receive clean drinking 
water that may results from a watershed protection program (Wunder, 2008).  In addition, 
PES’ conservation effects on land, labor, and agricultural product markets may generate 
much broader influences over the whole society, which is outside the scope of this review.  
 Specific to the SLCP, there is disagreement among scholars about its impact on 
participants’ household incomes and their non-income welfares. Based on different sets 
of survey data on rural households’ livelihood, both Uchida et al. (2007; 2009) and Liu et 
al. (2008) argue that participation in the SLCP significantly increases rural households’ 
income and shifts their labor endowment from on-farm to off-farm work. Li et al. (2011) 
conducted a similar survey, but in different regions. They confirm the positive impacts of 
the SLCP on rural income, as well as its significant role in mitigating income inequality 
among participating households. However, they do not find any evidence of rural labor 
transfer to non-farming activities.  
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In contrast, other studies find that net income on reforested land can be 
substantially above or below previous crop incomes due to the rigid compensation regime 
of the SLCP (Xu et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2007; Bennett, 2008). As shown in the 2003 
CAS survey, 7%, 49%, and 30% of households in the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, and 
Sichuan, respectively, suffered from net losses after they participated in the SLCP. More 
troubling was the evidence of significant shortfalls in subsidies actually delivered. In the 
2003 CAS survey, 21% of the surveyed participant households complained that slow 
delivery of subsidies was the most significant difficulty they faced in implementing the 
program (SFA, 2004). Similarly in a survey conducted among 1,026 households, about 
50% had received only partial compensation (Xu & Cao, 2001).  
E. Limitation of the PES approach   
It should be noted that the PES approach is not a silver bullet that can solve all 
environmental problems. As Ostrom (2003) suggests, some common-pool resources are 
mismanaged due to improper local property regimes and land stewards’ inert incentives. 
If the PES approach is introduced without necessary institutional capacity, it may 
perversely encourage illegal harvesting, as a way for land users to secure the de facto 
rights over land and qualify for PES. If so, developed community institutions would be a 
pre-condition for PES programs. Or, if the mismanagement of natural resources is caused 
by landholders’ financial constraints that prevent them from adopting profitable 
technologies and practices, then developing microfinance in rural areas would be an 
appropriate response (Engel, 2007). If it is farmers’ misunderstanding or unawareness 
about how the natural system works and how land uses affect ES that lead them to adopt 
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improper usages, education and awareness building are promising approaches (Bulte & 
Engel, 2006).  
In the SLCP, farmers’ lack of awareness of the negative impacts of cropping on 
sloping land may be a possible deterrent for impassioned tree-planting activities. The 
survey data I collected during my 2011 field work showed that over one quarter of rural 
respondents still thought planting crops was the best way of dealing with hillsides in 
China, and more than one third of the respondents would choose to plant wild flowers on 
the sloping land if they could. 
 
Figure 1-12. The Proposed Best Way of Dealing with Hillsides in China 
On the other hand, when the PES approach is used to direct natural resource 
management, its potential negative effects should also be carefully considered. An 
editorial article in the Journal of Conservation Biology (2009) listed seven problems 
caused by recognizing ecological benefits under the framework of ES: (1) adoption of 











ecological brittleness, (3) a serious mismatch between the scales of ES and the 
institutions to realize them, (4) a potential mismatch between the ecological value of ES 
and their prices in the PES market, (5) the tendency to stabilize ES that would weaken 
ecological resilience when movement of species is necessary, (6) the avoidance of 
destructive ecological processes that are vital for ecosystem function, and (7) the PES’ 
market incentives that crowd out moral incentives of conservation. The last problem has 
also been repeatedly discussed by psychologists and behavioral economists (Wunder, 
2005; Farley & Costanza, 2010). They find that when people receive a monetary payment 
for doing something, their motivation for doing it without payment diminishes (Sandel, 
2012; Ariely et al., 2009; Frey and Jegen, 2001). This psychological rule holds in the 
SLCP. Many participating households reconvert their land back to cultivation after the 
program ends (Uchida et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Ye et al., 2003).   
1.4 Policy deficits in the SLCP and dissertation structure  
This examination of policy design and implementation in the SLCP shows that it 
is at most a partially successful environmental program. It suffers from three major policy 
deficits that are summarized as follows. First, policy and forest tenure uncertainty has 
been a major concern for the SLCP participants. In the past sixty years, private forest 
property rights in China have been frequently appropriated and forest land has been 
transferred to common property. Facing the uncertain tenure history, farmers seem to 
overestimate the risk of losing control of their land once the land is transferred to forest 
land. In the meantime, the frequent stipulation revisions and the variant local 
interpretations under the SLCP tend to aggravate farmers’ doubt about the stability of this 
policy, which in turn compromises the enthusiasm and efforts they are willing to devote 
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to the program. Chapter 2 is devoted to address the issue of forestry tenure uncertainty. 
Through modeling the stochastic oscillation in forestry tenure history in the past sixty-
years, it is found that the hidden losses in timber value from uncertainty are huge. 
Compensation should a an effective approach to curb farmers’ negative incentive of 
cutting trees early, as long as the payment is sufficient and on time.  
Second, local forestry bureaus are to blame for the lack of ES targeting, effective 
monitoring, and post-program training. Since a significant amount of gently-sloping land 
is enrolled in the program, less ES can be achieved with a fixed budget. In many cases, 
monitoring and inspection are incomplete, tree survival rates may be low, and payments 
were made in good faith or out of the consideration of poverty reduction, which further 
impaired the funding efficiency of the SLCP. In addition, few local forestry bureaus 
provided professional training programs as promised in the SLCP plan that could prepare 
farmers for off-farm jobs. Without sustainable future income sources, many SLCP 
participants expressed the tendency to return to crop planting after the compensation 
periods end, thus threatening the sustainability of the ES benefits generated under the 
SLCP. Chapter 3 analyzes the failures of local governments in implementing the SLCP. It 
is pointed out that lack of administrative funding results in local governments’ 
parsimonious procedures in allocating reforestation quota and providing supporting 
services in the post-reforestation economy, which further causes the unsustainability 
threats as discussed above. The deficit may be overcome as the central government has 
arranged support funds for developing reforestation auxiliary programs. However, these 
funds, as well as the local fiscal revenue from the new plantation economy, should be 
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wisely used before they help strengthen the sustainability of the ecological benefits 
generated under the SLCP.  
Third, Chinese farmers’ attitudes towards the reforestation efforts and their 
intention to participate in the SLCP also play a key role in shaping the reforestation 
results of the SLCP. As the core agents in implementing this program, farmers should be 
properly incentivized and engaged in the ecological restoration initiative. Based on a 
framework constructed from Fishbein and Ajzen’s Theory of Reasoned Action (TORA), 
Chapter 4 conducts a study to evaluate farmers’ willingness to participate in the SLCP. It 
is shown that Chinese farmers tend to positively evaluate the reforestation efforts under 
the SLCP. The majority of them also express willingness to be involved in the program. 
However, some farmers claim that they have the right to farm on hillsides and that 
government compensation is necessary if it requires farmers to stop such planting. In 
addition, famers’ willingness to participate in the SLCP may be further compromised by 
the institutional barriers of shortage of compensation payments and policy uncertainty. 
These barriers have to be overcome before the government could galvanize broader 
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The Effect of Stochastic Oscillations in Property Rights Regimes on 
Forest Output in China 
2.1 Introduction 
For more than sixty years, the tenure of non-state forests
12
 in China has oscillated 
between regimes of private and common property. There have been at least four radical 
transitions, with no property-rights regime lasting more than twenty years.  
Before 1955, most non-state forests were privately owned. In 1955, however, the 
socialism campaign terminated the private property regime. Forests became common 
property. After sixteen years of inefficient forest operations, however, the forestry 
department modified this collective regime. In 1981, the department implemented a 
household responsibility system. Under this system, non-state forest lands were still 
collectively owned, but rural households were entitled with usufructuary rights over 
timber and non-timber forest products from their land. This privatization, however, led to 
immediate overharvesting during 1981–1982 and was again terminated in 1985, only four 
years after it commenced (Liu 2001). For the next seventeen years, a relatively stable 
common property regime dominated the non-state forest sector. But a new round of 
privatization reform was initiated in 2003 (Xu et al. 2008).   
                                                             
12 According to the forestry taxonomy in China, state forests include the forest resources under the charge 
of state logging enterprises, state forest farms, or natural reserve agencies. All the other forests consist of 
non-state forest. It makes up nearly 60 percent of forest area nationally. State and non-state forests are 
subject to different tenure systems.   
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The harm from such frequent and unpredictable policy changes is hidden from 
view: it is the foregone net value of the timber that could have been harvested over time 
had the policy environment been stable. It is especially important that these costs be 
assessed given China’s current attempts to become less dependent on imports of wood 
products.  
The booming Chinese economy requires ever increasing amounts of forest 
products. In 2010, China consumed the most wood-based panels, recovered paper, paper 
and paperboards in the world, as well as the second most industrial roundwood, 
sawnwood, and pulp for paper (FAO 2012). To satisfy this huge and growing demand, 
China imports more raw wood from neighboring subtropical countries. This has led to 
unsustainable exploitation of their resources (Xu and White 2004).  
In an effort to increase domestic supply of forest products, China has launched the 
most ambitious reforestation efforts in the developing world. It was originally expected 
that the reforestation projects would increase China's forested area by 10–20 percent 
(Bennett 2008). This would have significantly alleviated the pressure to exploit foreign 
forests as China increases its timber supply to meet its own demand.  
However, surveys show that farmers in the field have little confidence in the 
government’s reforestation plan. They are reluctant to invest in their forests after being 
repeatedly harmed in the past by unpredictable orders to surrender their forest property 
rights. Tenure uncertainty in China has become a major barrier to its current policy to 
promote domestic forest conservation and a sustainable supply of forest products. The 
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effects of this uncertainty should be assessed so that policymakers can reduce harmful 
policy uncertainty in the future. 
The forestry models in the literature cannot contribute to this policy analysis 
without significant modification. All forestry models are descendants of Faustmann’s 
seminal paper (1849). He examined the wealth-maximizing sequence of harvesting 
decisions of someone who owns a plot of land over an infinite horizon and plants a tree 
every time he cuts one down. The model applies equally to a sequence of finite-lived 
individuals, each of whom maximizes the sum of the discounted profits he earns from his 
trees while he owns the land plus the discounted value of the land when he sells it. In the 
Faustmann model farmers, taking the stationary price as given, harvest trees when the 
value of letting a tree grow another year equals the interest lost by postponing for a year 
not only the sale of the wood but also the revenue from future harvests.  
Although Faustmann’s original model assumes certainty, more recent 
contributions have abandoned that assumption and have examined the effects on rotation 
decisions of introducing uncertainty. The forms of uncertainty most closely related to our 
contribution arise from natural hazards and from expropriation. 
Natural hazards such as fires, ice and wind storms, and pest attacks can destroy 
forest stock. Reed (1984) asked how the risk of a forest fire would affect harvesting 
decisions. He used a Poisson stochastic process to describe the catastrophic events and 
assumed they occur independently and randomly. He concluded that the presence of fire 
risk increases the effective discount rate and shortens the optimal rotation ages. The 
Poisson process has been used to explain many other natural threats, such as hurricane 
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(Haight et al. 1995) and soil degradation (Routledge 1987). These articles all reach the 
same conclusion: it is optimal to cut trees at an earlier age if the risk of a natural disaster 
increases. More recently, Yoder (2004) has shown that with sufficient protection efforts 
and a salvage value that is high enough, rotation age may be extended.  
The risk of expropriation can also affect harvesting decisions. Yin and Newman 
(1997) examined empirically the impact on the forest sector of China’s rural reform. 
They found that in regions with severe tenure insecurity forest growth was limited. 
Amacher et al. (2009) show that expropriation risk creates incentives for agricultural 
clear-cutting and short-term harvesting. Qin et al. (2011) conducted a survey-based 
choice experiment with 210 Chinese farmers. The results show that reduced perceived 
risk of contract termination can significantly increase farmers’ willingness to pay for a 
forest contract.  
While the introduction of uncertainty into Faustmann’s tree-cutting model is a 
step in the right direction, none of this literature examines the consequences of the 
stochastic oscillations between different property-rights regimes. Our review of forest 
tenure in China suggests a characterization of such consequences is appropriate.  
The contribution of our paper is to characterize the harvesting decisions of owners 
of land that oscillates stochastically between private and common property over infinite 
time and to use this characterization to clarify the consequences of the government’s 
policy. Two conclusions are particularly striking.  
First, if farmers face a higher risk of transitions from private to common property, 
they may extend rotation periods rather than shorten them as the literature suggests. The 
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literature’s conclusion rests on the assumption that farmers are not compensated if 
lightning or pests destroy their trees; if they were insured sufficiently, the result would 
change. In China, compensation based on the size and age of a tree is paid when privately 
owned trees become common property (SFA, 2001). Whether the increased risk of such 
expropriation lengthens or shortens the rotation period turns out to depend on the 
magnitude of this compensation.  
Second, when calibrated, our model can be used to assess the hidden losses that 
China incurs because of the uncertainty engendered by its oscillating policy regarding 
property rights. We compute the discounted value of timber harvested (net of cutting 
costs) when policy oscillates unpredictably to the corresponding discounted value when 
property rights are guaranteed. The losses in timber value from uncertain tenure are huge. 
Whether they represent a loss in overall surplus, however, depends on the social value of 
the alternative uses to which the land was temporarily put when cleared of trees.  
The next section introduces the model. Section 3 investigates the comparative 
static effects of changing the compensation rate and the hazard rates governing the 
transition to and from the common property regime. In Section 4, we estimate the hidden 
losses that result from the policy uncertainty. Section 5 concludes.  
2.2 The model 
To isolate the effects of stochastic oscillations between property rights regimes, 
we make a number of simplifying assumptions. We assume that timber is the only forest 
product and that its price is a constant, normalized to one. We assume that the biological 
growth of timber is deterministic and summarize the volume of wood in a tree of age   by 
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the growth function     , satisfying the following properties:       ,  ′     , 
 ′′     ,        
′    ∞, and      ∞  
′     . Thus, as the tree matures, the 
volume of marketable wood it contains increases but at a decreasing rate. 
13
Replanting is 
assumed to be costless, but cutting down a tree is assumed to cost . We denote the cash 
flow at the time a tree is cut down, net of this harvesting cost, as            .  
inherits its properties from . Thus,        ,  ′     ,  ′′     , 
       
′    ∞, and      ∞  
′     . We also assume that there exists a t0  such 
that                . That is, the timber value of a tree will exceed the cutting 
cost if and only if the tree is older than t0 .  
Forest land under private property may stochastically transit to common property. 
Like Reed (1984), we describe the stochastic transition as a Poisson process, with an 
average transition rate of   per unit time. A larger   therefore corresponds to a shorter 
expected time until the transition to common property. Similarly, forest land under a 
common property regime may stochastically transit back to private property, with an 
average transition rate of  . The transition rates   and   are exogenous and the decision 
maker knows them. They reflect the magnitude of tenure uncertainty.  
Agents are assumed to be risk neutral. A forest owner's goal is to maximize the 
expected value of his forest over an infinite horizon. We assume that in computing his 
expected payoff, the owner takes into consideration that if his land is expropriated at a 
random time in the future, he will be compensated (possibly only partially) based on the 
                                                             
13 As most commercial harvests occur before the tree reaches maturity, we do not consider latter phases 






size of the trees he is forced to relinquish. This assumption accords with recent practice.
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We also assume that he anticipates that he will subsequently get his land (or a parcel of 
equivalent value) back as barren private property after it has remained common property 
for an unpredictable length of time. This assumption also accords with recent practice.
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Finally, we assume that the landowner anticipates that this stochastic cycle will repeat 
itself endlessly over time.  
The expected value of the forest can be expressed as a sum of all discounted 
future cash flows, either from timber sales or from compensations. Future values are 
discounted continuously at rate  . We denote the expected value of a plot of land with a 
tree on it of age   as      if the land is currently private property and  if the land is 
common property. Thus, if a tree is initially private property of age  ,  is defined as  
                                    
               
 
   
                       
(2.1) 
That is, the owner of a plot of land with a tree initially of age   will choose harvest time   
to maximize his wealth, which can be decomposed into the weighted average of two parts. 
There is a chance of      that if cutting is planned for  that the land has not yet transited 
to common property. If so, forest owners retain the net earnings        from the 
harvest as well as the value        of the private forest land with no tree on 
it. Alternatively, at some time  before the intended cutting time, a transition to 
                                                             
14 As required in the Decree of Forest Land Expropriation Regulation Measures (SFA, 2001): any legal 
entity that expropriates private forest land should pay compensation that covers the value of the land and 
trees, as well as the cost of replacement of farmers.  
15 After the 1956-1980 collective management of non-state forests, China initiated a new round of forest 
land privatization. One of the components of the reform was to confirm the existing forest boundary and 
return the forest land to its previous owners, if there was no dispute over the property rights (Liu, 2001). 






the common property regime occurs. In that case, forest owners receive the value of 
common property with a tree on it of age :       . At any time  , the likelihood 
of such a transition is      . The private forest land value,     , is defined as the 
maximized value of the discounted sum, as indicated in (2.1).  
When the transition to common property occurs, forest owners receive 
compensation                 for , which may be partial and depends on 
the size of the expropriated tree. After that, trees are assumed to be clear-cut by the 
government immediately
16
, and no replanting occurs. Former forest owners receive no 
revenues. All they can do is bide their time and wait for the stochastic transition to return 
to them their former land holdings stripped of their trees. Thus, a tree of age   in a 
common property regime is worth the value of the immediate compensation plus the 
expected present value of its return to private property in the future
17
: 
                     
∞
   
                                      (2.2) 
                                                             
16 We assume that the government clear cuts expropriated land even when the trees on it are so young that 
cutting is more expensive than the value of the harvested timber (t < t0 ).. This need not be irrational since 
the land may be put to more socially valuable use. Sometimes the rationality of harvesting such young trees 
is questionable. As Liu (2001) mentions, in the 1958 Great Leap Forward, China used harvested wood to 
fuel its steel furnaces in an over-ambitious attempt to expedite industrialization.  
17 In other applications, it might be more appropriate to assume individuals, not the government, do the 
harvesting. In that case, the definition of      would be slightly different. Define  as the unique root 
         the age when the value of the wood in the tree just covers the harvesting cost. Suppose the land 
is expropriated when the tree is age  .  If     , the expression in (2.2) still holds. If     , the 
compensation is paid immediately as before, but the tree is cut only when it reaches age   . That is, profits 
are dissipated because of free access, but individuals would not cut trees at a loss. So if the random return 
to private property occurs at        years, the land will be handed back to the farmer with a tree on it 
of age    , which will then be worth        as private property. Alternatively, if the random return 
occurs at        years, the tree will have been cut and the land will be handed back bare, worth      as 
private property. Thus, under this alternative assumption, the expression of forest value under a common 
property regime is: 
       
                
 
   
                                                                                   
                
    
   
                   
 
      
                   
 







Given the definition in equation (2.2), we can write the second term in the 
maximand in equation (2.1) as 
                         
∞
   
          
             
 
   
     
Substituting this into equation (2.1), we obtain an equation that must hold for any 
. Focusing provisionally on the case where    , we obtain the following: 
                        
                     
 
   
     
 
   
               
(2.3)        
The right-hand side of equation (2.3) can be regarded as a mapping         from 
any trial value of      into a possibly different real number on the left-hand side of 
equation (2.3). It can be shown that . Given any trial value of      , we can find 
a    as the optimal harvest age that maximizes the objective function. According to the 
envelope theorem,  
  
     
 
          
     
      
 
     
 
     
             
 
     
 
     
                   (2.4) 
It can be shown that   
  
     
  , as long as     . Since the mapping         
increases at a rate less than one ( ′      ), it has a unique fixed point. When we 
mention      henceforth, we are referring to this unique fixed point. 
 a ³ 0
 M(0) > 0
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The maximand in equation (2.3) is then a function of the cutting time  . Let it be 
    . Thus,  ′              ′                     
 
   
            
Since       ,   ′     ∞, and     
 
   
      and     are constant,  ′    is 
positive.  ′′     , so as   increases,  ′    keeps decreasing and      keeps 
increasing. For some  , ′    will be zero, and then,  ′    becomes negative. That 
means the function of      is single-peaked. It achieves the unique global optimum at the 
solution to the following first-order condition:  
 ′                     
 
   
                                     (2.5) 
Denote the unique solution to equation (2.5) as   . Substituting into equation (2.3), we 
obtain 
                         
 
              
 
   
     
  
   
                        
(2.6) 
Since  ,  , ,  ,  , and  are exogenous, the two endogenous variables    and 
     are simultaneously determined by (2.5) and (2.6). Once      is determined, it is then 
straightforward to determine      and the optimal time to wait before cutting a tree if it 
has initial age  . 18 
When forest owners receive full compensation following transitions to common 
property (   ), equation (2.5) implies that trees should be cut at a younger age in this 
                                                             
18 It turns out that if the tree is initially younger than    (    ), one should wait until it reaches age    to 




stochastically oscillating system (     than that in the standard Faustmann model, 
where    . When    , the optimal age to cut each tree is the unique solution to 
 ′                 , where      
         
 
      
 . This is the case of the Faustmann 
model. When     and    ∞ (the length of the commons phase is zero, and every 
time land owners plant a tree they risk losing their forest property without compensation), 
equation (2.5) is reduced to  ′                   , where    
                  
 




This is Reed’s condition.  
2.3 Comparative static analysis 
2.3.1 Effects of changing the compensation level (   
In some regions of China, complete or partial compensation is paid to original 
forest owners when the forest land is forcibly switched from private to common property 
(SFA, 2001; Wen et al., 2010). Although intended primarily as restitution, anticipation of 
such compensation would presumably affect farmers’ rotation decisions as well as the 
value of forest land under a private property regime. To determine the effect of changing 
the compensation rate   on the optimal rotation age, we differentiate (2.5) with respect to 
 to obtain (2.7)  
  ′′              ′     
   
  
             
 
   
 
     
  
           
(2.7) 
Since the term in square brackets on the left-hand side of (2.7) is negative,        has a 




equation (2.6), we conclude that 
     
  
 
                    
  
   
           
 
    
 
     
 
     
 
>0. Plugging this 
expression back into (2.7), its right-hand side can be rewritten as 
      
          
                 
  
   
                 
  
   
 . Since  ′   ,       
     for   in       , the right-hand side of (2.7) is negative. Therefore, 
     
  
   and 
   
  
  .  
Increasing the compensation paid for land expropriation increases the value of 
private land since it would increase an owner’s receipts even if he did not alter his 
rotation decisions at all. China’s payments to compensate farmers whose land has been 
seized is like insurance that partially protects against the risk of land loss. The increase in 
land value equals the value of such insurance.  
An increase in compensation also motivates farmers to lengthen the rotation 
periods. In this stochastically oscillating system, the owner of a tree will harvest it when 
the benefit of letting it grow in value for another year just equals all the expected costs 
involved in postponing the sale. Now, if the tenure risk had been covered by the 
government’s compensation mechanism, the marginal cost of postponing cutting by a 
year is reduced and farmers extend the rotation period. Thus,    increases with  . 
2.3.2 Effects of changing the mean time as common property (   ) 
The level of tenure uncertainty also affects the value of forest land and farmers’ 
rotation decisions. This subsection examines the effects of changes in the transition rate   
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(from common to private regimes); the next subsection deals with the transition rate   
(from private to common regime).  
According to equation (2.6),      can be rewritten as  
     
             
 
                      
  
   
           
 
    
 
     
 
     
 
                              (2.8) 
Substituting      into (2.5) with the expression of      in (2.8), we get  ′        
                
             
 
                      
  
   
           
 
 
. Thus,    is independent of 
 . Since the denominator of (2.8) is decreasing in   and no other terms depend on  ,      
is increasing in  . In other words, shortening the mean time as common property ( ) 
increases the value of forest land as private property but does not alter a farmer’s rotation 
decisions. 
2.3.3. Effects of changing the mean time as private property ( ) 
Unlike the first two parameters, the effects of changing   on forest land value 
     and optimal rotation age    are indeterminate.  
To demonstrate this, it is sufficient to consider an example. To make the example 
as instructive as possible, we focus on the special case where the government returns the 
land to the farmer immediately after expropriating it, clearing it of its trees and paying 
compensation. That is, we assume . This special case of our model is equivalent 
to Reed’s forest fire model but where farmers are partially insured against loss of their 
assets due to fire. 
 1/ l
 1/ s
 1/ l® 0
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In the example, we assume a replanting cost ( ) of 50 and an interest rate ( ) of 5 




                                                               (2.9) 
It can be verified that this growth function satisfies our assumptions:       ,  ′    
 ,  ′′     ,        
′    ∞, and      ∞  
′     .  Given the assumed cost of 
replanting and the growth function in (2.9), a tree must be more than         years old 
for its timber to be worth more than the cost of harvesting it. The simulation is run with 
MATLAB R2011a. We plot    against  , as shown in Figure 2-1, and      against  , as 
shown in Figure 2-2.   
 
                                                             
19 To test robustness, we also ran simulations based on other sets of parameters, and all of them led to 





Note: Since the magnitude of the optimal rotation age becomes extremely large when    , all 
the other curves are squeezed together in the left figures. The right figure is placed here for better 
view of the other four curves.  
Figure 2-1. Optimal Rotation Age with Changing Rate of   
  
Figure 2-2. Forest Land Value with Changing Rate of   
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 For a given    , the optimal rotation period is always longer the higher the 
compensation rate of  , as proved in section 2.3.1. In contrast, when the risk factor of   
increases, the rotation period may increase or decrease depending on the compensation 
rate. When      , the optimal rotation age decreases with  ; for example, Reed 
examined the special case where  and reached the same conclusion. But his 
conclusion does not hold for sufficiently high rates of compensation. When      , the 
optimal rotation age first decreases, then increases, with  . When      , the optimal 
rotation age increases with  . This conclusion contradicts most literature about forest 
risks, which concludes that higher risk levels should in all circumstances induce farmers 
to cut trees down earlier. Our simulation shows that, under a high enough compensation 
schedule (in this case      ), farmers would like to extend rotation periods when the 
risk of losing their forest land is higher: by extending it, the farmer increases the chance 
the government will harvest the trees at government expense and then pay the farmer a 
substantial portion of the value of the harvested timber. 
 In a risky system, postponing harvest has two effects pulling in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, the longer the rotation, the higher the timber value. On the 
other hand, farmers would face a higher risk of losing their property in an extended 
rotation period. The compensation mechanism serves as an option contract that 
guarantees farmers could get at least a certain amount of payment from tree-harvesting. 
For higher tenure transition risk, the value of this option contract is higher, and the 
farmers are in less of a hurry to cut trees down.  
 Similarly, for a given    , forest land value always increases with the 
compensation rate of  , as proved in section 2.3.1. In contrast, the value may increase or 
 q = 0
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decrease with the risk factor of  , depending on the compensation rate. When    , 
     decreases with  . When      , it first decreases, then increases with  . When 
     , it increases with  . This pattern represents rational valuation of real estate, such 
as forest land, given both tenure risk and property insurance. As discussed above, 
compensation for forest expropriation serves as an option contract that bounds farmers’ 
loss from tenure risks. This option value is actually embedded in the forest land value in 
our model. When the tenure risk increases, the option value increases accordingly, and so 
does the forest land value     .  
2.4 Loss of forest value due to the uncertain tenure policy 
In order to evaluate China’s net loss in forest value from the frequent tenure 
switches, we compare the forest value under the Faustmann rotation (  ) to that in our 
model. According to Faustmann’s assumption,    is the discounted value of trees that are 
optimally harvested and endlessly replanted. Let  be the forest value in our model. It 
equals the forest land value      plus the expected present value of the trees expropriated 
over time (net of harvesting costs) minus the expected present value of the compensation 
payments from the government over time. The value of the surrendered trees net of the 
cost of harvesting them should be added back because it represents the part of the value 
of the forest that was not included in the farmer’s payoff     . Compensation payments 
should be deducted from the farmer’s payoff since, while a benefit to him, they are 
merely a transfer from others elsewhere in society.  can be calculated with equations 
(2.10), in which the first term is the value of       minus the value of government 
compensation and the second term is the value of trees surrendered to the government 
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This value omits the direct compensation ( ) but includes the influence of the 
expected compensation on the optimal rotation      We further define the percentage loss 
of forest value as  
  
    
  
                                                     (2.11) 
We use the illustrative tree growth function as described in section 2.3.3 to estimate the 
percentage loss of net forest value due to China’s forestry tenure uncertainty. We still 
assume the interest rate as 5 percent. When examining the effect of compensation rate ( ), 
we set       , and      . These values correspond to the average lengths of the 
common and private phases as suggested by our examination of China’s forest tenure 
history.
20
 Similarly, when examining the effect of  , we assume      ; when 
examining the effect of  , we assume        . 
As illustrated by Figure 3, if the government increases the compensation rate, it 
can slightly reduce the loss due to policy uncertainty. However, regardless of the size of 
the compensation, the potential loss of net forest value is over 90 percent given the values 
for the hazard rates that we have assumed. In order to cut this loss, the government could 
either decrease the mean duration of the land as common property (1/ ) (assuming q > 0) 
or increase the mean duration of the land as private property (1/ ), as shown by Figure 4 
and 5.  For example, when    , if the mean time as private property was extended from 
                                                             
20 In the past more than 60 years, there have been two phases of private property regimes (1949–1955 and 
1981–1985) and two phases of common property regimes (1955–1981 and 1981–2001). Thus, the average 
lengths of the private and common phases are 5 years and 16 years, respectively. 
96 
 
5 years (     ) to 10 years (     ), the percentage loss of forest value could be 
reduced from over 100 percent to around 70 percent.  
If the mean duration of the land as private property is sufficiently short, the forest 
value  can be negative; consequently, the loss rate will exceed one. This strange 
phenomenon can occur whether or not the government pays compensation. According to 
(2.8), when    ,      
             
 
           
 
    
 
     
 
     
 
. When  the farmer will choose a 
rotation age    that makes        . Since t* is an increasing function of 
q,  t* > t0  for q ³ 0. The forest will therefore always have positive value for him.  
However, every tree the government expropriates will be younger than   , and 
some will be so young that       . In that case, the government’s cost of clear-cutting 
would exceed the value of the timber it expropriated from the farmers---which may be 
rational if the use to which the cleared land will temporarily be put is sufficiently 
valuable. If such expropriation occurred with sufficient frequency (  is large enough), the 
magnitude of the second term (negative) of  would exceed that of the first term 
(positive), and  would be negative.  




Figure 2-3. Percentage Loss of Forest Value with Changing Rate of   
 




Figure 2-5. Percentage Loss of Forest Value with Changing Rate of   
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper provides a framework for assessing the effects on forest output of the 
stochastic oscillations between private and common property regimes that have occurred 
in China during the last sixty years. The induced policy uncertainty distorts the harvesting 
decisions of land owners. By our reckoning, the losses in forest output resulting from this 
uncertainty appear large. Understanding the consequences of this policy-induced 
uncertainty is particularly important at a time when China is engaged in the most 
ambitious reforestation efforts in the developing world in the hope of significantly 
increasing its domestic supply of timber. 
In the special case where the expected time spent in the common property regime 
approaches zero, our model can be interpreted as one where harvesting occurs under the 
threat of a catastrophic event like a forest fire and where the government compensation is 
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reinterpreted as the payout from insurance against the catastrophe. As we show, the 
conclusion of Reed (1984) and others that increased risk of forest fire inevitably 
motivates farmers to harvest earlier fails to hold if the insurance payout is sufficiently 
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Locales as the Link: Institutional Failures and Innovations of the SLCP 
Implementation 
3.1 Introduction 
As with most ecological projects in China, the SLCP was performed on an 
expedited timeframe. In 1998, devastating floods hit China’s most two important river 
systems: the Yangtze River and the Yellow River basins. These floods caused over 4,000 
deaths and an economic loss of RMB200 billion (Tong & Shi, 2003). Most scientific 
evidence attributed the flooding to deforestation in the upper reaches of the two basins 
(Zong & Chen, 2000; Few, 2003; Yin & Li, 2003). Facing serious criticism, the State 
Council responded later that same year by circulating “Several Opinions on 
Reconstruction after the Disaster” (Guanyu zaihou chongjian de ruogan wenti), which 
required local governments to reforest steep hillsides, especially those identified as being 
of critical significance in preventing future soil erosion and flooding. In 1999, Premier 
Zhu Rongji’s six-province tour formally initiated the pilot stage of the SLCP in Guansu, 
Shaanxi, and Sichuan. After that, the reforestation program was expanded to over 400 
counties in 20 provinces in 2002, and increased again in 2006 to a total of 2,279 counties 
in 25 provinces.  While the scale of the SCLP was greatly increased, little revision or 
modification to the underlying policy had been made during this process.   
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While the considerable expansion of the SLCP helped China to increase its 
vegetation cover in a relatively short time period, the hasty policy design of the SLCP left 
a significant gap in understanding and coping with bureaucratic concerns in the process.  
In particular, the appropriateness of the incentive mechanism and the sustainability of the 
project were not sufficiently evaluated (Liu et al., 2008; Gao & Guo, 2012).  
Not surprisingly, the hastily-designed program resulted in both ecological and 
social problems. In some regions, survival rates of newly planted trees were low because 
(1) tree species were not properly selected to fit local ecological conditions (such as water 
availability) and/or (2) newly planted forests were not properly managed by local farmers 
and governments (Weyerhaeuser et al., 2005; Bennett, 2008). In addition, the government 
did not always appropriately conduct close inspections of local conditions, and, 
accordingly, was unable to effectively address the low survival rates in a coordinated 
manner. As Trac and his colleagues observed in one of the pilot provinces, Sichuan, 
monitoring only occurred between one and three times per year, and such monitoring was 
only of a cursory nature involving only “driving, parking, binocular observation, and 
brief talking between higher level officials and village leaders” (Trac et al., 2007).  
Many scholars also doubted the efficiency of compensation allocation in the 
SLCP from a social perspective. Given the rigid compensation design, which involved 
only two regional regimes, farmers received either substantially higher or substantially 
lower net incomes on reforested land, compared to their previous crop incomes (Uchida 
et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2007), which served to skew the economic 
incentives. Also, as local governments tended to retain central subsidies for their own use, 
shortage of compensation delivery to the farmers was not uncommon. Local government 
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forced farmers to reforest lands but through flaws in design and implementation refused 
to provide adequate financial assistance to farmers who had trouble in maintaining 
survival rates of trees (Xu et al., 2004; Grosjean & Kontoleon, 2009; Gao & Guo, 2012). 
Consequently, some participating rural households were compelled to engage in the 
program without adequate incomes from either reforestation compensation or crop 
revenues.  
Other problems were also frequently observed and discussed with regard to the 
SLCP implementation, such as lack of respect for the principle of volunteerism, lack of 
precision in targeting reforestation land, and lack of professional training for off-farm 
employment (Yin et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2006). Given these problems, many farmers 
opted to return to planting cash crops after the compensation periods lapsed, which posed 
a great challenge to the sustainability of the SLCP (Uchida et al., 2005; Ye et al., 2003; 
Grosjean & Kontoleon, 2008; Chen et al., 2009).   
With extensive work of empirical surveys, these studies have comprehensively 
revealed SLCP’s implementation shortfalls from the farmers’ perspective. However, the 
studies have provided little insight about the policy executants’ opinions on 
implementation and failed to explain why certain problems arose. In addition, most of the 
aforementioned studies were based on survey data collected before 2005. Yet, in 
recognition of the serious challenges to the sustainability of ecological benefits generated 
under the SLCP, the central government significantly revised the SLCP policy in 2007: it 
extended the compensation periods to 2021 and, additionally, initiated new auxiliary 
programs of complementary reforestation, basic farmland construction, rural energy 
development, and eco-migration, in order to strengthen the sustainability of the SLCP. 
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These new experiences have been seldom discussed in the literature. Finally, previous 
studies tended to focus on isolated problems with the SLCP implementation and ignored 
the overall institutional complexity underlying the identified problems.  
In an effort to explore the institutional causes of the implementation problems in 
the SLCP, this study takes a new perspective by focusing on the project executants of 
local governments. It analyzes how the reforestation project was carried out by local 
executants as a result of the motivations and constraints they were facing. Through 
analysis of in-depth interviews with local forestry officials and farmers in four SLCP 
participating provinces – Heilongjiang, Ningxia, Chongqing, and Yunnan - this study 
suggests that most of the aforementioned implementation problems were related to a 
shortage of administrative funding at the local level. Lacking adequate funding support, 
local governments would sacrifice precision in making pre-reforestation plans (tree 
species selection, reforestation land recruitment) and limit their efforts in providing post-
reforestation support (reforestation inspection, professional training for off-farm 
employment). In addition, under financial pressures, local governments tended to 
reallocate a portion of the central subsidies for local uses related to SLCP implementation.  
This study also suggests potential solutions to the implementation problems, 
utilizing various regional innovations that proved successful in replenishing local budgets 
and promoting the sustainability of the reforestation efforts within the framework of the 
SLCP. The lessons and experiences drawn from these regional innovations should 
provide a useful resource for forestry policy makers as they continue to evolve and 
improve the SLCP policy design, as well as assist in the appropriate design of other 
programs involving local agencies as an implementation hinge.  
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After a brief introduction of the interview method, the study begins by broadly 
examining the SLCP implementation, as documented by literature and supplemented by 
my field experiences. It then highlights two difficulties local governments encountered in 
implementing the SLCP: allocating reforestation quotas and providing post-reforestation 
supports. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the strategies local governments 
adopted to replenish local administrative budgets and resolve their implementation 
predicaments. The article concludes by drawing broad lessons about the significance of 
local stakeholders in environmental project implementation in China.  
3.2 Methods 
This study draws great support from national statistics and government documents 
related to the SLCP. In addition, it also uses primary data collected in the summer of 
2011 through interviews with local forestry officials and farmers in four culturally- and 
biophysically-diverse provinces: Ningxia, Chongqing, Yunnan, and Heilongjiang in 
sequence. In addition, the four provinces
 
 are selected because they represent a range of 
social and ecological conditions under which the SLCP was implemented (as described in 
section 4-1 in Chapter 4). The range of experiences of these provinces in implementing 
the SLCP is an appropriate representation of the methods local agencies attempted in 





Figure 3-1. A Map of China Showing the Four Provinces Studied 
A total of 20 forestry officials and 18 farmers were interviewed. At the time of 
interview, all officials were working in the forestry bureaus at municipal and county 
levels. Most official interviewees were approached with cold visits.
21
 In order to secure a 
higher chance of response, I usually visited local forestry bureaus in the afternoon, when 
most important meetings and tasks for the day were done, and typically started my visits 
with the administrative office, which is generally the body of China’s government 
agencies responsible for outreach and communications. To establish common ground, I 
began interviews by introducing my background and explaining the purpose of my visit, 
and then made interview requests with forestry officials who were knowledgeable of the 
SLCP implementation and local forestry finance. Not all requests were satisfied. In some 
                                                             
21 Two official interviews were set up through my personal connections at Heilongjiang.  
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small county bureaus, a staff member in the administrative office just indicated that s/he 
was capable to answer questions about the SLCP implementation and would not involve 
other colleagues. Other times, I was referred to one or two officials at the SLCP, financial, 
or forestry industry offices. Among the 20 interviewed officials, eight were SLCP 
officials, three were forestry industry officials, two were forestry financial officials, and 
seven were officials in charge of general administrative business at local forestry bureaus. 
Five of them were female and 15 were male. Their ages ranged from 26 to 50. About two 
thirds of the interviewees were below the age of 40.           
In order to gain broader insights about the various procedures and experiences of 
the SLCP implementation at each region, I adopted semi-structured interviews that 
utilized an open framework and allowed for focused, conversational, two-way 
communication. Although the majority questions were generated during the interviews, 
they were guided by four major topics designed in advance: (1) the SLCP implementation 
details at the local level, including reforestation area, survival rates, budget allocation, 
subsidy delivers, and etc., (2) the positive impacts of the SLCP, (3) the negative impacts 
of the SLCP, and (4) the expectation of future reforestation policy changes. The main 
focus of the interviews was to understand local officials’ work in interpreting, modifying, 
and implementing the SLCP policies, given specific local social and ecological 
qualifications and constraints, including any solutions or innovative approaches to 
implementation challenges.  
In order to confirm information developed from the officials, I also interviewed 
18 local farmers from the four provinces who were participating in the SLCP. The farmer 
interviewees were randomly selected from the survey samples as described in Section 4-1 
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of Chapter 4. Ten of them were male and eight were female. Most of them were young, 
say, under the age of 34. Only five of them were over 50 years old. They were asked to 
evaluate the positive and negative impacts of the SLCP, also through semi-structured 
interviews.  
3.3 Policy implementation at the local level 
As a large national program, the SLCP is unavoidably subject to central-local 
policy implementation dilemmas that have been extensively discussed in political science. 
The divergence of interests between central and local governments has long been 
recognized as a major cause of inefficient policy implementation in many public domains. 
As Bardhan and Moorkherjee (2000) point out, policy implementation at lower level 
governments tends to be captured by vested interests and local elites, and biased from the 
original policy design. China is not exempt from these central-local conflicts. These 
conflicts may even be aggravated due to China’s particular multi-section and multi-layer 
governance structure (tiao-kuai system). As introduced in Chapter 1, in China, a typical 
functional government unit at the local level is under the direction of two higher level 
authorities, the local government and its parent unit. While functional parent units 
generally emphasize their functional goals, local government units tend to prioritize 
economic growth, since that determines individual local officials’ career promotion. As 
local units are financially dependent on their local governments, they have a strong 
tendency to subordinate their functional goals to local economic concern. Such central-
local tensions have been extensively observed and discussed in various policy areas 
(Chen, 2009; Mol, 2009). For example, regarding revenue collection, while the central 
government strives to increase tax revenue by increasing tax rates, local governments 
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often counter by shrinking tax base as taxation often hinders local economic activities 
and increases local costs (Wong, 1991; Ma, 1995). Similarly, Skinner et al (2001 & 2002) 
found that local governments tend to selectively implement social and environmental 
policies in light of local priorities related to economic growth. Skinner, et al (2002) 
examined implementation of several environmental policies. They showed that, while 
environmental improvement and sustainable development programs are promoted by the 
MEP and win general support at the central level, the center cannot “motivate, direct, 
steer, and control local environmental protection bureaus” to effectively implement these 
programs, as they are financially dependent on their local administrations  
Lack of central-local coordination is also a key weakness in the SLCP. As 
summarized in Chapter 1, the original policy design of the SLCP was quite simple: the 
central government pays rural households to plant trees on their croplands. In other words, 
the center buys the forest ecological services from individual rural households. However, 
the center’s compensation payments are not made directly to each household and rural 
households cannot directly report their reforestation achievements to the center. Local 
agencies are indispensable liaisons in such a large-scale ecological project. Local 
agencies collect and report information about local social, economic, and ecological 
conditions, communicating central directives to individual households, allocating 
reforestation quota, distributing subsidy payments, providing technical and other supports 
to participating households, and monitoring project implementation. Thus, local agencies 
must be properly motivated before the reforestation program could be successful. 
In practice, the central government heavily depends on political approaches in 
mobilizing local cooperation. First, the central government designs the SLCP as a 
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comprehensive governmental project (zhengfu gongcheng), not just a sectoral one (bumen 
gongcheng). As shown in Figure 3-2, the SFA and the NDRC cooperatively represent the 
central government and assign reforestation tasks to provincial governments by signing 
liability agreements with them. In turn, the provincial governments assign the tasks down 
through the administrative ladder one by one, down to the township governments. In this 
process, the chief executives of local governments, not forestry bureaus, take the primary 
responsibility in implementing the SLCP. They are expected to maneuver all local 
resources to realize the goals of tree-planting, forest management, and supporting 
infrastructure building. In contrast, the role of local forestry bureaus is reduced to a 
participating party in the SLCP. Although they conduct most the silvicultural jobs and are 
also penalized for poor performance, they are not responsible for the two critical tasks of 
arranging reforestation funding and coordinating with other governmental departments. 
 
Figure 3-2. Administrative Structure of the SLCP 
Second, the center utilizes political punishment mechanisms to stimulate local 
efforts in the SLCP implementation. Along with the SLCP Regulation, the SFA issued a 





SLCP implementation. According to the Notice, given unsuccessful implementation
22
, 
local government leaders could be penalized with political warning, demerit record, 
serious demerit record, criminal charges, demotion, and even decapitation, depending on 
the seriousness of the failure. These are credible threats: cases of punishment of local 
government and forestry officials due to poor SLCP implementation had been 
occasionally mentioned by forestry officials during the interviews.     
In contrast to the political incentive mechanisms, the SLCP provides little 
financial incentive to mobilize local efforts in project implementation. As a land-use-
change policy, the SLCP would be naturally resisted by local agencies as it restricts 
agricultural production, requires great administrative efforts, and decreases farmers’ 
incomes, shrinking local tax bases. These negative effects were only partially addressed 
by the central government. In view of farmers’ potential loss of income from crop-
planting, the SLCP stipulation uses a compensation scheme that was intended to deliver 
adequate grain and cash subsidies to individual participating rural households on an 
average basis. These compensation payments could even temporarily increase local 
income. However, the central authority dictated that the SLCP’s administrative costs 
should be primarily paid out of county governments’ budgets.
23
 Poor administrative 
                                                             
22 Unsuccessful implementation has been defined quite broadly in the SLCP. In addition to low survival of 
newly planted trees, many other faults may also cause administrative penalty on local officials. These 
include purchase of unqualified tree seedlings, ineffective complementary planting, appropriation of SLCP 
compensation, and even serious complaints from local farmers. 
23 Although, in realization of the substantive work involved in the SLCP implementation, the central 
government also allocates some administrative fees to provincial governments since 2002, they are far from 
enough to cover all implementation costs. As required in the Technical Regulation for the SLCP 
(tuigenghuanlin gongcheng zuoye jishu zhinan), county governments should establish a special fund out of 
their local budget to pay the SLCP project management fees, as a rate of RMB45-75/ha. Using this rate as a 
standard, reforesting 26 million ha of land means a total spending of RMB1-2 billion, which is non-trivial. 
In order to alleviate the financial burden on county governments, some regions make alternative 
arrangements. For example, in Yunnan, payment of the SLCP management fees is equally shared among 
provincial, municipal, and county governments.   
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budgeting at the county level was repetitively raised by local forestry officials to explain 
many implementation problems in the SLCP, with allocation of reforestation quota and 
provision of post-reforestation support as two major ones.  
3.3.1 Allocation of reforestation quota 
Due to lack of administrative resources, local forestry officials had to minimize 
their efforts in targeting sloping cropland and monitoring reforestation sites. In discussing 
prevailing problems local forestry officials faced in implementing the SLCP, an official 
in Ningxia explained some of the reasons for their difficulties:  
It is not realizable [to conduct such precise targeting]. We [the county] have three 
townships and four villages, including 114 natural villages. The area [of the county] is 
1,131 km
2
 [i.e. 113,100 ha]. Only driving through the whole county along built roads 
would take you two days, not to mention examining the land plot by plot… Only two 
people here are able to do this job [i.e. reforestation land targeting]…You also need to 
count in the cost of gas. Patrolling the mountain areas once will cost over RMB5, 000. 
Who pays that? We are not covered [by our parent units]. 
One way local officials minimized administrative effort was to enroll only large 
blocks of land, as this helped save monitoring costs. For example, in two counties in 
Ningxia, the lower bound of the size of the enrolled land was one ha. While the easier-to-
implement method of retiring continuous swaths of land served to increase administrative 
convenience, it negatively impacted the ecological effectiveness of the reforestation 
program. As stipulated in the SLCP plan, the program aims to curb soil and water erosion 
and specifically targets croplands hillsides steeper than 25°. However, under the policy of 
continuous retiring, a significant portion of high-quality gently-sloping land was enrolled 
under the program, while steep-sloping low-quality land remained in cultivation. In 
addition, this retiring method directly contradicted the principles of volunteerism that had 
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been appraised by many scholars as a merit distinguishing the SLCP from the traditional 
practices China adopted to manage its forests. There was no reason to assume that 
farmers’ willingness to participate in the reforestation program changed synchronously 
with the steepness of their cropland, i.e. there is no reason to believe steep-sloping land 
owners were more willing to participate and gently-sloping owners less willing to. In my 
field work, I observed that some rural households were forcibly enrolled in the SLCP by 
local forestry bureaus, and some were forcibly excluded.  
Due to the compulsive nature of land recruitment, it induced serious resistance in 
rural communities. In such cases, forestry bureaus would avoid utilizing the strategy of 
compulsive recruitment and continuous retiring. Instead, they would adopt another low-
cost targeting method, limited voluntary participation. In the limited voluntary 
participation model, farmers were free to choose whether to participate in the SLCP or 
not, as long as their croplands were on hillside with slopes greater than 25°. This strategy 
also helped reduced local government’s cost in pre-program planning. However, the 
seemingly reasonable targeting rule also caused serious civil conflicts at the local level. 
One such conflict related to incompatible plantation on neighboring plots, which was 
observed in Chongqing. As commonly perceived by local farmers, participating was a 
better choice for two types of households: (1) households with hilly croplands that were 
hard to cultivate, and (2) households where most adult male and female members took 
jobs in cities as migration workers. Households that had relatively flat croplands and 
enough labor force remaining at home would maintain crop cultivation. Thus, as driven 





 forests adjacent to each other
25
 were formed. Farmers’ concern 
arose when they found that the growing of crops and bamboo on the adjacent lands 
affected each other. Owners of the bamboo plots complained that use of fertilizer on the 
neighboring croplands affected the growth of their bamboo springs. On the other hand, 
owners of the croplands argued that bamboo springs consumed so much water and soil 
nutrition that crops on their land would not live or became sterile. This civil conflict had 
been commonly recognized by the local farmers and forestry officials for a long time, but 
remained unresolved. As an official in this province noted:  
When you let them [farmers] freely choose to plant bamboos or crops, you also need to 
get ready to receive complaints from them. Land [and earnings from land] is the most 
important thing for farmers…This is a big [not easy] issue in rural areas. 
In addition to the concern about incompatible plantation, farmers also expressed 
doubt about the fairness of reforestation quota allocation. This was especially true among 
farmers who intended to participate but whose lands were not enrolled. The SLCP 
adopted an application system for reforestation quota allocation: each year, local 
governments identified local reforestation designs and submitted them up through the 
administrative ladder (county  city  province  the center); after checking local 
governments’ reforestation plan with the national target and budget, the central 
government had the option to partially or completely approve their plans, and accordingly 
assigned reforestation quota to each participating province; provincial quotas then were 
allocated down the administrative ladder to each city, county, township, village, and 
individual rural households in sequence. Since most local reforestation plans would not 
                                                             
24 Bamboo was the major species used for reforestation in this region, as it not only was recognized as 
“ecological forests” under the SLCP but also generates considerable economic values.   
25 Chongqing has a typical hilly topography, with fragmented flat and hilly areas adjoining each other.  
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be 100% approved by the center,  some qualified sloping land was excluded from the 
program. On the other hand, since the central government provided relatively generous 
compensation in the form of living subsidies, some farmers treated the reforestation 
compensation as the same subsidies they received from poverty alleviation programs and, 
therefore, considered the SLCP as a poverty reduction policy. Thus, in regions where no 
off-farm industries were developed to replenish farmers’ agricultural income, they would 
compete for the opportunity of being enrolled in the SLCP. When a farmer with strong 
willingness to participate was rejected by local governments, s/he would complain that 
the opportunity was used by forestry bureau officials to cater influential households or 
benefit villagers they had personal connections with. Given the tradition of closed 
decision-making processes and few limits on bureaucratic power in rural China, such 
concerns could not be easily ruled out. However, this was hard to demonstrate as forestry 
bureau officials declined to share their local SLCP roster. 
Overall, the administrative cost-minimization strategies were not proven to reduce 
forestry officials’ efforts in implementing the SLCP as expected. Instead, forestry 
officials may need to make more efforts to resolve the resulting conflicts and concerns. 
While local officials saved time and money by not patrolling hillsides (by recruiting only 
large blocks of lands or with the limited volunteerism principle), they had expend 
significant energy and resources in mediating conflicts between participating and non-
participating households and addressing concerns about the fairness of reforestation quota 
allocation. An administrative office described the difficulties they encountered in 
implementing the SLCP as follows:    
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We definitely hope we can satisfy all farmers with our job [in implementing the SLCP], 
as over-complaints [here the official meant farmer petitions
26
 or social movements] from 
them would result in negative evaluations of our job. We may be vetoed in the year-end 
evaluation and banned from bonus, regardless of any other good job we did. More 
seriously, we have heard the stories that some forestry bureaus and their leaders received 
political warning due to farmers’ petitions. However, it is not easy to satisfy all of them, 
you know, as a Chinese saying goes, it is difficult to cater for all tastes.   
The dilemma local forestry bureau officials encountered in allocating 
reforestation quotas reflected problems caused by constraints on administrative budgets. 
Also, it exemplified the deficits of an environmental campaign with an expedited policy 
design. As a national land use change policy with radical transformation in the way of 
rural production, the SLCP unavoidably involved various conflicts during its 
implementation, both expected or unexpected, which were not carefully attended in the 
policy design. To prevent pervasive negative influences of such conflicts, policy makers 
should extensively and comprehensively refine the program through more trial rounds 
before implementing on a nation-wide basis. In view of the great variety in social and 
ecological conditions in China, the SLCP policy makers should pursue a delicate balance 
in the policy design. On the one hand, it needs more flexibility to allows local executants 
(both local forestry officials and farmers) to modify the program to fit local conditions or 
resolve local constraints.
27
 On the other hand, it should also contain greater national level 
oversight to minimize bureaucratic favoritism. As Ostrom (1990) has explained, in 
regards to common pool resource management, collective institutions that are commonly 
recognized in local communities may be more effective in solving “small-scale, but still 
complex, uncertain, and difficult problems,” compared to the rules supplied by external 
                                                             
26 Petition, also called shangfang in Chinese, is an approach frequently used by Chinese farmers when their 
conflicts with local governments cannot be resolved. They will visit higher authorities to appeal for help.  
27 Bennett (2008) has pointed out that the SLCP has been designed with little differentiation. Apart from the 
two regional regimes and three subsidy lengths, program stipulations devise little flexibility that allows for 
differentiation across targeted areas and participants.  
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authorities. Although the forests newly cultivated under the SLCP are defined as private 
property,
28
 the forest resources per se inherit more characters of common property. This 
is illustrated by the close interconnection among small-scales land uses (the externality of 
one land use on another as highlighted before). Thus, simplified top-down quota 
assignment would not work for the SLCP. On the other extreme, a recruitment 
mechanism based on absolutely voluntary participation may also cause problems in forest 
resource management, such as incompatible land use, and should also be carefully 
evaluated before put into effect. An ideal way is to decide SLCP participation based on a 
collectively recognized rule, or collectively make out a SLCP quota distribution plan that 
is acceptable to the whole community. However, reaching such agreements in 
communities without sufficient social capital or collective decision-making traditions is 
challenging. It may still require significant inputs of time, energy, coordination efforts, 
and administrative funding from local forestry bureaus, which have been demonstrated to 
be lacking in the implementation history of the SLCP.  
3.3.2 Provision of post-reforestation supports  
In addition to the predicament local forestry bureaus encountered in allocating 
reforestation quota, poor administrative budgeting also caused other problems, with the 
lack of provision of post-reforestation supports an important one among them. 
Reforestation means not only transferring croplands to forests, but also transferring 
traditional farmers to agroforestry workers, transferring livestock from open rangelands 
to closed barns, and in some regions, transferring major energy sources from dry crop 
                                                             
28 As stipulated in the SLCP plan, the property of newly planted trees belongs to the people or institutes 
who are entitled with the usufruct rights of croplands that are reforested under the SLCP.  
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straws to more advanced energy supply. In view of these social and economic 
transformations associated with reforestation, policy makers suggested corresponding 
auxiliary components in the SLCP Regulation (tuigenghuanlin tiaoli) plan. As written in 
the fifth section of the regulation:
29
 
 In the process of reforesting sloping croplands, local governments should 
increase inputs in basic farmland construction, raise farmland productivity, 
and pursue stable grain supply.  
 Based on practical situations, local governments should develop small-
scale renewable energy supply in rural areas to satisfy farmers’ energy 
demand. Energy supplies from bio-gas, small hydro-power, solar power, 
and wind power should be considered.  
 The center encourages eco-migration, and will subsidize infrastructure 
building in the immigrants’ communities.  
 After reforestation, local governments should prohibit grazing in 
reforestation sites and introduce the experiences of captive breeding to 
farmers.  
 These practices have been considered essential to bolster the sustainability of the 
SLCP, as they could solve farmers’ major post-reforestation concerns about grain 
availability, energy sources, and livestock husbandry, and help them adapt to the 
significant transformations in their livelihood and production caused by reforestation.  A 
smooth transition from the old mode of agricultural production to the new mode of 
                                                             
29 These components were listed as policy recommendations in the initial plan of the SLCP. However, they 
were listed as the SLCP facilitating programs in the 2007 policy revision. 
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forestry operation may result in rural households being better-off working in the forestry 
industry or other off-farm industries than working as farmers. However, realizing such a 
smooth transition requires substantial investment, which is beyond the capacity of 
individual farmers. The focal question becomes who should bear the economic costs of 
transition. It would not be surprising for local governments, already short of 
administrative funding in implementing the SLCP, to remove the suggested but not 
required tasks from their to-do list. Unsolicited remarks from several forestry bureau 
officials suggest that neither forestry bureaus nor local governments considered basic 
farmland construction or alternative energy source development as component to be 
included in the SLCP.  Instead, they thought such public services should be operated 
under separate programs and that the central government should be the final buyer of 
these services. For example, when discussing local strategy to replenish energy supply 
due to the decrease in availability of dry crop straw as the primary energy source, an 
administrative official in Ningxia showed me a proposal for developing biogas plants in 
his county. Although in this proposal, reforestation had been listed as one of the reasons 
for developing biogas, it was still counted as an independent program. The proposed 
budget for this program was about RMB2.46 million, with RMB0.9 million of capital 
investment, RMB1.5 million of labor fees, and less than RMB0.06 million of other 
expenses. As shown in the proposal, the county government requested central 
government investment of RMB0.75 million, accounting for 30.5% of total budget and 
83.3% of all capital investment. In contrast, the county government would only match the 
center’s spending with a local investment of RMB 0.21 million, accounting to 8.5% of 
total budget and 23.3% of capital investment. The remaining RMB1.5 million of labor 
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costs would be undertaken by farmers. This proposal was submitted in 2009, and was still 
pending in 2011. Given that the county government had not developed other alternative 
energy sources and that the policy of tree-cutting prohibition (fengshan yulin) had been 
strictly enforced since the beginning of the SLCP, farmers in that county have been 
suffering from energy shortage for at least nine years
30
.  
In addition to the constraints of tight budgets, the long tradition of project-based 
rural management in China also explains local governments’ over-dependence on the 
center in providing rural infrastructure. Since the early 1980s when China initiated the 
economic reform, rural development has been raised as one of the tops issues on central 
government’s agenda and become heavily dependent on central government sponsored 
programs. An NDRC’s internal report
31
 shows that central government sponsored 
programs have almost covered all aspects of rural production and living activities, 
including key agricultural species (oil plants, sugar crops, and cotton) production, seed 
engineering, livestock breeding, basic farmland construction, agricultural irrigation 
system construction, natural reserve protection, rural community infrastructure 
construction (drinking water supply, electricity supply, road construction, and bio-gas 
development), and even renewal of school buildings. According to the national statistics, 
from 2001 to 2006, central spending counted for 30% or less in total government 
expenditure, as compared to its contribution to rural infrastructure construction that 
weighed more than 30% and even reached 50% in some years (Table 3-1). Given the 
                                                             
30 Ningxia was enrolled in the SLCP in 2002. A local farmer reported that his household’s spending on coal 
purchases had been double since they participated in the SLCP 
31 Rural Infrastructure Development Report (2011) 
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tradition of a strong central government in building rural infrastructure, local 
governments have gradually shrunk themselves back to a facilitating role.  
Table 3-1. Central and Local Government Expenditure and their Investment in 
Rural Infrastructure Construction 
  
Percentage of Central and Local 
Government Expenditure 
Percentage of Central and Local 











2001 30.5% 69.5% 48.4% 51.6% 
2002 30.7% 69.3% 32.8% 67.2% 
2003 30.1% 69.9% 48.0% 52.0% 
2004 27.7% 72.3% 51.2% 48.8% 
2005 25.9% 74.1% 40.7% 59.3% 
2006 24.7% 75.3% 36.4% 63.6% 
Note: Data from China Statistical Yearbook 2007 and Rural Statistical Yearbook of China 2002-2007. 
Since 2007, statistical caliber has changed and the number of central government spending on rural 
infrastructure construction became unavailable. Thus, the table only summarizes government expenditure 
data between 2001-2006. Local governments’ investment in rural infrastructure construction is calculated 
by subtracting central government’s spending from the total investment. 2001-2003 data of total investment 
in rural infrastructure construction are directly cited from Rural Statistical Yearbook of China 2004. Due to 
change in statistical caliber, this item has not been included in the statistical yearbook since 2004, thus, data 
for the year of 2004-2006 are derived by summing all infrastructure relative items in rural investment.  
Overall, in regard to the SLCP implementation, most problems have been 
attributed by local government officials to poor administrative budgeting. At the local 
level, the constraint of administrative funding shortage has induced various effort-
minimization strategies. For example, local executants have seldom conducted 
comprehensive pre-program assessments to evaluate the appropriateness of plot targeting 
or tree species selection. In some counties, these procedures were even reduced to a 
conference discussion among several technical staff members. Also, local governments 
may not strictly monitor farmers’ reforestation activities through regular inspections, as 
required by the central government. In addition, without additional funding, they would 
not take the responsibility of providing post-reforestation supports, like alternative energy 
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supply and off-farm employment training, which are essential to help farmers adopt to the 
radical post-reforestation transformations in living and production modes. Thus, without 
significant efforts from local governments, the reforestation programs would unavoidably 
encounter various problems as suggested by other scholars, such as lack of respect to the 
volunteerism principle, low survival rates of newly planted trees, ineligible targeting of 
croplands, and a high tendency among farmers to return to crop planting. 
3.4 Local governments’ solutions 
With the suddenly-increased but uncompensated workload of the SLCP 
implementation, minimizing administrative expenditure through parsimonious procedures 
was a natural response of local governments, but this was far from the final solution to 
their financial plight. Given the strict political penalizing policy embedded in the 
program design, long-term ineffective implementation of the SLCP is incompatible with 
local leaders’ political interests and they therefore are incented to seek solutions to local 
budget constraints to improve the SLCP implementation. As discussed below, the form of 
these solutions changed along with the SLCP program development.        
3.4.1 Milking the compensation system 
According to the stipulations of the SLCP, the central authority has on-paper 
control over every detail of the project, from assigning reforestation quotas to setting the 
compensation standards. Local forestry agencies are required to strictly carry out the plan 
stipulated by the center, without any local discretion, but on their own administrative 
budget. In fact, the simplified, two-tier compensation scheme was created by the central 
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government in part to prevent local governments from exploiting their informational 
advantage by exaggerating estimates of the forgone incomes of converted land.  
However, these arrangements turned out to be ineffective in curbing local governments’ 
strategic response of inflating their subsidies, especially in the early stage of the SLCP 
when supervision mechanisms were not fully established. At this stage, in order to recoup 
the administrative costs, local forestry agencies had often employed two strategies: (1) 
include already forested land into the reforestation plan, or (2) file an ambitious 
reforestation plan, implementing only part of it, and later reporting low survival rates for 
the whole plan. Since low survival rates had generally not resulted in significant 
withdrawal of subsidies from the center, local forestry agencies could retain the 
compensation payments for the part of the land that was actually not reforested, and use 
the savings to cover local administrative costs. Although these illegitimate practices were 
never mentioned by local forestry officials during my interviews, they had been revealed 
in several other empirical studies as one of the major implementation deficits in the early 
stage of the SLCP (Xu et al., 2004; Gao and Guo, 2012). A direct result of this deficit 
was the excessive expansion of the SLCP since the beginning of SLCP in 1999 (Xu et al., 
2004). The three pilot provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu overshot their quotas by 
more than 100 % within 3-4 months. This continued through 2000, when 312 counties 
initiated land conversions on their own initiative, despite the fact that the central 
government’s plan was to implement the pilot program in only 174 counties. Since then, 
the SFA had continued to receive numerous requests from local governments asking for 
higher land conversion quotas. The excessive expansion driven by local governments 
ceased in 2003, when the central government reduced reforestation quota allocation. As 
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shown in Figure 3-3, the area of croplands converted to forests under the SLCP decreased 
from 3.77 million ha in 2003 to 3.33 million ha in 2004, with an even sharper decrease in 
the area of reforested barren lands from 3.36 million ha in 2003 to 0.67 million ha in 
2004
32
.   
 
Note: Data cited from Gao and Guo (2012) 
Figure 3-3. The Areas of Reforested Croplands and Barren Lands under the SLCP 
Since 2004, the strategy of retaining central subsidies for local use gradually 
became not as “attractive” and “profitable” as before. On the one hand, this strategy had 
aroused serious concerns from both the central government and individual farmers, which 
posed great pressures on local governments as the middle party. From the center’s view, 
low survival rates of trees with fixed or even increased budgetary spending meant 
significant wastes of financial resources, which was not acceptable. From the farmers’ 
perspective, successive shortages of subsidy delivery, whether due to legitimate excuses 
                                                             
32 This change should be mainly attributed to a policy retrenchment, not a decrease in the area of 
convertible lands. As to the year of 2007, there was still 1.06 million ha of sloping croplands, with a slope 
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(e.g. low survival rates of trees) or not, triggered public anger and even social 
movements.
33
 Additionally, acquiring central subsidies had become increasingly hard, 
especially after 2007. In the new round of the reforestation program (2007-2015), the 
center not only ceased assigning new reforestation quotas to local governments, it also 
decreased by half the value of subsidies for farmers who keep their land as reforestation 
plantings after the first compensation round. Thus, little room was left for local 
governments to manipulate the distribution of central subsidies at the local level.  
3.4.2 Proposing supporting programs associated with the SLCP 
The year 2007 was a milestone in the SLCP implementation. As mentioned above, 
2007 marked the inception of the second round compensation. In this year, in view of the 
threats to the sustainability of the SLCP’s ecological benefits, the State Council issued 
the Notice of Perfecting the Policy of Converting Farmlands to Forests, which 
represented essential policy revisions from the first round (1999-2006). While the new 
compensation regime reduced the unit compensation payments by half,
34
 it extended the 
compensation periods to 2021. In addition, in the second round, the central government 
                                                             
33 Cases of social petitions and movements caused by shortage of the SLCP compensation delivery had 
been repeatedly reported by influential media agencies since 2003. For an incomplete list, such cases have 
been revealed in the county of Yingshan in Sichuang, the county of Cheng, Min, and Qinzhou in Gansu, the 
county of Nanzhang, Jiangxia, and xishui in Hubei, the county of Feng, Hanzhong, Ziyang, Xunyi, and 
Fengxiang in Shaanxi, the county of Gushi and Shangcheng in Henan, the county of Wushan in Chongqing, 
the county of Xingcheng and Kazuo in Liaoning, the county of Li and Xinning in Hunan, the county of 
Suiyang in Guizhou, the county of Huaining in Anhui, the county of Yongfu in Guangxi, and Suiling Farm 
in Heilongjiang.  
34 From 1999 to 2003, central subsidies included three parts: one time provision of free seedlings, an annual 
cash subsidy of RMB300/ha, an annual in-kind grain subsidy of 1,500 kg/ha in the Yellow River Basin and 
2,250kg/ha in the Yangtze River Basin. Since 2004, the grain subsidy was transferred to cash subsidy at a 
fixed exchange rate of RMB1.4/kg grain. Thus, for each hectare of cropland converted to forests, farmers 
could receive RMB 300 as livelihood subsidy, as well as RMB2,100 or RMB 3,150 as compensation for 
loss of grain production depending on their residency location. From 2007, the compensation for grain loss 
has been reduced by half, but the livelihood subsidy remains the same. Thus, for each hectare of reforested 
land, farmers could totally receive a cash subsidy of RMB1,350 in the Yellow River Basin and RMB1,875 
in the Yangtze River Basin (Li, 2009).     
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formally arranged funds to support local governments in developing reforestation 
auxiliary programs
35
 that were listed but not financed in the first round. For example, to 
support the construction of basic farmlands, the central government paid a subsidy of 
RMB9,000/ha in southwest areas and RMB6,000/ha in northwest areas. Taking all these 
funding supports together, the central government’s investment budget for the second 
round actually doubled compared to that in the first round
36
.  
These supporting funds could in part help alleviate local governments’ financial 
pressures in implementing the SLCP, at least for the provision of post-reforestation 
supports. Not surprisingly, such policy revisions received active responses from local 
officials. In all the four visited provinces, local forestry officials had reported either 
application or reception of one or more forms of the supporting funding, as listed in Table 
3-2. In contrast to their general tendency to conceal local records of the SLCP 
implementation from the interviewer, local forestry officials readily shared their 
proposals for funding applications. Unsolicited remarks from the forestry officials 
suggested that they tended to equalize successful applications of these supporting funding 
with improvements in their executive performance, and would even consider the success 
in obtaining supporting funding as a significant accomplishment in their efforts in the 
SLCP implementation. Given the assumed connection between reception of supporting 
funding and effective use of it, the policy revision in the second  round could help resolve 
most post-reforestation problems and promote the sustainability of the ecological benefits 
generated under the SLCP. 
                                                             
35 These programs include basic farmland construction, rural energy development, eco-migration, and 
complementary planting in reforestation sites.  
36 Central government investment in the first round of the SLCP accounted to RMB 157.73 billion 




Table 3-2. Proposed Reforestation Supporting Programs in Sampled Provinces 







Heilongjiang Longjiang Basic farmland construction 2009 2010 -- 
 
Jiguan Basic farmland construction 2009 -- -- 
Ningxia Jingyuan Complementary planting 2008 2009 2.5 
  
Eco-migration 2008 2011 28.5 
 
Longde Rural energy development 2010 -- 2.8 
  
Eco-migration 2008 2011 19.5 
 
Zhongwei Basic farmland construction 2008 2010 29.0 
Chongqing Beibei Basic farmland construction 2011 -- 1.9 
 
Zhong Basic farmland construction 2010 2011 1.0 
  
Eco-migration 2006 2008 47.5 
 
Yubei Basic farmland construction 2010 -- 1.3 
  
Eco-migration 2006 2008 4.2 
Yunnan Maguan Rural energy development 2008 2008 3.6 
 
Yanshan Basic farmland construction 2010 -- 2.5 
 
Jianshui Basic farmland construction 2010 -- 2.0 
  Qiubei Basic farmland construction 2009 2009 2.5 
Note: -- in the column of starting year means the program had not been started yet; -- in the 
column of investment means data not available.  
However, the effectiveness of these new funds may be compromised with two 
limitations. First, as stipulated in the Notice, the supporting funds were being made 
available with serious bias to assist the SLCP implementation in the Western parts of 
China, with the SLCP participating provinces in the Eastern part, and some in the Middle 
part,
37
 largely excluded. Thus, as reflected in Table 3-2, reforestation supporting 
programs were not as developed in Heilongjiang as in the other three western provinces. 
Political reasons for such bias had not been explicitly spelled out, either in the framework 
of the reforestation policy or generally considering other rural development and western 
development policies. However, it at least seems that the bias in the policy design was 
                                                             
37 According to economic development levels, China divides its territory into three zones: the eastern coast 
zone (most developed), the middle zone (less developed), and the western zone (least developed). The 
middle zone is comprised of 9 provinces and regions, including Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. The western zone includes the 9 provinces of Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. 
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not based on the consideration that these supporting services were not as necessary in the 
Eastern part as that in the Western region. In contrast, some provinces in the middle and 
eastern part were equally in need of these supports. For example, a forestry official in 
Heilongjiang mentioned that dry stalks of corn, sorghum, and rice had comprised the 
traditional energy sources in his county and accounted for over 70% of local energy 
consumption. After reforestation, most participating households had to switch their major 
energy source and purchase coal or collect tree debris for cooking and heating. The 
official had never heard of any central government sponsored plan of developing 
renewable energy in his region, but thought that such a plan would be a significant 
benefit to the province. Thus, although the newly established reforestation supporting 
funds showed significant benefits in western provinces and participating middle 
provinces, participating SLCP provinces in the middle and eastern parts may be still 
trapped with the plight of administrative funding shortage (Li, 2009).   
Second, the supporting funds were created in part to resolve farmers’ post-
reforestation concern; but such policy revisions had not been effectively communicated 
to farmers. None of the 18 interviewed farmers ever heard of any governments’ efforts in 
securing grain supply by constructing basic farmlands, developing renewable energy in 
rural areas, or migrating residents in areas with poor living conditions, even when these 
efforts were already under way. For example, two sampled counties in Ningxia had been 
enrolled in the eco-migration program since 2008. Based on the eco-migration policy, 
local governments had even suspended issuance of forest property certificates for trees 
planted under the SLCP, in order to avoid future disputes over land property rights. 
However, local farmers had no knowledge of the migration plan, nor why they did not 
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receive forest property certificates as stipulated in the regulation. Another case in point, 
in the county of Zhong in Chongqing, local governments had proposed construction of 
213 ha of basic farmlands to offset the SLCP’s negative effects on grain production, and 
this proposal had been successfully approved by the municipal government of Chongqing. 
However, the participating farmers were generally unaware of this SLCP supporting 
program. Given that the center’s aim is to build farmers’ confidence in the reforestation 
policy through the supporting programs and increase the sustainability of the SLCP, more 
efforts from local governments are needed to advertise these endeavors to individual 
farmers.  
3.4.3 Developing off-farm industries 
While the supporting funds help alleviate local governments’ administrative 
budget pressures by legitimizing their use of central funding, those funds represent a 
constant financial burden on the center, which is intended to be shared between the 
central and local governments in the SLCP project or any other large-scale public 
projects in China. In fact, developing self-sustaining off-farm industries based on the 
newly planted forests has been mutually agreed by the central and local governments as 
the best strategy of sustaining post-reforestation income for local players, i.e. local 
governments and participating households. Similar to their positive remarks regarding the 
development of reforestation supporting programs, local officials also cited developing 




In fact, such efforts were observed in almost every visited county, either as 
proposed or already realized. For example, in the northern province of Heilongjiang, a 
forestry official noted that his province had introduced pine grafting technology to 
farmers in 2009 and encouraged them to plant Korean pine (pinus koraiensis) since then. 
According to the official’s calculation, grafted Korean pine would become mature in 
2021, and at that time, sale of pine cones would generate an income of RMB105,000/ha, 
much higher than income from traditional corn-planting. During the 12 years of growth, 
operation of Korean pine plantation would still be profitable with the sale of thinned-out 
tree seedlings and under-growth medicinal plants. In contrast to the long-lived species in 
northern provinces, southern provinces were more likely to use fast-growing species in 
promoting economic plantations, such as Chinese pepper trees (zanthoxlum bungeanum), 
tea trees, and bamboo (dendrocalamus latiflorus). These economic species could generate 
income in a relatively short time. For example, in the county of Beibei in Chongqing, 
farmers had already increased their annual income by RMB 1,302 per capita by planting 
Chinese pepper trees in the reforested land. Increased local income contributed to an 
increase in local tax revenues, which in turn could be used by local governments to 
supplement their administrative costs in the SLCP implementation.  
While replacing crops with economic tree species has been generally recognized 
by the central and local governments as a way to sustain local economic development 
during the post-reforestation periods, field observation in the four reforestation provinces 
also suggested two major problems in regard to the development of these reforestation-
based industries. First, over-emphasis on economic values in species selection may 
compromise the ecological effectiveness of the newly planted forests. Most successful 
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cases of developing off-farm industries in reforestation counties were supported by 
overwhelming planting monocultures of species with significant economic values, such 
as pines, locust trees, and walnut trees in the northern part and bamboo, pepper trees, and 
tea trees in the southern part. In the sampled counties in Heilongjiang and Chongqing, 
over 80% of reforested lands were planted with these economic species. Interestingly, 
these trees are defined as ecological forests and implicitly encouraged by the SLCP,
38
 
Thus, planting economic species on the reforested lands would be the best strategy for 
local governments to simultaneously increase local income and fulfill the central 
government’s requirements on reforestation. However, not every economic species 
planting program could satisfy both of the two goals. When not possible, ecological 
benefits tended to first be sacrificed. The rapidly expanding rubber plantations in Yunnan 
provided are such an example. As stipulated by the SFA, planting rubber also counted as 
reforestation. However, converting diversified farming systems to monoculture of rubber 
caused serious concerns about the loss of biodiversity, carbon emission, and even 
hydrological conservation, which was targeted by the SLCP. Since water use of rubber 
overweighed that of the original displaced vegetation, the conversion resulted in net 
water loss (Ziegler, et al., 2009).     
A second concern relates to fairness of income distribution. Developing off-farm 
industries means radical transformations of rural economy from agriculture to forestry, 
and requires substantial inputs of financial resources and experiences, which is out of the 
                                                             
38 As stipulated in the SLCP Regulation, no less than 80% of the reforested area should be planted with 
ecological forests. And the SFA further explained the regulation by defining ecological forests as those 
planted with the aim of reducing soil and water erosion and alleviating the hazards of sand storms, 
including water conservation forests, shelterbelt forests, bamboo forests, and even dry fruit forests with 
certain planting densities. For an incomplete list of ecological and economic species defined under the 
SLCP, see the SFA’s Notices of determination criterion for ecological and economic forests under the 
SLCP (2001, SFA). 
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capacity of most individual rural households. Thus, local governments usually involved 
experienced farmers or companies with necessary specialties as project leaders in this 
process. Their leadership may take two forms: (1) leading collective decision-making 
among the SLCP participating households, and (2) renting reforestation lands from 
individual farmers and making independent decisions as to land use. The bamboo 
industry development in Chongqing served as a good example for the first form of 
leadership. While individual households still kept their use rights over the reforested land 
and remained as the primary beneficiaries of the reforestation compensation, their 
bamboo production was largely guided by the purchase policies of Yongfeng Corporation, 
the dominating buyer of local bamboo products. These policies covered the type, quality, 
and price of bamboo materials. As predicted by economic theories, the monopsony
39
 
power may redistribute wealth away from product sellers to the buyer since the single 
buyer can manipulate the market by forcing down the price and cut down the demand as 
compared to the competitive equilibrium status. Issues regarding market manipulation did 
not represent large concerns of either local governments or farmers at the time of my visit, 
as bamboo planting not only generated an acceptable amount of sales revenue but also 
qualified for significant reforestation compensation. However, they may result in future 
threats to farmers’ welfare when the SLCP compensation ceases and when the plantation 
becomes mature and generates redundant supply that flood the local raw bamboo material 
market. Compared to the shared power in collective decision making in the first form of 
leadership, a single renter’s domination in the second form of leadership seems more 
likely to result in concerns over time. In the first form of leadership, farmers still retain 
                                                             
39 In economics, monopsony is a market form which is dominated by one buyer, as compared to the 
dominating seller in monopoly.  
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their entitlement to full compensation payment and only negotiate with the leader in 
regard to benefit distribution in the post-reforestation economy. In contrast, renters in the 
second form of leadership became direct (at least joint) beneficiaries of the central 
government’s compensation payments, and certainly other economic benefits from tree-
planting. They pay land rent to either individual rural households or village collectives as 
stipulated in contracts. This was the case of Hexing Forestry Company in Heilongjiang. 
As its executive official explained, the company rented two blocks of forest land from 
village collectives in 2003 and 2006, respectively. Since the land had been seriously 
degraded, it was also enrolled for reforestation under the SLCP. With planting of timber 
trees, Hexing Company received government compensation at the rate stipulated for the 
northern Yellow River Basin. It also earned significant revenue by selling tree seedlings. 
However, the official refused to reveal more detailed financial information, including its 
revenue from timber and timber seedling sales and the rate of land rent paid to village 
collectives. Given that the center’s compensation payments went through the land 
contractor and village collectives before it reached individual farmers, there is a 
reasonable chance that farmers’ benefits would be misappropriated during this process. 
3.5 Conclusions 
With the example of the SLCP, this study highlights how a large-scale 
environmental program may encounter implementation problems when the constraints 
that local executants face are not properly accounted for. In the SLCP, the central 
government excessively depends on political penalizing mechanisms in mobilizing local 
efforts in project implementation, and largely ignores the financial burdens imposed on 
local governments. Obviously, implementing the reforestation program requires extra 
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inputs of human and financial resources that are beyond local governments’ financial 
capacity. However, such extra resources are not committed by the central government. 
Instead, the center requires local governments to pay the SLCP administration fees out of 
their own budget.  
With serious political pressures and financial stress, local governments are 
incentivized to focus on achieving the minimum goals of reforestation with fewer 
concerns on qualitative issues such as ecological sustainability of the reforestation efforts. 
Thus, local governments tended to utilize the most parsimonious ways in implementing 
the SLCP. As observed in the four sampled province, local governments tend to refrain 
from the tedious work of land resource survey and reforestation design for pre-
reforestation planning. Instead, they either continuously recruit large blocks of land or 
completely left farmers free to decide which plots to be enrolled in the program. They 
also try to conserve their efforts in post-reforestation support provision. As revealed in 
interviews with forestry officials and farmers, very few county governments took on the 
supplementary tasks of reforestation, basic farmland construction, rural energy 
development, and eco-migration as necessary components of the SLCP, and failed to 
seriously invest efforts in them, except when these post-reforestation supports were 
targeted under other rural development programs. While the constrained measures help 
reduce local governments’ direct costs in project implementation, they induced civil 
conflicts and farmers’ complaints that required significant efforts to resolve. In addition, 
insufficient inputs of administrative efforts underlie the problems of inefficient 
reforestation land targeting, soft monitoring, enlarged unemployed rural labor force, and 
a high tendency among farmers to return to crop-planting, all of which challenge the 
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long-run sustainability of the ecological effectiveness of the SLCP. In other words, the 
goal of the SLCP in improvement of ecological services was displaced by local 
governments to simply extending tree planting. This is in parallel to Jahiel’s findings on 
the implementation of China’s water pollution discharge fee system (Jahiel, 1997). She 
pointed out that “the primary goal of the discharge fee system--to reduce water pollution-
-was essentially displaced by the means designed to achieve that goal--the collection of 
fees originally established to create negative incentives to pollute.”
40
 
As a way to mitigate their budgetary limitations, local governments also 
strategically explore other financial sources, either within or outside the framework of the 
SLCP. For example, they may retain part of the center’s compensation payment for local 
use, compete for extra funding through the supporting funds that are committed by the 
central government in the second round of the SLCP, and they strive to develop off-farm 
industries based on the reforested plantations. However, none of the solutions are perfect. 
While the first two practices impose a continuous financial burden on the center, the last 
one arouses great concern about ecological efficiency and economic fairness in the 
newly-developed forestry economies.  
As a whole, the SLCP highlights the shortcomings of a campaign strategy with 
short-term efforts to resolve environmental problems that need long-term attention and 
inputs. Due to the hasty policy design, local governments’ incentives were not carefully 
attended to by the SLCP. It seems that policy makers did not fully anticipate how their 
design would encounter various conflicts and dilemmas as illustrated in this study, when 
the SLCP was implemented nation-wide. Future revisions SLCP policy, or designs of 
                                                             
40 Intercept from email communication with Jahiel, July 2013.   
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other large-scale ecological projects in China, should consider two types of improvement 
in policy design. First, the central government should devote more time and energy in 
making pre-project assessment and allow more trial rounds of implementation. This is 
necessary to assure that potential deficiencies in motivation structures are fully revealed 
before the project is expanded to a larger scale. Secondly, the central government should 
arrange mechanisms that allow for sufficient local flexibility in project implementation. 
For example, instead of reforestation quota assignment through the political hierarcy, the 
central government may involve an auction mechanism in quota distribution. This would 
help align the monetary value of forest ecological services with participation costs and 
reduce the potential conflicts in quota assignment. It is hard to image a uniform set of 
rules could fit all situations, especially for a large county like China with such diversified 
local conditions.  
This paper contributes to the literature in the SLCP with new temporal and spatial 
scopes of study. While most previous research was based on empirical materials collected 
before 2005 (during the first round of the SLCP implementation), this paper uses 
interview data collected in 2011 that reveals new experiences of the SLCP 
implementation in its second round. While most previous case studies focused on the 
three pilot provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, and Sichuan, this paper considers the SLCP 
implementation in four other provinces with different ecological and social conditions. 
For example, the case of Heilongjiang illustrates how the SLCP was integrated into 
China’s traditional forest farm management, and the case of Ningxia highlights how the 
SLCP interacts with other rural development programs, such as eco-migration.  
138 
 
This paper is valuable in introducing how the reforestation policy evolves from an 
environmental campaign focusing on quick expansion in scale to a long-term project 
targeting sustainability in ecological service provision. However, with only one-period 
interview with limited number of local forestry officials, this study is at best an 
exploratory one. It introduces fragmented experiences of the SLCP implementation in 
several regions, but it lacks systematic evaluation of how to adapt the reforestation policy 
to local conditions. In addition, this study does not include the opinions of forestry 
officials at the central level on reforestation policy design and implementation, or their 
interpretation of the implementation deficiencies that are discussed above. These 
shortcomings need to be addressed in subsequent studies with broader interviews and 
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Farmers’ Intention to Participate: An Environmental Attitude-Behavior 
Analysis towards the SLCP 
4.1 Introduction 
Human impact has increasingly altered the world’s vegetation cover and many 
natural resource restoration programs have been initiated in response to global ecological 
degradation. However, in retrospect, many such programs (like China’s Three-North 
Shelter Forest Project and India’s control on agricultural expansion) have failed in 
sustaining their environmental achievements, as their implementers were forced to 
participate. They did not recognize the significance of these programs, or just perceived 
them as disturbance of their traditional agricultural livelihood. Consequently, much of the 
restored vegetation was reverted into farmland or rangeland at the end of the projects 
(Cao, 2008; Rao & Pant, 2001).  
Thus, it would be essential to understand project implementers’ attitudes towards 
the natural restoration programs and their willingness to participate. This study still 
focuses on the SLCP, and analyzes Chinese farmers’ attitudes towards the reforestation 
program, as well as their participation intention. Specifically, it respectively examines 
farmers’ intention to participate in the SLCP, their attitudes and knowledge of the 
program, their evaluation of reforestation effects, their perception of social expectations 
on reforestation, and the difficulties they encountered when implementing this program. 
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These all-together could provide a comprehensive view of farmers’ perception of the 
SLCP.    
As one of the largest ecological programs in China, the SLCP directly involves 
millions of rural households as core implementation agencies (Bennett, 2008). Its success 
depends on not only a set of delicately designed institutions, but also active participation 
from the farmers’ side. Thus, a greater understanding of farmers’ willingness to 
participate will go a long way in helping policy makers improve the implementation of 
the SLCP. It would not only help us identify the reasons of current implementation 
problems from farmers’ perspective, but also indicate possible solutions for future 
revisions of China’s reforestation policy. 
As prescribed by the SLCP plan, farmers are supposed to be both implementation 
agents and beneficiaries of the program. They can freely choose whether to participate or 
not, and if they do participate, they should be compensated with grain and cash that are 
on average more than their pre-program incomes. However, as indicated in Chapter 1, 
this reforestation policy has not been strictly carried out in the field and many farmers 
have been forced to participate, even when they suffered a loss of income (Uchida et al., 
2007, 2009). In other words, the observed farmers’ participation in the SLCP was not a 
reflection of their willingness to participate. Given the complexity of the program’s 
influence on farmers’ livelihoods, rural development scholars have done extensive 
objective evaluations of the SLCP’s livelihood impacts (Liu et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011). 
However, a critical gap is evident on the subjective aspect of the issue: (1) what are 
farmers’ attitudes towards the SLCP and their willingness to participate, and (2) how 
does farmers’ participation in the reforestation program alter their perception, attitudes, 
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and evaluation of reforestation per se, as well as environmental protection. This 
attitudinal study attempts to fill this gap by revealing farmers’ intentions to participate in 
the SLCP.   
Investigation into people’s attitudes towards the SLCP has been very limited. In 
2004, Cao and his team surveyed 1,305 rural and 2,608 urban residents from six 
provinces that were affected by the SLCP by simply asking them whether it was 
worthwhile to invest more than 300 billion RMB in the ecological conservation program 
(Cao et al., 2009a). The statement was supported by an overwhelming majority; 73.49% 
of rural respondents and 80.29% of urban respondents agreed with it. In a follow-up 
survey focusing on rural counties of Shaanxi Province, the study’s researchers further 
evaluated farmers’ perception of the program’s success, its impact on rural livelihoods, 
and its sustainability. While a significant majority of rural residents thought that the 
SLCP had successfully restored forest coverage (51.1%) and had provided adequate 
compensation (49.2%), their opinions about the impact of the SLCP on farmers’ 
livelihood impacts was mixed. A roughly equal number of farmers (42% and 40.7%) felt 
their livelihood had, and had not been adversely affected by the project (Cao et al., 
2009b). A rural household survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 
in 2003 may help us better understand farmers’ seemingly ambivalent opinions. The 
survey revealed that farmers felt a lack of volunteerism to participate and great 
uncertainty about the time and amount of compensation payments. Thus, although SLCP 
compensation was, on average, higher than local agricultural income, for some farmers, 
the compulsiveness meant they had to give up more profitable land use opportunities. As 
estimated by the survey results, at least one-fifth of the reforested land would be returned 
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to crop planting when the compensation periods ended, imposing great challenges on the 
sustainability of the ecological benefits generated under the program.  
While these attitudinal surveys provided a basic view of farmers’ perception, 
evaluation, and concern about the SLCP, their generalizability may be constrained for 
two reasons. First, all surveys were taken around the end of the pilot phase of the SLCP 
when its ecological and social effects were fully visible to farmers. Second, most survey 
questions were developed based on researchers’ working experiences and focused on 
specific issues in SLCP implementation. This approach did not comprehensively evaluate 
farmers’ general attitudes towards the SLCP or the reciprocal effect of SLCP 
participation on their attitudes towards reforestation, ecological conservation, and 
environmental protection. Thus, while the individual questions in existing studies 
illustrate farmers’ concerns over specific issues, they might not adequately reveal farmers’ 
willingness to participate in the SLCP.  
Thus, it is valuable to revisit the issue after ten years’ implementation of the 
reforestation project, with systematic environmental psychological analysis. This paper is 
based on Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned Action (TORA). It uses a 
survey dataset collected in the summer of 2011 in four SLCP participating provinces, 
Heilongjiang, Ningxia, Chongqing, and Yunnan. It analyzes farmers’ intention to 
participate in the SLCP by checking their general and specific environmental attitudes.  It 
also considers other supporting factors in behavior-attitude connection, including factual 
knowledge, efficacy, and social expectations. It further discusses the possible inverse 
correlation between attitude and behavior and examines how participation in the SLCP 
may affect farmers’ attitude towards reforestation. In order to identify the social groups 
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that are more supportive of the reforestation initiative, farmers’ environmental 
psychological constructs (including perception, attitudes, and evaluation of reforestation 
under the SLCP, as well as the general environmental attitudes) are related to their 
demographic characteristics, including age, gender, income, education, and region.   
The study shows that reforestation efforts under the SLCP are generally positively 
evaluated by study participants. Most of them understand the significance of reforestation 
in alleviating soil and water conservation. They also show willingness to be involved in 
the program. However, that general willingness to be involved in the SLCP is not 
supported when farming on sloping lands is examined. Most farmers claim that they have 
the right to farm on hillsides and that government compensation is necessary if it requires 
farmers to stop such planting. In addition, famers’ willingness to participate in the SLCP 
may be further compromised by the institutional barriers of shortage of compensation 
payments and policy uncertainty. These barriers have to be overcome before the 
government could galvanize broader willingness to participate in the new round of SLCP 
implementation. 
First, this paper reviews the literature on environmental attitude and behavior. 
Based on the review, it then sets the framework for examining farmers’ intention to 
participate in the SLCP. The attitudinal survey, conducted in summer 2011, is introduced 
in Section 4.3. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the survey results and their 
implications. Section 4.5 concludes the paper by drawing broad lessons for reforestation 





4.2 Environmental behaviors and attitudes 
4.2.1 Connection between environmental attitudes and behavior 
 If participation in the SLCP is conceptualized as a specific environmental 
behavior, the participation intention can be analyzed under the framework of 
environmental attitude-behavior. At the beginning when researchers defined attitude, they 
thought it to be in accordance with behaviors: How people think would determine how 
they behave. Attitudes have long been considered as a core factor in explaining and 
predicting behaviors. For example, Greiner et al. (2009) reported that farmers with high 
conservation motivation had demonstrably higher adoption rates of conservation 
practices than farmers within the same industry and region who held strong economic and 
social motivations.  
However, counter evidence concurrently exists dating back to as early as the 
1930s. With his classic psychological experiment, LaPiere (1934) challenged the 
connection between attitudes and behaviors. While driving through the U.S. with a 
Chinese couple and stopping at over 250 restaurants and hotels, the couple were refused 
service only once. However, when these owners were surveyed several months later on 
whether they would serve Chinese people, 92 percent of them said that they would not. 
Clearly, in this case, behavior showed less evidence of racial bias than expressed attitudes 
did. More empirical works confirm that relationships between attitude and behavior are 
ambiguous. Schultz, Oskamp, and Mainieri (1995) examined nine studies of the 
relationship between general environmental concerns and recycling behaviors. Five of 
them reported positive relationships and four reported insignificant ones. Scott and 
Willits (1994) revealed such a dilemma that Pennsylvanians who expressed support for 
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the New Environmental Paradigm
41
 were reluctant to participate in environmental 
protection activities. Selfa and Winter (2008) found that the practices of environmental 
purchases and production were not always consistently correlated with consumers and 
producers’ environmental attitudes. Similar findings about environmental attitude-
behavior inconsistency were also found in works of Maloney and Ward (1973), Smythe 
and Brook (1980), Dunlap and Van Liere (1983), and Heberlein and Black (1976).  
Several reasons have been proposed for such inconsistency. First, public concern 
may be influenced by government attention to environmental issues. People with strong 
pro-environmental attitudes may still count on the institutions to clean up the 
environment (Dunlap, 1991; Minton and Rose, 1997). Second, people may underestimate 
their ability to change environmental situations. Third, people lack the necessary 
information and leadership skills to facilitate the process of environmental restoration 
(Dunlap, 1991).  
The most cited work in explaining the puzzle of attitude-behavior inconsistency is 
the TORA, proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen in 1975 (Figure 4-1). TORA suggests that a 
person’s actual behavior is determined by his behavioral intention, which in turn depends 
on his attitude and subjective norms. Behavioral intention measures a person’s relative 
strength of intention to perform a behavior. Attitude consists of beliefs about the 
consequences of performing the behavior multiplied by people’s valuation of these 
consequences. Subjective norm is seen as a combination of perceived expectations from 
                                                             
41 The New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) was first introduced by Dunlap and Van Liere in 1978. It is the 
most widely used scale in evaluating people’s environmental attitudes (Dietz et al., 1998). It consists of 
twelve items reflecting three aspects of people’s environmental attitudes: “the existence of limits to growth 
for human societies, the balance of nature, and humanity’s right to rule over the rest of nature.” With the 
evolution of environmental problems, the NEP was accordingly revised into the New Ecological Paradigm, 
which extends the range of ecological worldviews (Dunlap et al., 2000). 
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relevant individuals or groups along with intentions to comply with these expectations. 
Therefore, a person’s voluntary behavior is predicted by his attitude toward that behavior 
and how he thinks other people would view them if they performed the behavior (Hughes 
et al., 2011). Further, attitude is a function of a person’s factual knowledge, and how he 
perceives subjective norms depends on his moral values.  
 
Figure 4-1. Theory of Reasoned Action 
A revised version of TORA, the theory of planned action (TOPA), was proposed 
by Ajzen and Fishbein in 1980 and 1991. Compared to TORA, TOPA adds people’s 
control as an important mediator in the relationship between intention and behavior. It 
demonstrates that human action is guided by three kinds of situation-specific beliefs: 
beliefs about the likely consequences of the behavior (behavioral beliefs), beliefs about 
the normative expectations of others (normative beliefs), and beliefs about the presence 
of factors that may support or hinder performance of the behavior (control beliefs) 
(Bamberg, 2003). This theory also considers other two mediating factors that influence 
the connection between attitude and behavior: effort and monetary incentive. Effort plays 
an important role in strengthening the connection between attitude and behavior, as 
attitude and behavior are more strongly related when more efforts are  required to 
implement the behavior,. In contrast, monetary incentive would reduce the significance of 
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the correlation between attitude and behavior, as people who are less concerned with the 
environment may also be attracted to pro-environmental behavior if monetary incentives 
are involved (Schultz and Oskamp, 1996). 
Based on TOPA, empirical studies about pro-environmental behavior expand their 
pool of explanatory variables. For example, Axelrod and Lehman (1993) grouped nine 
factors that might affect environmental behaviors into three categories: attitudes (general 





, and channel efficacy
44
), and outcome desires (tangible outcome 
desire, social outcome desire, and principled outcome desire). They found, in terms of 
environmental behavior determination, the influential factors varied significantly across 
different population groups. For students, principled outcome desires, social outcome 
desires, channel efficacy, self efficacy, issue importance, and threat perception were their 
major concerns. For community members, only the factors of issue importance, channel 
efficacy, and tangible outcome desires played significant roles. Other scholars also 
considered the factors of social pressure, injunctive norm, social representations (the 
modalities of knowledge conveyed by society and shared by a social group), and 
perceived capacity to act in influencing environmental behaviors (Hopper and Nielsen 
1991; Minton and Rose, 1997; Michel-Guillou and Moser, 2006). 
In addition to social norms and efficacy, the degree of specificity of the relevant 
environmental issues also influences the connection between the attitude and behavior 
towards them. Generally, general attitudes predict general behaviors and specific attitudes 
                                                             
42 Response efficacy considers whether the action per se is possible. 
43 Self-efficacy considers whether a person is capable of conducting the behavior. 
44 Channel efficacy considers whether there is enough infrastructure to realize the outcome.  
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predict specific behaviors (Schahn and Holzer, 1990). For example, Barnes et al. (2009) 
showed that negative attitudes toward water management in the Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
(NVZ) led to destructive environmental behaviors. This argument is supported by Stern-
Oskamp’s theory that links actual behavior through with contextual factors (contextual 
factorsgeneral worldviewspecific attitudes, beliefs, and cognitionsbehavior 
intentions actual behavior) (Stern & Oskamp, 1987). In this framework, general 
environmental concern influences situation-specific cognition, which in turn affects 
specific behaviors. However, as the distance between the logical elements increases, the 
connection between them decreases. Thus, general attitudes may have some influence 
over a specific environmental behavior, but it is hard to predict it (Schuman and Johnson, 
1976; Weigel, 1985; Dietz et al., 1998; Bamberg, 2003). In contrast, specific 
environmental attitudes are more meaningful in making specific predictions (Vukina et 
al., 2008).  
Review of the literature suggests four dimensions that should be considered for 
predicting farmers’ true intention to participate in the SLCP.  
 Their specific attitudes towards the SLCP, as well as their general attitudes 
towards soil and water conservation, ecological preservation, and 
environment protection (environmental attitudes). While many factors 
have been considered in explaining environmental behaviors, attitude is 
still the key factor. Farmers’ perception of the significance of the SLCP 
should influence their intention to participate. In addition, their general 
attitudes towards soil and water conservation, ecological preservation, and 
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environmental protection may also influence the specific behavior 
intention (Stern & Oskamp, 1987; Schahn & Holzer, 1990). 
 Perception and valuation of the reforestation consequences. As indicated 
by the TORA model, belief about the consequences of performing specific 
behaviors is an important component of attitudes. While positive valuation 
may promote a behavior, a negative one may hinder it. In the case of the 
SLCP, perception of the program’s positive ecological and socio-
economic impact may enhance farmers’ participation intention.    
 Necessity of reforestation (social expectation). As indicated by the TORA 
model, perceived expectations from relevant groups affect a person’s 
intention to undertake a behavior. In the case of the SLCP, if the target 
problem of soil and water conservation is generally perceived as an urgent 
issue and if reforestation is generally perceived as a necessary and 
effective approach to solve this problem, participating farmers’ may feel it 
is imperative to realize the goals prescribed by the program. 
 Difficulties in carrying out the reforestation activities (efficacy). As 
indicated by the TOPA model, before becoming involved in an action, a 
person would consider whether the action is possible, whether he or she is 
able to carry it out, and whether there is enough infrastructure in place to 
support realization of the action. Perceived insuperable difficulties would 
discourage farmers’ willingness to participate.  
While the causal relationship from attitude to behavior has been extensively 
discussed and investigated, some scholars have also proposed an inverse connection 
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between them. For example, Liska (1984) argued that the government can first alter 
behaviors through compulsive environmental policies, which then help alter perceptions 
of what is “right” or “wrong”. The theory behind this argument is that a person who 
sticks to a certain behavior for some time would soon foster a positive attitude towards 
that behavior. Thus, it would also be interesting to investigate whether participation in the 
SLCP would alter farmers’ attitudes towards the program, as well as their perceived 
difficulties and social expectations of this program.   
4.2.2 Connection between environmental attitudes and social determinants 
As an independent psychological construct, environmental attitudes per se also 
attract substantial research interest. Understanding attitudes, especially the component of 
behavior intention, is an important aspect in behavioral analysis. The study of 
environmental attitudes arose in the US in the 1960s and flourished in the 1970s, when 
declining environmental quality began to concern the general population (Heberlein, 
1981). Environmental attitudes can be generally defined as the collection of cognition, 
affect, and behavioral intentions about the environment (Kaiser et al., 1999).  
As indicated by studies from Western industrialized countries, at the individual 
level, people’s environmental attitudes are related to their demographic characteristics, 
including age, gender, education, and income. Young people are more likely to hold pro-
environmental attitudes (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980; Mohai & Twight, 1987; Torgler & 
Garcia-Valinas, 2007) because: (1) they are less integrated into the dominant social order, 
which views environmental protection as threatening the existing institutions (Malkis & 
Grasmick, 1977); (2) they have better access to environmental information (Shen & Saijo, 
2008); and (3) they cherish the long-term benefits of environmental protection more than 
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old people who may not live long enough to enjoy them (Whitehead & Blomquist, 1991; 
Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, 2000). 
Women are usually more concerned about the environment, because of their 
traditional female socialization experiences, cultural norms, and their roles as caregivers, 
nurturers, mothers, and child protectors (Merchant, 1990; Mohai, 1992; Scott & Willits, 
1994; Hunter et al., 2004; Karpiak & Baril, 2008). In contrast, studies have found that 
men are more likely to be material-oriented, and less concerned about environmental 
protection. However, the trend of single parenting and the modernization of family 
structures have changed the pattern of gender effects. Men may become more 
environmentally concerned as they take on more childcare responsibilities. Single 
mothers might be more influenced by the dominant social paradigm, pulling them away 
further from their traditional role of care-giver (Stets & Biga, 2003) 
Scholars also link better education with pro-environmental attitudes. In two 
articles published nearly 30 years apart, Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) and Torgler and 
Garcia-Valinas (2007) both show a positive correlation between the two factors. Other 
researchers also have found that more highly educated people usually possess greater 
ability to recognize negative environmental consequences (Dietz et al., 1998; Tjernstrom 
& Tietenberg, 2008), especially the harms that cannot be perceived by common sense 
(Stevens, 1984) and the problems whose causes and consequences are not easily 
connected (Dalton, 1984).  
The relationship between environmental attitudes and income has been widely 
discussed, but remains controversial (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980). Under the framework 
of “hierarchy of needs,” Maslow (1954) argued that people free of economic pressures 
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should have higher demands for a clean environment, which can be considered as luxury 
goods (Nevitte & Kanji, 1995; Franzen, 2003). Conversely, people facing the urgency of 
satisfying basic survival needs (such as housing, food, crime, and employment) may 
partially tolerate environmental degradation (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980). They may even 
embrace polluting firms because of the new employment opportunities brought to local 
communities (Gelober, 1992). However, other studies reject such arguments with the 
findings of negative (Tjernstrom & Tietenberg, 2008; Hirsh, 2010) and insignificant 
correlations between income and environmental attitudes (Antil, 1984; Samdahl & 
Robertson, 1989; Adeola, 1994). Torgler & Garcia-Valinas (2007) pointed out that 
environmental attitudes are actually determined by people’s wealth and financial 
satisfaction, both of which are related, but not necessarily determined, by income.  
Beyond these social structural factors, people’s environmental concerns are also 
substantially affected by the actual levels of environmental problems (Tremblay & 
Dunlap, 1977). For example, DeGroot (1967) noted significant “rank-order correlation 
between the frequency with which respondents perceived neighborhood air pollution as a 
problem, and the actual measured level of suspended particulars in that neighborhood.” 
Such correlations are especially significant when local, rather than distant, environmental 
problems are referred. In fact, the actual environmental exposures have been used to 
explain residential and racial differences in environmental attitudes by environmental 
justice scholars. It is found that urban and Black Americans are more likely to express 
serious concern about the environment mainly when environmental conditions in 
questions are in the cities (Tremblay & Dunlap, 1977; Mohai & Bryant, 1998; Robin & 
Mohai, 2005). The individual level connection corresponds to Inglehart’s (1995) 
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“objective problem” hypothesis found at the national level. In the analysis of the World 
Values Survey data from 43 countries, he showed that great support for environmental 
protection can be found in countries either with high per capita income or facing 
significant environmental problems. 
These works set up a framework for analyzing the socio-economic basis of 
environmental attitudes held by those with social backgrounds in Western countries. It 
would be necessary to re-examine the socio-economic impact on environmental attitudes 
within the social backgrounds of Asia and China, which have different cultural roots 
(White, 1967). From the limited literature, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Compared to environmental protection, economic growth is still a priority in some 
developing Asian countries and regions, such as South Korea, Thailand, and Hong Kong. 
However the trend is reversed in India and China. When asked which should be given 
priority, 52% Indian respondents favored environmental protection over economic 
growth, 64% of Chinese felt the same (World Value Survey, 2000
45
). The majority 
people in India and China expressed a willingness to pay more for products in order to 
improve environmental quality (Schultz, 2002, also see Table 4-1). Similar to their 
western peers, Asian scholars also try to link environmental attitudes with multiple social 
structural variables and explore attitudinal differences among various demographic 
categories. They reached similar conclusions as well, in terms of the positive correlation 
between income, education and pro-environmental attitudes (Daniere and Takahashi, 
                                                             
45 The world value survey is a large-scale global survey of people’s values, with a component of their 
values on environmental protection. The survey covered 15 developed countries in its first round of 1981-
1984, and was extended to 56 countries in the last (the fifth) round of 2005-2008, including both developed 
and developing ones. The surveys conducted in 2000 in China and in 2001 in India were part of the fourth 
round of the world value survey. Both of them took the multi-stage PPS (probability proportional to size) 
sampling technique. The samples covered both rural and urban communities in most part of each country, 
say, 24 provinces in China and 18 states of India.   
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1999; Aoyagi-Usui et al., 2003). However, they tend to explain the education effects 
differently. For example, instead of stressing the informative role of education, Thai 
scholars find that education, especially the modern westernized science and technology 
education that is not embedded in traditional Thai culture, plays a role in changing 
cultural values that might discourage environmental activism or participation in pro-
environmental actions. In Japan, humans and nature are not that clearly distinguished and 
the Japanese do not consider nature as a subject for scientific analysis. Thus, science 
classes in Japan help foster pro-environmental attitudes, mainly by strengthening the 
traditional philosophy of loving nature. In India, emotional connections contribute toward 
pro-environmental attitudes (Budruk et al., 2009). 
However, obvious Asian-Western differences are also observed in terms of the 
effects of age and gender on environmental attitudes. In Asian cultures, age is usually 
positively related to pro-environmental attitudes, since resource conservation is in 
compliance with most Asian traditions and old people are more likely to hold traditional 
values compared to the young (Fuji, 2006). In some Asian countries, like Japan and 
China, old people are relatively frugal and tend to recycle wastes and minimize resource 
consumption when possible. As to gender, no consistent conclusions have been made 
across Asian countries. While in Japan, women are more environmentally proactive than 
men, Daniere and Takahashi (1999) find no significant differences among genders in 
Thailand. They explain this phenomenon with the emphasis on collectivist- and family 
values in local cultures. 
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Table 4-1. Environmental Attitude Comparison between the US and Asian Countries 
United States Japan South Korea India China Thailand Hong Kong
Protecting environment 54.1% 53.2% 35.1% 52.5% 64.4% 46.1% 40.4%
Economy growth and creating jobs
45.9% 34.1% 52.5% 35.0% 29.5% 50.4% 59.6%
Agree 52.3% 66.4% 75.8% 68.0% 82.4% 86.5% 63.2%
Disagree 47.7% 33.6% 24.2% 32.0% 17.6% 13.5% 36.8%
Agree 49.8% 53.4% 49.3% 61.9% 73.7% 74.2% 57.2%
Disagree 50.2% 46.6% 50.6% 38.1% 26.3% 25.9% 42.7%
Agree 50.2% 46.6% 50.6% 38.1% 26.3% 25.9% 42.7%
Disagree 33.9% 42.4% 28.6% 36.5% 59.5% 34.0% 47.3%
Serious 62.6% 51.9% 43.7% 81.6% 41.9% 47.6%
Not serious 37.5% 48.1% 56.4% 18.5% 58.1% 52.5%
Serious 68.9% 51.0% 53.2% 70.6% 30.8% 45.1%
Not serious 31.1% 49.1% 46.8% 29.4% 69.3% 54.9%
Serious 58.7% 40.3% 51.9% 77.7% 45.0% 44.4%
Not serious
41.4% 59.6% 48.1% 22.3% 55.0% 55.6%
Serious 80.5% 98.2% 95.7% 83.5% 81.5% 77.6%
Not serious
19.6% - - 16.5% 18.4% 22.5%
Serious 83.2% 92.7% 94.3% 78.8% 82.8% 73.5%
Not serious
16.8% 7.4% 5.7% 21.1% 17.2% 26.5%
Serious 93.8% 97.1% 95.7% 82.7% 81.5% 75.8%
Not serious
6.1% - 4.3% 17.3% 18.5% 24.1%
Environmental problems in the 
world: Global warming or the 
greenhouse effect.
Environmental problems in the 
world: Loss of plant or animal 
species or biodiversity.
Environmental problems in the 
world: Pollution of rivers, lakes and 
oceans.
Environmental problems in your 
community: Poor sewage and 
sanitation.
Protecting environment vs. 
Economic growth
Would give part of my income for 
the environment
Increase in taxes if used to prevent 
environmental pollution
Government should reduce 
environmental pollution
Environmental problems in your 
community: Poor water quality.
Environmental problems in your 
community: Poor air quality.
 




In the past twenty years, China has witnessed a rise in environmentalism. The 
concern about the environment among the general public has been galvanized and has 
resulted in a sharp increase in environmentally-related petitions and movements (Zhang, 
2009). This new trend has caught the attention of some sociologists, spurring their 
research about Chinese people’s environmental attitudes. A survey conducted by China’s 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in 2005 revealed that 76% of 
urban Chinese felt environmental protection was an urgent issue. In interviews with 5,000 
urban residents in six major cities in China, Cao et al. (2007) found that 91% of the 
interviewees thought the environment had been badly degraded, and 84% of them 
perceived negative impacts of environmental degradation on their health. This 
corresponds to the Western trend of increasing environmental concern as a response to 
environmental degradation. In general, pro-environmental attitudes are also found among 
populations with high educational attainment, females, and young people (Wu, 1997; 
Chung & Poon, 2001; Shen & Saijo 2008; Tang et al., 2009). However, these patterns are 
not that robust in China. Negative connections between age and environmental concern 
were confirmed by several studies that argued that the pro-environmental tendency 
among young people could be attributed to their idealistic mindset and light social 
pressures (Hong, 2005; Chung and Poon, 2001; Cao et al., 2009b; Cao et al., 2007; Tang 
et al., 2009). However, other empirical results also demonstrated non-linear or positive 
relationship between age and pro-environmental attitudes. For example, Zhang and his 
colleagues (2001) found the most environmentally concerned group was the 20-29 age 
cohort, not the younger 15-19 cohort or other older cohorts. This 20-29 cohort was born 
around the beginning of China’s reform and openness policy and may be influenced by 
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the international environmentalism the Chinese were exposed to at that time. In a sample 
collected in Shanghai, Shen and Saijo (2008) found that age was positively related to 
individual environmental concern, implying that older generation were more concerned 
about the environment. There were two possible reasons for the disparity between Shen 
and Saijo’s finding and the traditional wisdom about the age effect. First, most old people 
in Shanghai experienced serious air pollutions during 1980s and early 1990s. The 
hazardous exposure made them more concerned about environmental problems. Second, 
Chinese parents traditionally care more about their children than themselves, which has 
been augmented further by the “one-child policy.” In order to maintain a better 
environment for the next generation, older people may be more opposed to environmental 
deterioration.  
Similarly, the traditional wisdom about gender effects on environmental attitude 
is confirmed by some Chinese studies, but challenged by others. Analysis of survey data 
collected from Henan supported the traditional gender effect that women, as care-givers, 
were more concerned about the environment (Tang et al., 2009). In contrast, studies in 
Guangdong and Shanghai found men more concerned about the environment and were 
inclined to pro-environmental behaviors, because of their higher levels of education, 
political activeness, and altruistic orientation rooted in specific Southern cultures
46
 (Wu, 
1997; Chung & Poon, 2001; Shen & Saijo, 2008).  
As to the educational effects, most Chinese studies support the informative role of 
education in promoting pro-environmental attitudes (Wu, 1997; Zhang, 2001; Hong, 
2005; Harris, 2006; Shen and Saijo, 2008; Cao et al, 2009b). Wu (2009) argued that 
                                                             
46 In South China, men are more actively involved in child education and community issues, compared to 
their northern counterparts. 
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environmental risks tended to concentrate in lower social class communities, partly 
because less educated people lacked the ability to perceive environmental risks. Others 
discuss the effects of social expectations on highly educated people’s environmental 
attitudes. Since the society generally expects higher-education recipients to take more 
responsibility in environmental protection, they may gradually internalize such 
expectations (Tang et al., 2009). However, counter evidence also exists. For example, 
Chan (1999) found people with little knowledge about the environment may still exhibit a 
strong emotional attachment to it. In Guangdong, the group most receptive to the NEP 
was people with only a primary education. The research did not attempt to explain these 
anomalous results (Chung & Poon, 2001). 
Chinese studies indicate an ambiguous effect of income on environmental 
attitudes. All possible relationships (positive, negative, and U-shaped) have been found 
among studies in different regions (Hong, 2005; Harris, 2006; Shen and Sajio, 2008; 
Chung & Poon, 2001; Cao et al., 2007; Cao et al., 2009b). Wu (1997) explains the 
negative relationship between income and environmental attitudes by saying that lower 
income groups are frugal. They were conservative in resource consumption and retained 
greater portion of wastes for sales. As to the non-linear relationship, Chung and Poon 
(2001) pointed out that in Guangdong, groups with income of RMB701-1000 per month 
(US$82.4–117.6) were most receptive to the NEP and the lowest income groups were the 
least receptive to the NEP. Such phenomenon could fit fairly well into the environmental 
Kuznets curve, which indicates that people are willing to trade off environmental 
protection for economic growth in the initial stage of development. But when their 
income exceeded a certain level, they become concerned about the environment.   
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4.3 The method 
4.3.1 Sampling and sample characteristics 
China is a diverse nation in terms of its culture and biophysical environment. In 
order to reflect such diversity, as well as its potential influence on environmental attitudes, 
data for this study were collected in four culturally- and biophysically-diverse provinces: 
Ningxia, Chongqing, Yunnan, and Heilongjiang. The survey was conducted from May to 
August 2011. 
Ningxia is located in the northwestern arid region and has been described as one 
of the world's most unsuitable areas for human habitation (UNDP, 2010). It suffers from 
serious shortage of water and risks of desertification. Through long-term living with 
extreme resource scarcity, residents in this area have learned how to steward their 
resources. The northeastern province of Heilongjiang is characterized by fluvial plains 
and rich stocks of natural resources (Zhang, 1987; Li & Xie, 2006). Its three major rivers 
of Heilong, Songhua, and Wusuli provide sufficient water supply, which is also 
supplemented with plenty of underground water and an annual precipitation is about 
400mm-650mm. People in Heilongjiang are characterized as generous in using and 
sharing resources. The mid-western province of Chongqing has hilly topography where it 
is difficult to raise crops (Xu, 2001), but its warm and humid climate is good for plant 
growth (Zhang, 1987). Chongqing residents place emphasis on individual control of land 
and resources. Yunnan is located on the south-east brink of the Tibet Plateau, which is 
characterized with low latitude and high altitude. Similar to Chongqing, Yunnan has a 
sub-tropical climate and abundant precipitation which are good for crop growth, but hilly 
topography that make crop-planting difficult (Chen, 2001). In addition, many ethnic 
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minorities inhabit Yunnan. Their environmental perceptions are influenced by religious 
beliefs and adherence to their traditional practices of collective ownership and resource 
governance (Guo, 2001).   
In addition to the biophysical characteristics, socio-economic characteristics may 
also affect people’s attitudes towards the environment. While three of the four sample 
provinces fall into the western zone, only Heilongjiang belongs to the relatively 
developed middle zone
47
. Thus, it is not surprising to see that Heilongjiang has the 
highest per capita rural income, which is followed by Chongqing, Ningxia, and Yunnan 
in sequence. However, as a municipality under direct control of the central government, 
Chongqing has the largest share of urban population, as well as the highest average 
income in urban communities. Unlike the population structure in the other three 
provinces, Ningxia has the smallest population which is dominated by the Hui ethnic.  









Per Capita Annual 
Income of Urban 
Households (￥) 
Per Capita Annual 
Income of Rural 
Households (￥) 
Chongqing 792558 2885 27472 18991 5277 
Heilongjiang 1036860 3833 27051 15096 6211 
Ningxia 168965 633 26693 17537 4675 
Yunnan 722418 4602 15698 17479 3952 
Note: The table reports 2010 economic data, which are cited from Chinese National Statistical Yearbook. 
The average exchange rate between US dollar and Chinese Yuan in 2010 was 1USD=6.77RMB. 
In addition to the differences in biophysical and socio-economic characteristics, 
there are general East-West and North-South differences in the social cultures of China. 
While the East-West difference has gradually vanished and is not so relevant in 
                                                             





 North-South differences remain significant in Chinese people’s 
common knowledge, although it has seldom been explicitly investigated as a scientific 
topic.
49
 In some descriptive articles, the cultural differences between northern and 
southern China are primarily attributed to their distinct climates. Separated by the Qin 
Mountain and Huai River,
50
 nature is harsh in the north and bountiful in the south. Thus, 
two of the four sample provinces were selected from the north and two from the south.   
In each province, three diverse counties were first selected with the consideration 
of maximizing the sample’s representativeness. In Ningxia and Chongqing, two sample 
counties were selected from the pool of counties with income per capita above provincial 
average, and one lower than provincial average. In Heilongjiang and Yunnan, one with 
above average provincial income per capita and two with lower than provincial average. 
In each county, one rural community was randomly selected. Twenty-four respondents 
were recruited in each community using a combination of snowball and stratified 
sampling techniques. Each respondent was requested to list five other potential 
respondents along with their contact information. Two of the listed subjects were 
contacted for further interview. In order to mitigate the potential bias brought by the 
snowball sampling technique (i.e. closely related interviewees tend to hold similar views), 
sampling in each community commenced with interviewing a senior resident, who has 
wide connections with local people and who was encouraged to list diverse candidates for 
                                                             
48 In the Dynasty of Han and Tang, two cultural groups were formed to the west and east of Tong Guan, a 
crucial geographical county next to the then capital Chang’an. Guanxi (west to Tong Guan) societies are 
dominated by hunting cultures, and in Guandong (east to Tong Guan) agriculture thrived. However, such 
East-West difference vanished since the late Tang Dynasty when the west-east communication was 
strengthened; such differences are now negligible (Hu, 2002). 
49
 In a most recent genetic study, it is confirmed a substantial genetic difference between northern and 
southern populations in China (Xue et al., 2008) 
50 Although the geographic division has been perceived as common sense among Chinese people, it was 
only recently lined out by Chen Quangong and his team in 2011 (Zhang et al., 2012). 
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further interview. Furthermore, I built four strata based on income and education: high 
income and high education group, high income and low education group, low income and 
high education group, and low income and low education group. The stratified sample 
can at least reflect the general variance of environmental attitudes on the two dimensions. 
I attempted to survey 288 participants and completed 216 surveys, yielding a compliance 
rate of 75 percent. The sampling technique used ensured representation on the 
dimensions of income, education, and cultural diversity.  
Table 4-3. Sample Distribution (n=216) 
Variable Category 
Number of Rural 
Respondents 
Percentage 
Gender Male 122 60.1% 
 
Female 81 39.9% 
Age (years) 
15-24 35 17.2% 
25-33 33 16.3% 
 
34-48 71 35.0% 
 
49-74 44 21.7% 
 
Unknown 20 9.9% 
Educational Less than High School 112 54.1% 
attainment High School 39 18.8% 
 
College 44 21.3% 
 
Unknown 12 5.8% 
Income 
(RMB) 
0-9,999 88 43.3% 
10,000-30,000 88 43.3% 
 
Above 30,000 27 13.3% 
Region Chongqing 54 26.2% 
 
Heilongjiang 46 22.3% 
 
Ningxia 62 30.1% 
  Yunnan 44 21.4% 
Participation Yes 131 60.6% 
In the SLCP No 70 32.4% 
 
Respondents’ demographic information was collected (Table 4-3). I was able to 
obtain the age of 203 of the respondents. The respondents’ birth year was used to 
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determine their ages. Educational attainment was obtained for 207 of the respondents. Its 
level was measured by the years of school attending. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their annual household income; this was used as an indicator of income level.
51
 I recorded 
the respondent’s gender. There were 122 males and 81 females in the sample.
52
 The 
respondent’s address was used to determine urban or rural residency. 
Since the sample size is somewhat small, for the following regression analysis, I 
further collapsed the demographic variables into binary variables. Specifically, education 
is coded 1 and 0 to indicate whether the respondents received a high school or greater 
education; income is coded 1 and 0 to indicate whether the respondent’s household 
income is over RMB10,000 or not; age is coded 1 and 0 to indicate whether the 
respondent was over 34 years old or not; region is coded 1 and 0 to indicate whether the 
respondent was from northern or southern China. These criterion values were selected 
carefully in order to reflect the characteristics of different social groups. Under China’s 
policy of 9-year compulsive education, average rural residents would finish middle 
school, and people with high school education are relatively distinct in rural China. Given 
an average rural household size of four people and the rural poverty line of RMB2,300,
53
 
a household income of RMB10,000 roughly reflects the distinction between poor and 
average households (China Rural Statistical Yearbook, 2008). As to age cohort, this study 
selects the boundary of the year of 1978, when the radical policy of Reform and Open Up 
was initiated. People born after this year are more likely to be influenced by international 
                                                             
51
 In China, income is usually shared within family members. Thus, household income may be a better 
indicator of income levels than individual income. Some interviewees are reluctant to reveal the exact 
income levels. In this case, they are instead encouraged to indicate an income range and the average of the 
upper and lower boundaries of the range is used to estimate these interviewees’ annual household incomes. 
52
 Gender information is missing on some questionnaire.  
53 This poverty line was proposed in 2011 during the CPC’s central conference of poverty alleviation and 
development (China’s Sustainable Development Report 2012, China Academy of Sciences, 2012)  
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ideology, differing from previous generations. The north-south difference in China has 
been generally recognized and discussed in the method section. 
However, it should be pointed out that arbitrary dichotomization of continuous 
variables may lead to biased estimation. For example, in this study, I divide respondents 
into two groups with either middle school education or an educational attainment higher 
than that. Yet, it may be the college education that played the key role in affecting 
people’s environmental attitudes. If this was the case, re-categorizing the educational 
groups with college education as the new criterion would be a more plausible way, and 
that would make education a significant factor in the cases when it is not with the current 
dichotomization method. However, the sample of college educated is small and it is not 
statistically feasible to run the simulations in this way. Such deficit in data processing 
should be addressed in future research with larger and more representative samples.  
4.3.2 The survey 
The survey contains two parts. The first part consists of multiple choice questions that 
evaluate farmers’ intention to participate in the SLCP. It starts with the question of 
whether the respondent’s household has participated in the SLCP. If yes, he or she was 
guided to answer all questions that are listed in Table 4-4. If not, the respondent was only 
requested to answer the questions with stars. As suggested by the discussion at the end of 
section 4.2, the questions were organized under six categories that respectively examine 
farmers’ intention to participate, their attitudes (affective evaluation) towards the SLCP, 
evaluation of reforestation consequences, perceived social expectation on reforestation, 
possible efficacy for carrying out the reforestation activities and their knowledge about 
reforestation and the SLCP project. 
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Table 4-4. Questions about Farmers’ Attitudes towards the SLCP 
Dimensions 
of Indicators 
Questions or Statements Potential Answers 
Behavior 
Intention 
How would you evaluate the statement: I am 
willing to participate under the current 
compensation framework* 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
 How would you evaluate the statement: I will 
continue to cultivate grassland or forest 
without compensation 





How would you evaluate the statement: 
Reforestation efforts in China are worthwhile* 




How would you evaluate the statement: The 
reforestation efforts in China are successful* 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
 How would you evaluate the statement: The 
productivity of my agricultural land has 
increased after reforestation* 




How would you evaluate the statement: 
Farmers in China should not farm on steep 
hillsides* 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
 How would you evaluate the statement: The 
government should compensate farmers if it 
orders them to stop cropping on hillsides* 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
 How would you evaluate the statement: I 
think the government should extend the 
compensation period* 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
Efficacy Do you receive these subsidy payments on 
time? 
(Yes, no) 
 Have you got the forest property certificate?  (Yes, no) 
 How would you evaluate the statement: 
Income earned from forestry is enough to 
meet my expense 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
 What are your most urgent concerns about 
after taking part in reforestation projects? 
(Instability of the policy, insignificant 
environmental quality improvement, decline 
in income, cannot retrieve the property rights 
of the forest, nothing to worry about) 
Factual 
Knowledge 
What is the best way of dealing with hillsides 
where no trees are present?* 
(Leave the land bare, plant grasses on it, 
plant trees on it, plant crops on it, raise 
animals on it, build homes on it, use soil and 
rocks to stabilize it, do nothing with it, others) 
  What do you think is the main goal of 
reforestation?* 
(Water and soil conservation, agriculture 
productivity improvement, livelihood 
improvement, poverty alleviation, others) 
 
The second part evaluates farmers’ general environmental attitudes with the seven 
questions copied from Section N of the 2005-2008 World Value Survey (WVS) (Table 4-
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5). This section of the WVS has been used to measure people’s values concerning 
environmental protection in 97 societies with various social backgrounds. China is part of 
the survey, with its sample from both urban and rural populations. Thus, this set of 
questions is an appropriate tool in evaluating general environmental attitude in rural 
China. The seven questions reflect three aspects of environmental attitude: general 
attitude towards environmental protection, concern about environmental problems in 
local communities, and concern about ecological conservation in the world.  
Table 4-5. Questions about Farmers’ General Environmental Attitudes 
Dimensions of 
Indicators 




Controls should be placed on industry to 
protect the environment from pollution 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
Protecting job is more important than 
protecting the environment 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
I would like to donate money to support an 
environmental cause 
(Strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree) 
Environmental 
problems in the 
community 
Air quality (Very serious, serious, neutral, unserious, 
very unserious) 
Drinking water pollution  (Very serious, serious, neutral, unserious, 
very unserious) 





Loss of natural places for fish and wild 
animals to live 




4.4.1 Intention to participate: a TORA analysis 
This section analyzes the six factors that may promote or deter farmers’ intention 
to participate in the SLCP, as listed in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5. Answers to each question 
are further analyzed with regard to respondents’ demographic characteristics, in order to 
identify the social groups that are more supportive for future development of the SLCP.  
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A. Behavior intention and attitude 
The study examined farmers’ behavioral intention by asking them whether they 
are willing to participate in the SLCP under the current compensation framework. The 
subgroup of the SLCP participants were further asked whether they would like to 
continue reforestation even without compensation. Farmers’ answers to the five-point 
Likert scale were collapsed into two categories: Agree (Strongly Agree and Agree), and 
Not Agree (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, and Neutral).      
Overall, a significant majority of farmers (75.2%,                 ) are 
willing to participate in the SLCP and most SLCP participants (68.1%,             
    ) say they will stay in the program even without compensation.54 In contrast, only 
11.5% farmers are reluctant to put efforts in the reforestation program, and about 15.5%  
Table 4-6. Farmers’ Intention to Participate in the SLCP 
  
I am willing to participate under 
the current compensation 
framework 
I will continue to cultivate 
grassland or forest without 
compensation 
Percent of Agree 
(%) 
75.2 68.1 
Predictor   Wald      Wald    
Gender -.434 1.027 .311 .200 .293 .588 
Education -.304 .424 .515 -.145 .130 .718 
Income .098 .052 .820 -.294 .618 .432 
Age .425 .818 .366 .079 .038 .846 
Region .173 .134 .714 .071 .031 .859 
Model Summary 
      -2 log likelihood 147.932 183.386 
Cox and Snell    .028 .010 
Nagelkerke    .043 .014 
Note: The first question was asked among all rural respondents, the second one only among 
SLCP participants.  
                                                             
54 Judgment of significance in this finding is based on Chi-squares tests that compare current distribution of 
agreement and disagreement with a half-half distribution between them. The value of Chi-square and p-
value are reported. The significance level of        is adopted. For the following analysis, comparisons 
between farmers’ responses are all tested with the Chi-square test. 
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SLCP participants express a tendency to quit after the compensation periods (data not 
shown in the table). The overwhelming willingness to participate in the reforestation 
program does not differ significantly across age, gender, income, or education groups, 
neither among different regions
55
.     
Farmers’ strong intention to participate in the SLCP is supported by their positive 
evaluation of reforestation. Overall, 169 (81.6%) of the farmers think reforestation efforts 
in China are worthwhile, whereas only 10 (4.8%) of them disagreed with this opinion. 
Table 4-7 indicates that, compared to women, men are more likely to hold a supportive 
stance in regard to the worthiness of the SLCP. While 86.7% of male respondents 
recognize the worth of China’s reforestation efforts, females feel the same way. As table 
4-7 shows, this difference is not significant. Educational attainment and income are also 
insignificant in the bivariate model.   
Table 4-7. Farmers’ Affective Evaluation towards Reforestation 
  Reforestation efforts in China are worthwhile 
Percent of Agree 
(%) 81.6 
Predictor   Wald    
Gender -.673 2.613 .106 
Education .470 1.055 .304 
Income -.347 .631 .427 
Age 1.294 8.279 .004** 
Region .970 4.707 .030* 
Model Summary 
   -2 log likelihood 158.133 
Cox and Snell    .094 
Nagelkerke    .150 
Note: **significant at the level of 0.01.*significant at the level of 0.05. 
 
                                                             
55 Significance in this finding is judged based on t-tests in the binary logistic regressions. The significance 
level of        is adopted. For the following analysis, significance of individual demographic variables 
is all tested with the t-test   
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However, another factor that significantly affects farmers’ attitudes towards 
reforestation is their age. Compared to the older ones, younger respondents were more 
likely to take neutral or negative attitudes towards the worthiness of reforestation. 
Although 73% of respondents under 33 years old agreed that reforestation efforts are 
worthwhile for China, 86.1% of older respondents felt this way. These differences are 
significant (               ).  
Region was also significant. The reforestation efforts under the SLCP are more 
likely to be positively valued in the northern regions of Heilongjiang and Ningxia than in 
southern regions of Chongqing and Yunnan. While the percentages of northern and 
southern respondents who reject the worthiness of reforestation are very low (4.8% and 
5.1% respectively), more northern respondents agree that reforestation efforts in China 
are worthwhile, but more southern respondents are neutral about it. These results are 
significant (               ) and can be interpreted in two ways: From the 
attitudinal perspective, one could argue that northerners are more proactive in 
environmental protection than the southerners and are therefore, more likely to recognize 
the value of reforestation. However, no systematic comparison of north-south differences 
in environmental attitudes in China has been conducted. An alternative explanation is that, 
given the harsh ecological conditions in the northern provinces of Ningxia and 
Heilongjiang, reforestation is indeed more valuable there than in the southern provinces 
of Chongqing and Yunnan. Heilongjiang has the major stocks of natural forests in China 
(Great Khingan and Lesser Khingan Mountains) that have been serious destroyed since 
the early 1980s. In recent years, the Chinese government has devoted great efforts in 
restoring the natural forest cover in Heilongjiang. As to Ningxia, reforestation is so 
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imperative for desertification control that it has drawn both national and international 
attention. In 2012, the World Bank invested over 100 million dollars in the Ningxia 
Desertification Control and Ecological Protection Project. This view that Northern 
provinces are in more need of reforestation can also be indirectly supported by the 
geographic distribution of China’s forest protection and reforestation efforts. Among the 
six major forestry eco-engineering programs in China, one focuses on timber production, 
one on wildlife and biodiversity protection, and one on natural forest restoration. The 
other three programs target desertification and soil erosion control, mainly through 
reforestation. Among the three reforestation programs, only the SLCP has a national 
scope. The other two, the Beijing and Tianjin Sandstorm Source Control program and the 
Three North Shelterbelt Construction program mainly focus on the northern part. This 
may be a more plausible explanation, although it needs further empirical support with 
ecological data showing the north-south difference in the necessity of reforestation, 
which is out of the scope of this study.  
B. Reforestation consequence evaluation 
Attitude consists of beliefs about the consequences of performing the behavior 
multiplied by people’s valuation of these consequences. In the case of the SLCP, farmers’ 
positive attitudes towards reforestation are in accordance with their positive evaluation of 
the program. Overall, 126 farmers (61.8%) agree that the program is successful. 
Moreover, similar to the demographic pattern of farmers’ attitudes towards reforestation, 
elder respondents are more likely to recognize the program as a success. While 69.4% of 
farmers over 34 years old agree with that, the percentage drops to 43.1% among the 
group younger than 33. This difference is significant (               ). As to the 
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regional effect, respondents from Heilongjiang and Ningxia are more likely to recognize 
the program as a success. The percentage of agree in these two provinces is 71.2%, which 
drops to 58.0% in the two southern provinces of Chongqing and Yunnan. This difference 
is also significant (               ). Further empirical research is necessary to 
judge whether the subjective difference in evaluating the success of the SLCP indeed 
reflect the factual difference in SLCP implementation, or is just caused by different 
evaluation criterion adopted by farmers in the sample provinces. In addition, educational 
attainment and gender are also significant indicators of SLCP evaluation. Compared to 
male farmers, female farmers are more likely to take a critical viewpoint and deny the 
success of the SLCP. This difference is significant (                ).   
Table 4-8. Farmers’ Evaluation of Reforestation Consequences under the SLCP 
  
Reforestation efforts under 
the SLCP are successful 
The productivity of my agricultural land 
has increased after reforestation 
Percent of Agree 
(%) 61.8 34.4 
Predictor   Wald      Wald    
Gender -.849 5.720 .017* -.735 3.813 .051 
Education -.722 3.637 .057 -.426 1.074 .300 
Income -.469 1.364 .243 -.294 .609 .435 
Age 1.270 10.915 .001** -.135 .104 .747 
Region 1.103 8.118 .004** .104 .067 .796 
Model Summary 
      -2 log likelihood 194.075 182.492 
Cox and Snell    .193 .048 
Nagelkerke    .261 .065 
Note: Both questions were asked among all rural respondents. **significant at the level of 0.01, 
*significant at the level of 0.05. 
  
However, it seems that farmers’ general positive evaluations of the reforestation 
efforts under the SLCP are not in accordance with their evaluation of the program’s 
efficiency in increasing agricultural land productivity. According to the right half of 
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Table 4-8, only 34.4% of farmers report a gain in land productivity because of the 
reforestation program. Farmers’ answers to this factual question did not vary significantly 
with respect to their age, gender, income, education, or the region they are in. Only 
gender was significant. Farmers’ non-positive evaluations of the SLCP’s role in 
increasing their land productivity may be caused by three reasons. First, a rural household 
may enroll all their agricultural land into the SLCP and cease agricultural production. In 
this case, they cannot evaluate the gain of land productivity and tend to keep neutral on 
this question. Second, their land productivity was relatively high and the marginal 
increase due to reforestation was not noticeable. Third, it may be too early to see any 
positive impact of the SLCP on land productivity improvement, given that tree-planting 
under the SLCP in the four provinces was less than ten years at the time of my field visit.  
To better understand the reforestation consequences, future surveys are needed to clarify 
how the SLCP influences agricultural land with various pre-program conditions.
56
 
However, no matter what the reason is, there is a noticeable divergence between farmers’ 
evaluation of the program’s general success and its success in directly benefiting farmers 
by increasing agricultural land productivity. Such divergence indicates that farmers may 
consider other factors when they evaluate the program as a whole, which are not included 
in this study. These factors may include the SLCP’s benefits of water conservation and 
increase in vegetative cover, its compensation payments, farmers’ new incomes from 
economic plantations, and so on. The possible reasons for farmers’ positive evaluation of 
the reforestation program deserve further investigation in future surveys.   
 
                                                             
56 Some preliminary results showed that the SLCP helped improve soil structure and reduce soil nutrient 
loss in Shaanxi and Guizhou Provinces (Liu et al., 2002; Liang et al., 2006). However, there had been no 
such evaluation conducted in my sample counties.  
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C. Social expectation 
In the TORA model, perceived expectations from relevant groups or the society 
as a whole influence a person’s attitude in directing his/her intention to carry out a 
behavior, as people have the intention to modify their behaviors to comply with these 
social norms. Thus, in the case of the SLCP, it is important to understand how farmers 
perceive the social expectation regarding reforestation of steep hillsides, which has been 
described as one of the major goals of the program. The study evaluated this perception 
by asking the opposite question: whether farmers should farm on steep hillsides. Table 4-
9 shows that farmers seemed to hold quite divergent opinions on this issue. Only 36.4% 
of respondents thought farmers should not farm on hillsides, 84 (40.8%) of them thought 
they should. Neither group is significantly larger than the other (                
     ). The distinct divergence exists in all sub-groups with different ages, genders, 
income and education levels, and from different regions. None of the indicators are 
significant for farmers should not farm on hillsides. 
Table 4-9. Farmers’ Perceived Social Expectation on the SLCP 
  
Farmers should not farm on 
steep hillsides 
The government should 
compensate farmers if it orders 
them to stop cropping hillsides 
Percent of Agree 
(%) 36.4 81.0 
Predictor   Wald      Wald    
Gender -.432 1.633 .201 -.063 .021 .884 
Education -.541 2.264 .132 -.148 .105 .746 
Income -.141 .150 .698 .433 .784 .376 
Age .438 1.452 .228 .307 .513 .474 
Region -.127 .136 .713 -.934 4.292 .038* 
Model Summary 
      -2 log likelihood 222.397 153.876 
Cox and Snell    .053 .034 
Nagelkerke    .072 .057 
Note: Both questions were asked among all rural respondents. *significant at the level of 0.05 
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In addition to the legitimacy of farming on steep hillsides, it is also crucial to 
examine farmers’ perceived necessity to receive the reforestation compensation, as the 
characteristic that distinguishes the SLCP from most other ecological programs in China 
is its payment institution. Most respondents, 81%, thought farmers should be 
compensated to stop growing crops on hillsides. Region was significant for government 
compensation (                ). This claim was more clearly expressed in the 
southern provinces of Chongqing and Yunnan. Given that most farmers thought 
compensation is a necessary condition of the reforestation policy, it is natural to infer that 
these farmers would stop reforestation on steep hillsides and return to crop cultivation 
when the compensation period ends. This is in accordance with other empirical findings 
(Uchida et al., 2007; 2009). None of the other indicators were significant for this question. 
D. Efficacy 
Many scholars recognize efficacy as a third factor in addition to attitude and 
subjective norm in predicting people’s behavior attention (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; de 
Vries et al., 1988; Conner and Armitage, 1998). Axelrod and Lehman (1993) further 
categorized efficacy into three groups: response efficacy (action is possible), self-efficacy 
(personal capability), and channel efficacy (enough infrastructures to realize the 
outcome). Since the dissertation work focuses on the institutional arrangements of the 
SLCP, it particularly examined the channel efficacy of reforestation, that is, what 
institutional supports or barriers farmers come across when they carry out the 
reforestation tasks. As shown in Table 4-10, my field survey revealed some financial 
difficulties SLCP participants faced: about one third of participating households
57
 do not 
                                                             
57 For each household, only one member was surveyed. Thus, the percentages shown in Table 4-10 can also 
be considered as percentages of rural households.  
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receive compensation on time and over half of them cannot support their daily living with 
only the forestry income. The lack of the institutional support of sufficient and timely 
financial compensation poses great challenges to the government’s vision of transferring 
an agricultural economy to a forestry economy in the reforested areas. In addition to the 
financial difficulties, farmers are also concerned about the security of their property 
rights over trees. When asked to list their top concerns after participating in the SLCP, 
almost half of the respondents raise the issues related to forestry policy: 15.3% directly 
relate to the issue of property right insecurity and 32.1% generally refer to forestry policy 
uncertainty. Moreover, in China, the most uncertain aspect of forestry policy is also about 
property rights arrangements. As mentioned in Chapter 1, China’s non-state forestry 
tenure had been unstable for over thirty years since 1955. Thus, it may be inferred that a 
considerable portion of farmers’ concern over policy uncertainty can be interpreted as 
Table 4-10. Farmers’ Difficulties in Implementing the Reforestation Policy 
  Number % 
Do you receive compensation payments on 
time? 
  
    Yes 62 66.7 
    No 31 33.3 
Have you got the forest property certificate? 
    Yes 72 77.4 
    No 21 22.6 
Forestry income is enough to meet my expense 
    Agree 21 17.9 
    Neutral  29 24.8 
    Disagree 67 57.3 
What is your most urgent concern after taking part in the SLCP? 
    Policy uncertainty 42 32.1 
    Income loss 35 26.7 
    No ecological improvement 29 22.1 
    Insecure property rights 20 15.3 




considered when farmers responded to the question, such as, the sustainability of the 
compensation payment, the rules about reforested land conservation, and the assignment 
of timber harvest quotas. 
While channel efficacy has been extensively discussed here, further exploration of 
farmers’ perception of the response efficacy and self-efficacy are necessary to better 
judge their true intention of participation in the SLCP. Unfortunately, they are not 
included in my survey. However, as suggested by previous studies, we may infer some 
difficulties in this genre.  For example, Trac, Harrell, Hinckley, and Henck (2007) have 
revealed that, in Baiwu Township in Sichuan Province, the tree species used for 
reforestation were not suitable for local ecological conditions, and most trees failed to 
grow. In other cases, mis-selection of species also aggravated water shortage, especially 
in already arid regions (Chen et al., 2007). As for self-efficacy, many scholars pointed out 
the problem of lack of technical support in reforestation (Xu et al., 2006). They argued 
that tree-planting needs a different set of skills compared to crop cultivation, and farmers 
may or may not have these skills. If not, they would need proper training from local 
forestry bureaus to execute the reforestation tasks properly. However, due to local budget 
constraints, this kind of technical training has been rarely provided.  
E. Factual knowledge 
As indicated by the TORA model, a person’s factual knowledge about a behavior 
may affect his (her) attitudes, and further the intention to take that behavior. Thus, this 
study examined farmers’ knowledge about the necessity and goals of reforestation under 
the SLCP. Overall, most farmers clearly understand that reforestation is necessary for 
conserving soil and water in hilly regions. As indicated in Figure 4-2, an overwhelming 
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majority (over 80%) recognized that planting trees and almost 50% thought planting 
grasses is the best way of dealing with steep barren hillsides and that reforestation is 
aimed at reducing water and soil erosion. However, more than 20% farmers insisted that 
crops should be planted even on steep hillsides. This result should not be ignored.    
 
Note: the sum of the percentage of responses to each question is over one hundred, since these are multiple 
response questions and respondents were allowed to pick more than one answer for these two questions.  
 
Figure 4-2. Farmers’ Knowledge about the SLCP 
 
F. General environmental attitudes  
The last factor that may affect farmers’ intention to participate in the SLCP is 
their general attitudes towards environmental protection and ecological conservation. 
While general environmental attitude is not a strong predictor of specific pro-
environmental behavior, it may influence the intention to take a specific behavior by 
influencing the situation-specific cognition (Stern & Oskamp, 1987; Schahn and Holzer, 
1990). In addition, general environmental attitude also reflects people’s intrinsic values 
What is the best way of dealing with hillsides where no trees are present? 
What do you think is the main goal of reforestation? 
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about environmental protection (Gagnon Thompson & Barton, 1994; Kennedy et al., 
2009). If a person holding the values that certain environmental consequences are 
negative, the belief that humans are able to reduce the threat, and the norms that humans 
should conduct pro-environmental behaviors, he (she) is more likely to behave 
environmentally (Snelgar, 2006). 
Overall, rural Chinese respondents are quite supportive of protecting the 
environment from pollution. As shown in Table 4-11, 176 of the 212 (83%) respondents 
agree to control industry development to curb pollution, whereas only 11 of them (5.2%) 
disagree with the statement. The difference is significant (                 
     ). In addition, the agreement was consistently high among all sub-demographic 
groups. However, there were significant age differences. Older people are more likely to 
support environmental protection against pollution. The percentages of people supporting 
pollution control are 76.0% and 89.1%, respectively, among the young and old groups, 
and the difference between then is significant (               )  
Similarly, approximately 71% of farmers think protecting one’s the environment 
is more important than protecting job and 75% of them say they would donate money to 
support an environmental cause. This conclusion is in accordance with the WVS result: 
70% of the 883 surveyed agricultural workers in China thought it was more important to 
protect the environment than sustain economic growth and create jobs, and 71% of 
agricultural workers expressed their willingness to donate part of their income to 
environmental protection.  
Gender is a significant factor in distinguishing farmers’ responses in regard to the 
tradeoff between job protection and the environment. Men tend to be more conservative 
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in making sacrifices to protect the environment, compared to women. While more than 
one third of male respondents rated job protection more important than the environment, 
less than one fifth of female respondents felt this way. More women tend to be neutral 
toward or in favor of environmental protection. This is significant (           
     ). Except for gender, other demographic factors seem insignificant in affecting 
farmers’ tendency to make sacrifices for environmental protection. As to donation for 
demographic indicators were significant on this issue.  
Table 4-11. Farmers’ General Attitudes towards Environmental Protection 
 
Controls should be placed to protect 
the environment from pollution 
Protecting job is more important 
than protecting the environment 
Percent of Agree 
(%) 83.0 28.8 
Predictor   Wald     Wald   
Gender -.027 .004 .951 -1.152 8.365 .004** 
Education .803 2.693 .101 -.296 .558 .455 
Income .422 .876 .349 .648 2.334 .127 
Age 1.236 6.968 .008** .706 2.944 .086 
Region .096 .044 .833 .057 .022 .883 
Model Summary 
      -2 log likelihood 149.553 188.648 
Cox and Snell    .063 .106 
Nagelkerke    .106 .152 
  
I would like to donate money to 
support an environmental cause 
   Percent of Agree 
(%) 74.8 
   Predictor   Wald    
   Gender -.218 .363 .547 
   Education -.357 .849 .357 
   Income .088 .050 .823 
   Age .342 .819 .365 
   Region .505 1.809 .179 
   Model Summary 
      -2 log likelihood 198.333 
   Cox and Snell    .028 
   Nagelkerke    .041    




A concept that closely relates to environmental attitude is environmental concern. While 
many researchers use the two concepts synonymously (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1981; 
Dunlap and Jones, 2003), others try to make a distinction between them. For example, 
Grosby, Gill, and Taylor (1986) define environmental concern as a strong, positive 
attitude toward preserving the environment, and Kennedy et al. (2009) even extend the 
definition by including concrete behaviors. While an over-broad definition seems 
unreasonable, as it blurs the boundary between the psychological activity of concern and 
the physical activity of action, the emphasis of concern on the negative environmental 
consequences should make it stronger than general environmental attitudes in predicting 
specific environmental behaviors. Thus, this study examined farmers’ concern about 
environmental problems in their communities, as well as ecological conservation. More 
specifically, the issues of air pollution, water pollution and garbage littering at the local 
community level, and loss of natural habitats at the global level are considered in the 
study. Overall, respondents show strong concern over environmental problems. As shown 
in Table 4-12, local air pollution and loss of natural habitats have drawn attention from 
the most respondents in my survey. Roughly 78% of the surveyed farmers think air 
pollution and 52% think water pollution serious environmental threats. Such concern did 
not vary across groups with different demographic characteristics. Similarly, almost 70% 
of respondents thinkthe problem of garbage and littering in their communities is 
serious.76% of respondents are concerned about loss of natural habitats.  This somehow 
contradicts the results from the WVS, which showed that most agricultural workers 
thought serious environmental problems occurred at the global level, but not in their 
communities. Possible explanations for such divergence are the spatial and temporal 
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variance of the two surveys. While the WVS covers all 31 provinces in China, my survey 
focuses on four SLCP participating provinces that are affected by soil and water erosion. 
In addition, they are also economically less developed than the national average level. 
Thus, environmental problems may be more discernible in these places. On the other 
hand, my survey was conducted four years later than the last round (also the cited round) 
of the WVS. China is experiencing a period with a sharp increase in environmental 
concern, as well as a continued increasing concern for rural environmental problems. The 
divergence between the WVS and my study may reflect a true shift in values concerning 
environmental protection during the four years. 
Table 4-12. Farmers’ Environmental Concern  
  Air pollution in local community Drinking water pollution 
Ratio of Serious (%) 77.9 52.9 
Predictor   Wald     Wald   
Gender .346 .752 .386 .512 2.392 .122 
Education -.076 .034 .853 -.044 .016 .900 
Income -.482 1.132 .287 -.429 1.366 .243 
Age -.056 .019 .890 -.451 1.669 .196 
Region -.123 .097 .756 -.871 6.606 .010* 
Model Summary 
      -2 log likelihood 178.852 226.5 
Cox and Snell    .017 .092 
Nagelkerke    .027 .122 
  Garbage littering in local community Loss of natural places 
Ratio of Serious (%) 69.7 75.6 
Predictor   Wald     Wald   
Gender .790 4.539 .033* -.747 3.880 .049** 
Education -.385 1.010 .315 .746 3.224 .073 
Income -.104 .073 .786 .080 .038 .845 
Age .072 .035 .852 .354 .813 .367 
Region 1.548 15.680 .000** -.398 1.068 .301 
Model Summary 
      -2 log likelihood 204.325 184.202 
Cox and Snell    .112 .048 
Nagelkerke    .155 .072 
Note: All questions were asked among all rural respondents.**significant at the level of 0.01; *significant at 





Gender is a significant indicator distinguishing farmers’ concern about littering in 
communities and loss of natural places as a global issue. While females are more likely to 
be concerned about the community environmental issue of garbage and littering (  
             ), male respondents are significantly more concerned about loss of 
natural places (                ). Region seems to be another important factor 
that affects farmers’ judgment on the seriousness of environmental problems. For two of 
the four issues mentioned in the survey, north-south residency is significant. While 
farmers from the two northern provinces of Heilongjiang and Ningxia are more likely to 
be concerned about littering in their communities, farmers in Chongqing and Yunnan are 
more likely to raise the issue of drinking water pollution. This may be interpreted in two 
ways: From the environmental psychological perspective, this divergence may just reflect 
north-south differences in perception of environmental hazards. Alternatively, this 
divergence of environmental concern in the northern and southern provinces may just 
reflect their “objective problems” (Inglehart, 1995). This view is supported by my field 
experiences in the four provinces. The sanitation conditions in the surveyed Heilongjiang 
and Ningxia counties were much worse than that in Chongqing and Yunnan. In the two 
Northern provinces, one can see large amounts of garbage littering the major streets, 
animal wastes were seen in rural yards, and food wastes were besides fast food stands. In 
Ningxia, there were also several exposed waste treatment facilities located near 
neighborhoods. The problem was significantly less in Chongqing and Yunnan. Since the 
geography of Chongqing is extremely hilly and its farmers were widely dispersed over 
the hillsides, there are fewer public areas in rural Chongqing and most of them were kept 
quite clean. The three surveyed Yunnan counties are located adjacent to Er Ocean (Er 
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Hai), the second largest freshwater lake in Yunnan, as well as a famous tourist attraction 
with ethnic customs. Under the guidance of the strategy of developing eco-tourism, local 
governments put serious efforts in sustaining a clean public environment. They phased 
out dry latrines and helped each rural household to install flush toilet. They built 
incineration waste treatment facilities, and promote the slogan, “Protecting Er Hai
58
, just 
as protecting our eyes.” Thus, except for the fact that more surveyed farmers from the 
Northern provinces rate the issue of littering as serious since they suffered more from that, 
southern respondents are more likely to concerned when the other three environmental 
problems were mentioned.  
4.4.2 An inverse correlation: the impact of participation in the SLCP on 
farmers’ knowledge, perception, and attitudes towards reforestation, as well 
as environmental protection 
As indicated in Chapter 1, while the SLCP is distinguished from China's other 
forestry policies with a stated principle of volunteerism, this principle is not actually 
respected in project implementation. For example, in my sample, there were 131 SLCP 
participants and 70 non-participants. Thirty-six of the participants (27.5%) indicated that 
they would not like to be involved in the program, whereas 53 of the non-participants 
(75.7%) showed willingness of participation in the SLCP. Thus, for these farmers, 
whether to participate in the SLCP is not based on their free choice, but by force. This 
institutional deficit makes it meaningless to link SLCP participation with farmers’ 
attitudinal factors and their socio-economic background to analyze how the pro-
environment behavior is socially determined. However, on the other side of the coin, it 
                                                             
58 The Er Hai is the second largest fresh water lake in the province of Yunnan. It is an important food 
source for local people who are famous for fishing, as well as a tourism income source.  
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excludes the bias of self-selection and provides a unique opportunity to investigate 
whether participation in the SLCP would affect farmers’ perception, attitudes, and 
evaluation towards reforestation, as well as their general environmental attitudes. There is 
considerable empirical evidence that behavior affects attitudes (Bem, 1972; Jones, 1991; 
Felson & Bohrnstedt, 1980; Zanna & Olson, 1982). Assuming that participating 
households were selected randomly, or based on some criteria (such as the location of 
their farm land) that are neither directly nor indirectly related to their environmental 
attitudes, the random selection provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the  
Table 4-13. Attitudinal Differences between SLCP Participants and Non-participants 
 Attitudes 
  Wald   
-2 log 
likelihood 
I am willing to participate under the current 
compensation framework 1.180 6.083 .014* 136.671 
Reforestation efforts in China are worthwhile 1.499 10.234 .001** 142.669 
The reforestation efforts in China are 
successful 1.512 13.090 .000** 170.25 
The productivity of my agricultural land has 
increased after reforestation .672 2.174 .140 177.11 
Farmers in China should not farm on steep 
hillsides .560 2.156 .142 215.412 
The government should compensate farmers 
if it orders them to stop cropping on hillsides .141 .090 .764 152.177 
Controls should be placed on industry to 
protect the environment from pollution -.186 .140 .709 141.594 
Protecting job is more important than 
protecting the environment .572 1.735 .188 179.996 
I would like to donate money to support an 
environmental cause .907 5.095 .024* 187.993 
Air pollution in your community -1.266 6.311 .012* 158.806 
Drinking water pollution -.710 3.436 .064 214.724 
Litter or garbage in your community .499 1.589 .208 196.154 
Loss of natural places for fish and wild 
animals to live -.398 .840 .359 177.185 
Note: All questions were asked among both SLCP participants and non-participants. This table summarizes 
the how participation in the SLCP affects farmers’ attitudes towards the reforestation program and general 
environmental protection, with the effects from gender, education, income, age, and residency region 




reciprocal effects from behavior to attitudes. The posterior difference in farmers’ attitudes 
towards reforestation, as well as environmental protection, between SLCP participants 
and non-participants can be explained by their reforestation experiences in the program.   
Table 4-13 reports such differences. As shown in the table, compared to non-
participants, the majority of SLCP participants confirmed that the reforestation efforts 
under the SLCP were worthwhile (88.5% of the respondents), thought that they are 
successful (73.3% of the respondents), and expressed their willingness to participate 
(72.5% of the respondents). In contrast, these percentages drop to 67.1%, 37.1%, and 
35.7%, respectively, among non-participants. With the t-tests in binary logistic 
regressions, it can be shown that these differences among the SLCP participants and non-
participants in regard to their evaluations of the reforestation program and their 
willingness to participate, are all significant (See Table 4-13). Such distinctions 
confirmed the hypothesis that participation in the reforestation program per se would 
alter farmers’ attitudes towards it, which is a new example of the reversal effect of 
behavior of attitudes. However, it seems that participation in the SLCP does not 
significantly alter farmers’ perception as to the legitimacy of farming on hillsides and the 
necessity of reforestation compensation. There were roughly equal percentage of 
participants and non-participants thought compensation was necessary to persuade 
farmers to retire from cropping on hillsides, say 80% among non-participants and 80.9%, 
respectively. In addition, participants were not less likely than non-participants to deny 
their rights of farming on steep hillsides. In fact, the percentage of participants who 
claimed that right (43.5%) was more than that among non-participants (25.7%), although 
this difference is not significant.  
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Similarly, farmers’ general environmental attitudes do not differ much between 
participants and nonparticipants. The majority of farmers in both participant and non-
participant groups agree that controls should be placed on industry to protect the 
environment, say 78.6% and 87.1% respectively. Similarly, 73.3% of participants and 
74.3% of non-participants say they would like to donate money for environmental 
protection. The two groups are equally less likely to support the idea that protecting jobs 
is more important than protecting the environment. Only 32.8% participants and 17.1% 
non-participants agreed with such a statement, and the difference between them is not 
significant. However, it seems that, compared to non-participants, the SLCP participants 
are more likely to donate for an environmental cause. The percentages of respondents 
who would like to donate money were 81.5% and 62.9% among participants and non-
participants, respectively. This difference is significant (               ).   
While the SLCP participants take more pro-environmental attitudes as reflected in 
their tendency to donate for environmental causes, the group are less likely to feel 
concern about air pollution in local communities. 74% of participants raise air pollution 
in their communities as serious issues, this percentage increased to 88.6% among non-
participants. Given that participants and non-participants live in the same communities, 
the difference in their perception of the seriousness of environmental pollution should not 
be caused by different environmental risks they are facing. Further research is necessary 
to investigate the reason of such difference.   
4.5 Discussion 
This study shows overall positive attitudes towards the SLCP among Chinese 
rural populations. The majority of the farmer respondents evaluate the reforestation 
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efforts under the SLCP as worthwhile and successful. They are also knowledgeable of the 
main goal reforestation and realize that planting trees is the best way to deal with 
hillsides. When asked whether they would participate or stay in the program, most 
farmers tend to respond with a positive answer, at least, without explicitly expressing any 
reluctance in terms of the SLCP participation. The trend of general support for the SLCP 
is in accordance with previous studies. With survey samples collected from Shaanxi, 
Ningxia, and Guizhou, various studies conclude that the majority of farmers are satisfied 
with their participation experiences in the SLCP, and are optimistic and supportive for the 
future development of the program (Li, et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2005; 
Hu et al., 2007). Yet, there emerges a great conflict as to whether farmers would stay in 
the reforestation program without compensation. While some studies confirm my 
conclusion that farmers would not quit the SLCP after compensation periods, or at least 
avoid explicitly expressing such a tendency, others studies come to the opposite 
conclusion that majority farmers would return to crop planting (Uchida et al., 2009; Li, et 
al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2007) 
The contradiction among studies interestingly matches farmers’ contradictory 
answers in my sample. While 68.1% of the respondents say they will continue 
reforestation without compensation, 81% of them think that compensation is necessary if 
the government requires farmers to reforest crop lands. It may be inferred from the 
contradiction that Chinese farmers are reluctant to directly show an anti-environmental or 
an anti-governmental attitude by explicitly saying they would quit the environmental 
initiative of reforestation. However, when confronted with a direct economic burden, 
their concerns about economic losses would surpass their reluctance and alter their 
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answers about the necessity of economic compensation on environmental efforts. This 
should not be particularly surprising. For decades, environmental psychologists such as 
Dunlap have noted the tendency for the general public, concerned about environmental 
degradation themselves, to count more on the government to bear the costs of 
environmental cleaning, rather than pay the costs themselves (Dunlap & Scarce, 1991; 
Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Yet, Chinese farmers, at least those in my sample, may not 
explicitly express their dependence on the government, when the costs are generalized 
overall environmental protection. A majority of the respondents in my sample (83%) 
support pollution control to protect the environment, 74.8% of them would like to donate 
for environmental causes, and 71% of them would trade off job protection for 
environmental protection. 
In addition to the concern over reforestation compensation, other institutional 
barriers may also hinder farmers’ willingness to participate in the SLCP. As revealed in 
my survey, compensation payment is still a significant problem in the SLCP 
implementation: over one third surveyed rural households do not receive compensation 
payments on time and only 17.9% of them earn sufficient incomes to meet their living 
expenses from reforestation compensation or other forestry operations. In addition, a 
great number of farmer respondents raise the issue of institutional risks in the SLCP: 32.1% 
of the respondents directly point to the SLCP policy uncertainty, while 15.3% of them 
worry about the security of their property rights over the newly planted trees. Compared 
to previous studies on the SLCP’s institutional arrangements, it seems that the problems 
of  shortage of compensation payments and policy uncertainty persist, even in the second 
round of implementation when the central government has devoted great efforts in 
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sustaining the ecological benefits generated under the SLCP (Xu et al., 2004; Chen et al., 
2009; Ye et al., 2003).  
Overall, farmers’ intentions to participate in the SLCP is simultaneously affected 
by the positive force of their attitudes towards the reforestation program and the negative 
forces of their perceived difficulties in implementing the reforestation policy and the 
social norms as to reforestation on steeply sloping lands. On the one hand, Chinese 
farmers tend to positively evaluate the worthiness and consequences of the SLCP and 
most of them also hold pro-environmental attitudes, which provide a strong basis for 
promoting participation the SLCP in rural China. However, the positive influence on 
willingness to participate in the SLCP is mitigated by the fact that a substantial number of  
farmers do not think avoiding farming on steep hillsides is necessary. Respondents 
indicated that most of them would do so if compensated by the government. In addition, 
respondents face great difficulties in maintaining the economic benefits, in terms of both 
forestry income and forest property rights, after participating in the SCLP. These 
impediments must be overcome before the government secures well-grounded and 
pervasive willingness among farmers for the SLCP participation.  
Some demographic characteristics affect farmers’ intention to participate in the 
SLCP. Gender and age are two influential factors identified in this study. Compared to 
females, male farmers are more likely to recognize the reforestation efforts under the 
SLCP as worthy and successful and more likely to be concerned about loss of natural 
places. However, they are more conservative in sacrificing job opportunities for 
environmental protection. This may be caused by a radical gender difference in their 
values and attitudes towards the environment and environmental protection, or just 
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because males are more actively engaged in the SLCP implementation and more 
knowledgeable about the program. As to age, old farmers are more likely than young 
farmers to positively rate the SLCP, support pollution control and environmental 
protection. These findings somehow contradict the western tradition that younger cohorts 
are more pro-environmental, but they seem in line with the Asian tradition that aged 
people are more inclined to conserve resources and hold environmental friendly attitudes. 
In addition, since the young and old groups are divided in this study with the temporal 
boundary of the 1978 Reform, this divergence in support of the SLCP, as well as 
environmental protection, among the two groups may also reflect a radical change in 
people’s values before and after the reform. It has been generally discussed that those 
grown up under the reform may hold strong materialist values, while those raised during 
the socialist years may value of community benefits (Ho, 2001). Finally, compared to 
southerners, farmers in the northern provinces of Heilongjiang and Ningxia are more 
likely to positively rate the SLCP.  
Despite the traditional focus on demographic variables in explaining 
environmental attitudes and behavior, this study also finds that some of farmers’ 
evaluation about the SLCP and their attitudes towards environmental protection are not 
influenced by their demographic backgrounds. For example, for farmers among all age, 
gender, income, educational, and regional groups, they equally showed strong willingness 
to participate in the SLCP and to continue reforestation if they were already involved in 
the program. They felt equally concerned about air pollution in their communities, and 
would like to donate money for environmental protection. However, most of them would 
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agree on the point that land productivity was not increased due to reforestation and that 
farmers should not farm on hillsides.  
In addition to these demographic variables, this study reveals that previous 
experience of participation in the SLCP is a more effective and direct factor that 
promotes farmers’ willingness to participate. Compared to non-participants, the SLCP 
participants are more likely to show a willingness to be involved in the reforestation 
program. In addition, they are more likely to positively evaluate the reforestation efforts. 
Furthermore, participants are more likely than non-participants to make economic 
sacrifices for environmental protection. This finding confirms Liska’s model of 
reciprocal effects between attitude and behavior. This model claims that long-term 
practice of certain behaviors may positively modify people’s attitudes towards the 
specific behavior (Liska, 1999).  
4.6 Conclusion 
With the TORA model, this study systematically examines Chinese farmers’ 
intention to participate in the reforestation program of SLCP, considering not only their 
expressed attitudes towards the program but also their perceived social expectations on 
reforestation and the difficulties in carrying out reforestation tasks. It was found that, 
although farmers tend to positively evaluate the SLCP and show willingness to 
participate, this willingness is not necessarily supported by the idea of retiring sloping 
lands from farming. Through years of the SLCP implementation, as well as propaganda 
of this policy in rural China, it seems that most Chinese farmers have clearly understood 
the fact that farming on sloping lands may cause soil and water erosion and that 
reforestation is necessary for conserving soil and water in hilly regions.  
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However, this alone does not get at farmers attitudes towards cropping on these 
slopes. It is challenging for farmers to give up the rights to farm on hilly terrain or 
succumb to social pressures to do so, especially in regions where most arable lands are on 
hillsides. Instead, an overwhelming majority of farmer respondents think compensation is 
necessary if the government requires them to give up the economic benefits of farming. 
Moreover, Chinese farmers encounter various institutional problems, such as delays in 
compensation payments, forestry policy uncertainties, and lack of off-farm professional 
training, that would hinder their willingness to participate in the SLCP. Despite forced 
participation in the program, respondents evaluate the program positively.  
Further, comparative studies among demographic groups demonstrate that male 
farmers and farmers born before 1978 are more likely to take a supportive stance towards 
reforestation efforts under the SLCP than their younger counterparts. That is male and 
older farmers are more likely to take pro-environmental attitudes in terms of pollution 
control and trading job protection for environmental protection. This is a positive sign for 
recruiting participation for the SLCP, as at this time, the production decision-makers in 
most rural households are adult males. However, it may pose future threats, as the post-
reform generation takes over the decision making and more male farmers migrate to work 
in cities. As social norms are hard to change within a relatively short time period, the 
central government should focus on removing institutional barriers and facilitating 
reforestation initiatives for farmers and younger people as the SLCP is revised.  
This study uses survey data covering four ecologically and culturally diverse 
provinces: Heilongjiang, Ningxia, Chongqing, and Yunnan. Thus, it should provide more 
representative results compared to most previous studies with data collected in a single 
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location. Although the sample size is limited by funding and time constraints, the 
findings are important. This study provides an important baseline that can guide future 
research in this area. For instance, my finding of significant north-south differences in 
terms of the worthiness of reforestation efforts warrants further investigation, with a 
larger and more diverse sample. More research should also be conducted on the 
demographic determinants of farmers’ intentions to participate in the SLCP, with a more 
demographically diverse sample.  
This study also points to the need to address the factors underlying farmers’ 
evaluations of the general success of the SLCP and its effectiveness in achieving specific 
goals, such as increasing the productivity of remaining crop land. More ecological data 
should be collected along with socio-economic surveys to compare the pre- and post-
reforestation ecological conditions. More subjective questions should be asked to identify 
the key factors farmers considered when they evaluate the success of the reforestation 
program. While the channel efficacy of the SLCP implementation has been extensively 
discussed in my institutional study, future studies should help examine the other two 
sides of efficacy: response efficacy and self-efficacy, by posing the questions of whether 
farmers believe reforestation is a possible alternative to agricultural production in certain 
regions and whether they are capable of implementing the reforestation tasks. The SLCP 
has been extended to 2021 and millions of farmers will be participating in the program as 
core implementation agents. Understanding their perception will be critical to the further 
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Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
5.1 Summary of key findings 
The Slope Land Conversion Program (SLCP) is often praised by governmental 
officials and scholars as one of the most important and successful ecological restoration 
programs in China, or even in the developing world (SFA, 2004 & 2006-2013; Liu et al., 
2008, Li, et al., 2011). According to official records, the program converts millions of 
hectares of cropland to forests, introduces the Payment for Environmental Service 
mechanism into China’s ecological programs, and helps reduce poverty and inequality in 
remote rural areas. However, as the first attempt of bring in market mechanism to 
ecological conservation in China, this program also suffers from some implementation 
failures that have been extensively documented (Xu et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2006; Trac et 
al., 2007; Weyerhaeuser et al., 2005). My research examines the underlying causes of the 
failures and assesses the problematic motivations of the key stakeholders in the SLCP.  
First of all, the central forestry agency is responsible for the uncertain and 
inconsistent forestry policy. Similar to many other environmental policies, forestry policy 
in China are often reactive responses to environmental crises or non-environmental 
events (Guo & Foster, 2008). Following the socialism campaign, China terminated the 
private property regime over forests and turned them into communities’ property in 1955. 
Influenced by the success of household responsibility system in the agricultural sector, 
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the forestry department copied that system to forestry in 1981, which caused large-scale 
clear cutting of trees in the following three years. Thus, the forestry governance agency 
had to return forest land to community property in 1985 (Liu, 2001). Inefficient forest 
management under the common property regime had been identified as a major cause of 
several environmental problems, such as sand storms in northern cities, floods and 
droughts in major water systems, and wildlife extinctions. In response to these problems, 
China launched six major forest conservation and reforestation programs, as listed in 
Table 5-1 (SFA, 2004). Among them, the SLCP was a direct result of the devastating 
flood in the upper and middle reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow River basins in 1998 
(Bennett, 2008). It was quickly expanded to most of the provinces in the country in the 
following three years. The review of China’s forest policy history indicates two serious 
problems: policy uncertainty and lack of careful assessment, which underlie most 
implementation failures of the SLCP.  











Key Shelterbelt Development Program 1978 9.5 N.A. 
Grain for Green Program 1999 29.0 40.00 
Natural Forest Protection Program 2000 98.0 5.60 
Beijing and Tianjin Sandstorm Source Control Program 2000 7.6 8.21 
Wildlife Conservation and Nature Reserve Development Program 2001 172.8 19.95 
Fast-Growing High-Yield Plantation Development Program 2002 1.8 0.10 
 
As summarized above, during 1955-2003, the tenure of non-state forests in China 
has oscillated between regimes of private and common property, with no property-rights 
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regime lasting more than twenty years, a period much shorter than the ecologically 
optimal rotation periods for most tree species. Forest governance was also intersected by 
the influential forestry projects with special purposes. The effects of forest tenure 
uncertainty on farmers’ rotation decisions and forest output were simulated with a 
dynamic optimization model in Chapter 2. It is shown that the uncertainty discourages 
farmers’ long term planning and stimulates strategic behaviors in forest management. The 
costs in forest output such actions incur have been proven to be significant. Although the 
central government could pay compensation for forest expropriation and make private 
land holdings profitable to farmers, such forestry operation still adversely affects society 
as a whole, as compensation payment would be higher than the saved forest value. By my 
reckoning, the losses in forest output resulting from this policy-induced uncertainty 
appear large. 
 Second, the hasty policy design of the SLCP leaves local governments’ 
incentives to implement the program properly largely ignored. Not surprisingly, as a land 
use change program that induces radical transformation of local production activities, 
implementation of the SLCP requires substantive inputs of human and financial resources 
that are beyond local governments’ financial capacity. However, the central government 
requires local governments to pay the SLCP administration fees out of their own budget. 
In response, local governments would minimize their efforts in the project 
implementation and adopt parsimonious measures, such as cursory planning and 
incomplete assessment of the project’s environmental impact. Consequently, many 
gently-sloping plots were enrolled in the program and many steep-sloping ones were not 
(poor targeting); tree growth aggravated ground water depletion in some arid regions 
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(negative ecological effect); and compensation payments were substantially higher than 
previous crop incomes for some households and lower for others (low funding efficiency) 
(Xu et al, 2004; Weyerhaeuser et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007). In addition, they may 
even interfere with policy implementation by retaining compensation funding in order to 
cover local administrative costs (Bennett, 2008).  
The third party in the SLCP, individual rural households, is not fully prepared as 
core agents for the national ecological restoration project, either. Chinese farmers seem to 
positively evaluate the reforestation efforts under the SLCP; they understand the 
necessity of planting trees on steep sloping lands to restore key ecological services, such 
as soil and water conservation; they also express a high inclination towards participating 
in the SLCP. In addition, rural Chinese show a positive tendency towards environmental 
protection, even when this comes at an economic cost. These all together provides a good 
basis for future SLCP implementation. However, farmers’ willingness to participate 
could be mitigated by the feeling of some that cropping should be allowed on steep 
slopes. An overwhelming majority of farmer respondents think compensation is 
necessary if the government requires them to give up the economic benefits of farming. 
Moreover, Chinese farmers encounter various institutional problems, such as delays in 
compensation payments, forestry policy uncertainties, and lack of off-farm professional 
training, that would hinder their willingness to participate in the SLCP. These barriers 
should be removed before the SLCP wins general support in rural communities.  
In sum, this study demonstrates how incentive deficits among the central 
government, local governments, and individual farmers may affect the implementation of 
the SLCP. In addition, these deficits are not separate; instead, they seem to interact each 
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other. For example, The center’s strategy of short-term planning leads to great policy 
uncertainty, which further compromise farmers’ confidence in the reforestation plan and 
the efforts they devoted to tree plantation and management. Similarly, the shortage in 
local administrative funding is a direct cause of local governments’ strategic behavior of 
retaining part of compensation payments that are supposed to be distributed to farmers, 
which is major concern of the SLCP participants.  
5.2 Policy recommendations 
The first round of the SLCP’s compensation ended in 2010. Considering the 
tendency among farmers to reconverting their land to cropping when compensation 
ceases, the central government promised to extend compensation payment for already 
enrolled land for another eight years, to 2017. However, a successful conservation 
program cannot be supported only by a large budget. The success of such programs also 
depends on institutions that could align the center and its local agents’ interests in 
promoting long-term ecological benefits. The following steps would go far towards 
helping correct the institutional failures in the SLCP. 
1. Take preventative, rather than reactive, measures in addressing environmental 
problems, before they become environmental crises. The preventative stands could allow 
time for detailed program planning and impact assessment.  
2. Considering the diverse ecological and socioeconomic conditions across China, 
rigid approaches should be avoided when making a national program plan. Instead, the 
plan should be adapted to local and regional conditions. In addition, program 
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implementation would involve mechanisms allowing great flexibility, such as market-
based voluntary participation and auction. 
3. A large scale land-use-change program, like the SLCP, should be accompanied 
by necessary supporting initiatives, for example, developing rural energy supply 
infrastructures in the regions where traditional energy supply dwindles due to the forest 
conservation policy. In addition, such support should be made available to programs all 
over the country, not just in the west.  
4. A careful environmental impact assessment report should be required before 
any further revision of the reforestation plan was put into effect. The assessment should 
use lessons already learned, for example, the failure of tree planting and the 
incompatibility between tree growth and crop growth. It should also contain ecological, 
economic, and social effects of reforestation activities under all possible scenarios. Such 
assessment may be realized through a national study, which focuses on both the SLCP 
participants and its administrators and implementers.  
5. The benefits and costs incurred to every party involved in the program should 
be carefully evaluated and attended to. Although local forestry bureaus are administrative 
branches of the state forestry and have the responsibility to carry out the center’s policy, 
they would not be willing to do that if implementation of a new policy significantly 
increases local administrative costs.   
6. Considering the benefits of long-term support for ecological conservation and 
environmental protection from the grassroots, China should promote formal and informal 
environmental education, especially for rural populations, since most ecological 
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programs occur in rural areas. If the government could not mobilize sufficient 
educational resources in the administrative system, environmental non-governmental 
organizations should be utilized as a major media for environmental education in remote 
areas.    
While most parts of analysis here are specific to the case of the SLCP, they have 
broader implications for other ecological projects in China, since the institutional and 
motivational deficiencies with each stakeholder described above are commonly shared in 
China’s environmental governance system. Projects that are responsive to environmental 
crises or external stressors are common in all environmental fields, including air pollution 
control, water pollution treatment, and even energy efficiency improvement. Most of 
these programs suffer from lack of convincing long-term plan, interagency conflicts, and 
environmentally inactive local agencies. Thus, the aforementioned policy 
recommendations could cast valuable insights when planning similar environmental 
projects 
5.3 Future work 
In my dissertation research, the ecological conditions of a forest have been treated 
as exogenous when I analyzed the social aspects of forest management. In the future 
work, I plan to extend the social-economic-political model by incorporating feedbacks 
from the natural forest system. Preliminary field work has revealed that forest 
management approach adopted in different communities varies with local ecological 
conditions. I am trying to disentangle such connection by exploring the potential 
reciprocal effects. Two factors under consideration are social capital and natural capital 
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in forest communities. I am curious about how one of them would affect, and be affected, 
by the other. To a further step, I will investigate other mediating and contextual factors 
shaping the dynamics of human-nature forest systems, such as climate change, 
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